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Abstract 
The recent intellectual movement away from universalism towards particularism can 
be witnessed in most divisions of social philosophical thought. Such a paradigmatic 
shift has radically transformed a number of theories including feminist ethics. In 
contrast, however, philosophical analyses of fairness in sport have retained 
allegiance to universalist accounts in that conceptions of fair play remain enshrined 
in formalist accounts of the nature of rules and laws that govern sporting games. In 
this thesis, it is argued that universalist accounts of fair play in sport are incomplete 
in so far as they fail to consider that what constitutes fairness in sport is more than 
just the interpretation of formal rule structures. The richer analysis of fair play in 
sport offered here highlights the importance of individual experiences and the 
structures that shape those experiences. The ethical investigation is compatible with 
certain feminist ethical commitments. In order to evaluate whether a given sporting 
ethos is ethical, the thesis is committed methodologically to a mixed model 
approach. The aim is to find out the beliefs, values and ideologies of the people 
involved. Hence, a context-respectful methodology collecting and utilising thick 
descriptions is employed. It is argued that an ethical ethos has no room for 
intentional rule violation. For a given ethos to be ethical its game must be practised 
in a certain way with a certain attitude. The evaluation in this thesis concludes that 
the ethos of English elite women's cricket is unethical. It is hoped that a potential 
outcome of the thesis will be a different understanding of fair play that may shape 
new forms of ethical enquiry and challenge existing methodologies. 
Argument: 
(1) In sport philosophical literature fair play has been characteristically understood in 
one way: the formalist account of the nature of rules and laws. 
(2) While it is true that one can not talk about fair play without reference to the rules 
and laws of an activity, this account is incomplete since it fails to consider ethos. 
(3) Part of what an ethos means derives from the beliefs, values and ideologies of 
players themselves who have constructed agreements as to how the game ought to be 
enacted. 
(4) To understand fair play in elite women's cricket, therefore, one must understand 
the rules and laws but also, crucially, its ethos. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1 Contextualisation of Study 
Recent decades have witnessed a profound challenge to the method and styles of 
theory that have guided the social sciences since their late 19th century origins. As a 
result, confidence in the ability to describe and explain social reality accurately has 
been undermined echoing this point. Marcus and Fischer (1986) state: 
... 
in every contemporary field whose subject is society, there are 
either attempts at reorienting the field in distinctly new directions 
or efforts at synthesizing new challenges to theory with established 
programs for research (p. vii). 
It may be argued that this is the case in philosophy generally and more particularly in 
ethics. In a rapidly changing world, there are new controversies surrounding those 
problems associated with the representation of social morality. Moreover, it is 
important to recognise that it is not just the theories and ideas that are being 
challenged but the established methodologies and epistemologies that underlie them. 
Thus: 
This reassessment is more salient in some disciplines than in 
others, but its presence is pervasive. It is not just the ideas 
themselves that are coming under attack but the paradigmatic style 
in which they have been presented. Particularly in the social 
sciences, the goal of organising disciplines by abstract, 
generalising frameworks that encompass and guide all efforts at 
empirical research is being fundamentally challenged (Marcus and 
Fischer, 1986, p. 7). 
The contemporary debate on this reassessment involves various academic disciplines 
`battling it out' as to who can represent a multi-cultural, diverse, post-modern world 
in the most efficacious way. However, the idea here is not to present the definitive 
concept of fairness and, competitively to present it any more forcefully than anyone 
else. Rather, the aim here is to offer a different, subtler way of understanding 
fairness and ethos in sporting games in general and elite women's cricket in 
particular. 
Ethics as a branch of philosophy, characteristically asks the following kinds of 
questions: Why should we be moral? Are there any absolute moral values? Are 
there such things as universal duties and obligations? What ought we do in order to 
lead a flourishing, happy, and good life? Ethical questions in sport are, therefore, 
also concerned with topics of right and wrong. The predominant ethical ideal in 
modern sport is one of fair play. What is fair play? Why should we follow the rules 
of a game? Do we have a moral obligation to follow the laws? What kinds of things 
are required of us to be good sportspersons? 
Within the field of ethics generally, it is widely recognised that there is a move away 
from universalism and descriptions of right conduct towards more particularity and 
descriptions and prescriptions for good lives. As Nussbaum (1993) suggests: 
Anglo-American moral philosophy is turning from an ethics based on 
enlightenment ideals of universality to an ethics based on tradition 
and particularity; from an ethics based on principles to an ethics based 
on virtue; from an ethics dedicated to the elaboration of systematic 
theoretical justifications to an ethics suspicious of theory and 
respectful of local wisdom; from an ethics based on the isolated 
individual to an ethics based on affiliation and care; from an 
ahistorical detached ethics to an ethics rooted in concreteness and 
history (p. 9). 
Philosophers can also be criticised for favouring a more `justice' oriented approach 
when examining moral actions within sport (Lumpkin, Beller & Stoll, 1994; and 
Fraleigh, 1984). As indeed Held (1993) maintains, we are in the grip of contractual 
thinking where realities are interpreted in contractual terms, and goals are formulated 
as instrumental, rational contracts. 
When considering the nature of morality in sport, ethicists have predominantly 
concentrated on issues such as, fairness, equality, and justice. They have paid strict 
attention to right actions, rule adherence, and have appropriated the use of abstract 
frameworks and universal conceptual definitions. What is needed is an authentic 
account of the athlete's experience of fair play within a particular sporting context. 
Sport has been historically and predominantly a male preserve. It should not, 
however, just be men's experiences that are examined within the context of sport but 
women's experience as well. Women's experiences are plural - there is no singular 
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experience of women - they should be given an opportunity to share in the debate 
(DeSensi, 1992). Women's experience is worthy of exploration in its own right and 
may lead to a consideration of issues that characteristically arise from women's 
experience. It is this experience that can then be used to inform a fuller picture of fair 
play. 
There is an obvious void regarding the concept of feminism in the 
philosophy of sport literature as well as a critical need for the 
exploration of a theoretical undergirding to viable questions and 
issues regarding gender issues, gender relations, and feminism in 
society and in sport (DeSensi, 1992, p. 79). 
2 The Research Problem 
The main aims of this thesis, then, are: (1) to develop a philosophical analysis of the 
concept of 'ethos' with particular reference to the meaning of fair play; and (2) to 
explore how feminist ethical theories may contribute to our understanding of 
methodology and empirical research. 
2.1 Research Questions 
1) What is meant by the concept of `ethos'? 
2) What is the ethos of English elite women's cricket? 
3) To what extent does a given ethos relate to fair play norms? 
2.2 Objective 
The objective of the thesis is to develop a philosophical analysis of the ethos of 
sporting games considering: 
(a) how the basic elements of ethos and fair play can be articulated and 
ethically justified; 
(b) how the ethos of English elite women's cricket (hereafter EWC) can be 
understood and interpreted; 
(c) how the ethos of EWC relates to fair play norms; 
(d) how the above can be located in the context of an empirically informed 
understanding of EWC. 
The successful juxtaposition of conceptual and empirical understanding provides the 
foundation for an examination of fair play. In order to secure this juxtaposition, a 
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particular theoretical position must be established. The potential of `Immanent 
Critique' is explored and tied both to the theory and methodology adopted in the 
thesis. In doing so, this thesis offers a novel contribution to the existing body of sport 
literature. It puts forward an original mode in which to theorise fair play offering a 
partly empirical research approach that is philosophically justified by a mixed model 
analysis. 
The starting point in searching for this position is the following premise: game 
formalism is wrong to insist that rules (on their own) ensure fairness in sporting 
games. Ethoses (or ethoi) within sporting games are not the same. Athletes play the 
same game with the same rules but the way those rules are applied illustrates that fair 
play is conceived differently in different traditions and sporting cultures. 
3 The Structure of the Thesis 
The purpose of Chapter Two is to provide a brief historical analysis of conceptions 
of fair play. In Part One, the periods of Homeric Greece, Historic Greece, Mediaeval 
Ages and Modern Britain are examined in order to establish the link that sports are 
contests. Part Two considers women's sport and their history within the game of 
cricket. The argument proposed is that key turning points in history have shaped our 
current conceptions of fair play. 
Chapter Three examines the commitment of traditional moral theory to a principle of 
impartiality. Paradigmatic exemplars from deontological, consequential, and social 
contract ethics are outlined. In an attempt to show how feminist ethics differs from 
these distinct approaches, the diversity of feminist ethical approaches is considered. 
This chapter ends with an analysis of context-respectful theory and its relationship to 
a principle of impartiality. Discussion, here, sets up the preferred account that is used 
throughout the remainder of the thesis; that is, to develop a context-respectful theory 
of fair play and to consider its implications for understanding the ethos of EWC. 
The review of feminist ethical literature, in this chapter, is a theoretical precursor for 
the adoption of a context-respectful approach and the rejection of universalism. An 
allegiance is formed to the importance of the embodied subject who is immersed in 
4 
the practice. The story of feminist ethics is, therefore, one that enables the position of 
formalism to be rejected. It provides a door to a certain kind of critique in which the 
formulation of the methodology is initially constructed. 
Chapter Four critically examines previous approaches to the study of fair play and 
their philosophical foundations. Part One begins with a discussion on formalism and 
the role that rules play in defining the concept of fair play. It is concluded that what 
constitutes fairness in sporting games is more than just the formal rules. Next, the 
role of context-respectful theory in relation to fair play is explored. The concept of 
ethos is discussed in detail and the importance of empirically informed theory 
established. Finally, the chapter states the purposes of `Immanent Critique' which 
then form the rationale for the methodology employed in the thesis. 
In Chapter Five, `Methodology, ' a mixed model approach to the ethical investigation 
is defended. The idea for this approach arose through exploring the possibilities of 
feminist ethical theory. The aims of this chapter are: (1) to operationalise the 
juxtaposition of moral theory and empirical investigation; and (2) to provide a 
research design for how such a mixed model approach can be applied to fair play and 
ethos. The methodology seeks to incorporate empirical findings to structure a 
normative approach to the study of fair play. The main point will be to set about 
producing less distorted descriptions, explanations, and understandings of ethical 
conduct in game playing. To place women at the centre of a study is not of course 
new, but studying the nature of ethos in the particular context of elite women's 
cricket, from the perspective of the athletes' own experiences, is indeed original. 
Chapter Six attempts to articulate the ethos of elite women's cricket. The empirical 
findings are presented and fair play is explored as a system of norms. Using the rich 
data acquired from one culture (EWC), this chapter examines the dynamic character 
of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the sources of that change may be. 
Part One begins with an explanation of interviewees' perceptions of fair play. Part 
Two considers, in more detail, the application of fair play and ethos within the game 
itself. This chapter concludes by arguing that fair play is context dependent, wherein 
the boundaries of ethos are continually re-negotiated between players, coaches, and 
administrators. 
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Chapter Seven examines the concept of ethical ethos in more detail and concludes 
the thesis. Three theoretical moves are made to secure the aims of the research: (A) 
The rejection of formalism as an adequate theory of game playing; (B) The merits of 
an empirically informed theory; and (C) The explication of an ethical ethos. An 
ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC is conducted using the reflective examples of 
the interviewees. Finally, it is argued that the ethos of EWC is unethical. 
The next chapter provides the starting point for the thesis. The argument proposed is 
that key turning points in history have shaped our current conceptions of fair play. 
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Chapter Two 
Historical Conceptions of Fair Play 
Part One 
1 Introduction 
It would be naive to propose that this section presents a detailed historical analysis of 
fair play over the last three thousand years. Clearly, this is not the case. Moreover, it 
is important to be aware of applying a historically ethnocentric approach and 
misunderstanding the meaning of events and values. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine briefly historical conceptions of fair play and suggest that key turning 
points in history have shaped our current understandings of the concept. 
It seems that, throughout history, there are various interpretations of fair play which 
are inextricably linked to the practices and moralities of different times. Part One 
provides a brief historical analysis of conceptions of fair play within 'sport. ' Four 
time frames will be considered: (1) Homeric Greece, (2) Historic Greece, (3) 
Mediaeval Society and the Middle Ages, and (4) Modern Britain. Part Two considers 
the history of women's participation in sport and cricket. 
2 Homeric Greece 
Historically sporting games may be considered as contests of muscular agon, 
whereby athletes confront their antagonists in a struggle to ascertain the victor. Agon 
or competition refers to the nature of the contest. As Callois (1988) explains: 
Agon presupposes concentration, appropriate training, assiduous 
effort, and the will to win. It implies discipline and perseverance. It 
makes the champion rely solely on his (sic) own resources, 
encourages him (sic) to make the best possible use of them and forces 
him (sic) to utilise them fairly and within fixed limits which, being the 
same for everyone, result in rendering the superiority of the winner 
indisputable. The agon appears as the pure form of personal merit and 
serves to demonstrate it (p. 9). 
It may be argued that contemporary sporting games are also modelled on contests of 
agön. The purpose of this section is to examine some of the events that took place in 
Homeric Greece to gain an understanding of how fair play was conceptualised. 
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Although sometimes disputed, both the Iliad and the Odyssey were compiled by 
Homer (Rieu, 1950). Little is known of Homer's life, or place of birth, but it is 
generally accepted that he lived between 750 and 700 B. C (Weiler, 1996). It may be 
said, however, that his writing depicts the Mycenaean Civilisation which existed five 
or six hundred years before this. 
The Iliad is an epic tragedy that narrates the story of Achilles. It consists of twenty- 
four books about the Trojan War and Greek warriors. In total, it represents fifty days 
in a battle that lasted ten years. Although there was a place called Troy (Ilium) that 
was indeed destroyed, Homer inherited and embellished upon the idea of a ten year 
war. However, it can still be inferred that the author describes the social structure of 
that society, and the relations that took place between its citizens (Rieu, 1950). 
Before we consider conceptions of fair play in this enacted story, it is first necessary 
to understand two features that characterise Homeric society identified by Maclntyre 
(1996). It is important to do so because interpretations of fairness will be inextricably 
linked to its context and social structure. 
First, within Homeric society each citizen has a defined role and status that is 
delineated within a determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures 
within this framework belong to kinship and to the household. Maclntyre (1996) 
further suggests: 
For the given rules which assign men (sic) their place in the social 
order and with it their identity also prescribe what they are and what is 
owed to them and how they are to be treated and regarded if they fail 
and how they are to treat and regard others if those others fail (p. 123). 
At this time in Heroic society, there is no distinction between morality and social 
structure. They are one and the same. It is likely that this feature has a significant 
impact on conceptions of fairness and what fair play means at that time. Without 
knowing one's place in the social order, a person would be unable to understand who 
they were and what their role in society comprised. The force and rule of kinship was 
all powerful. A person clearly understood his or her defined role - what duties 
derived from their status and what actions were deemed permissible. Conceptions of 
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fairness could not be divorced from their social structure. In other words, "there 
could be no standard external to those embodied in the structures of his (sic) own 
community" (MacIntyre, 1996, p. 133). 
Another feature that characterises Homeric society is that life is considered to be 
fragile. Each character in the Iliad, whether victor or vanquished, is subjected to 
impersonal brute force (Corlett, 1996). Thus, each citizen must have the: 
... capacity not 
just to face particular harms and dangers but to face a 
particular kind of pattern of harms and dangers, a pattern in which 
individual lives find their place and which such lives in turn 
exemplify (p. 125). 
Homer illustrates this when he describes the scene where the ghost of Patroclus asks 
Achilles finally to bury him. Patroclus believes his life is predestined and tries to tell 
Achilles that the same is true for him also. 
And give me that hand, I beseech you; for once you have passed me 
through the flames I shall never come back again from Hades... For I 
have been engulfed by the dreadful fate that must have been my lot at 
birth; and it is your destiny too, most worshipful Achilles, to perish 
under the walls of the rich town of Troy (Rieu, 1950, p. 414). 
Sports, like Homeric society itself, were Aristocratic. Homer regarded sports as a 
natural part of Aristocratic life where the principal events were reserved for the 
monopoly of the Nobles (Gardiner, 1955). Book twenty-three of the Iliad refers to 
The Funeral and the Games. The Games are in honour of the dead Patroclus. It is in 
this book that we can begin to understand the conception of fair play in Homeric 
society. 
The first event was the chariot race. Achilles tells the warriors that he is mourning 
the death of his friend and will not take part in the event that he would undoubtedly 
win. The competitors include: Eumelus King of Men, Diomedes son of Tydeus, 
Menelaus son of Atreus, and the young Antilochus, son of King Nestor. During the 
race Phoebus Apollo (a spectator) knocks Diomedes' whip out of his hands allowing 
Eumelus to take the lead. But, the Goddess Athene was watching, and returned the 
whip and gave his horses a new fresh spirit. Moreover she chased Eumelus and used 
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her powers to break the yoke of his chariot. As a result he lost his horses and fell to 
the ground. 
After Diomedes came Menelaus, and then Antilochus who was shouting at his horses 
to run faster. At a narrow point Antilochus dangerously passed Menelaus and 
succeeded in running him off the road. At which point Menelaus shouts after him: 
Well, have it your own way; but all the same, you shall not carry off 
the prize till you have answered on your oath for this affair (Rieu, 
1950, p. 424). 
Diomedes won the race, followed by Antilochus, and then Menelaus. Eumelus came 
in last dragging his chariot and driving his horses out in front. At this point Achilles, 
who feels sorry for Eumelus says: 
The best driver of the lot has come in last. Let us give him a prize, as 
is only fair. Make it for second, for of course Diomedes takes the first 
(Rieu, 1950, p. 426). 
But, Antilochus refuses absolutely to abandon his claim to second place. There upon 
Menelaus protests that Antilochus has cheated him. He appeals to his Nobles to 
judge impartially between them when Antilochus says: 
I am a much younger man than you, King Menelaus, and you, my 
senior and my better, know well enough how a young man comes to 
break the rules. His mind is quicker, but his judgement not so sound. 
Forgive me then, and of my own accord I will let you have the mare I 
won, I would rather give it to you at once than fall for ever out of your 
majesty's favour and perjure myself before the gods (Rieu, 1950, 
p. 428). 
The dispute is settled and Achilles provides a special prize for Eumelus. He gives a 
fifth prize to King Nestor as a memorial of Patroclus' death. It seems that the 
warriors have a conception of fair play within their event. Menelaus questions 
Antilochus' honour, and asks for a fair judgement to be made. Antilochus 
acknowledges that he has broken the rules and offers to return his prize. 
It was believed that the intervention of a God often signalled that an injustice had 
been done (MacIntyre, 1996, p. 124). An impersonal force, in the form of one of the 
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Gods, would interfere in an attempt to restore justice. In this case, the Goddess 
Athene intervened to correct an injustice served to Diomedes. In Homeric society, 
morality and the sense of fairness were often determined by the resolutions of the 
Gods. 
The next two events, boxing and wrestling, are of interest because they are both 
specialised forms of sport that necessitate the existence of rules of conduct 
(Gardiner, 1955). The boxing contest was between Epieus and Euryalus. Epieus, 
who was a champion boxer, says that he will rip his opponent's flesh to bits and 
smash his bones. Euralyus indeed is knocked out, but his partner's threats were not 
sincere. In fact Epieus is praised by Homer when he writes, "His chivalrous 
opponent gave him a hand and set him on his legs" (Rieu, 1950, p. 433). The notion 
of a chilvarous gesture is an important idea and will be discussed further below. 
The wrestling competition involved Aias and Odysseus. The match was conducted 
under the rules of what the Greeks referred to as 'upright wrestling' in which the 
object was to throw your opponent to the ground (Gardiner, 1955). After some time 
neither opponent seemed likely to succeed. Thus, at the risk of boring the crowd, 
Achilles declared that both competitors had won, and were to share equal prizes. 
Next was the foot race with Aias, Odysseus, and Antilochus. The race was very close 
and as they drew near the finish Odysseus prays to Athene, "Hear me, Goddess. I 
need your valuable aid. Come down and speed my feet" (Rieu, 1950, p. 433). Athene 
responds and Odysseus wins. Aias becomes annoyed and complains that the 
Goddess has tripped him. His comments are laughed at, and Achilles says: 
I'll tell you something that you know already. The gods still favour the 
old crowd; for though Aias is only a little older than myself, Odysseus 
over there is a product of an earlier generation, a relic of the past. But 
his old age, as they say, is green; and it's a hard job to beat him in a 
race - for any of us but Achilles (Rieu, 1950, p. 433). 
The fact that the Goddess favoured Odysseus is not seen as unfair. Her intervention 
was perceived as a fair and legitimate aid to Odysseus. It is Aias who is mocked and 
ridiculed. 
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The next event is the armed fight between Aias and Diomedes. After some time, the 
spectators plead with the two warriors to stop their murderous form of sport and 
share the prizes. They do so, but Achilles awards Diomedes the victory because he 
was about to slash Aias across the throat. The next sport is the discus, with 
Polypoetes, Leonteus, Aias, and Epieus, which Polypoetes wins easily. Then comes 
the archery competition between Prince Teucer and Meriones. To win, the 
competitor must cleanly shoot down a pigeon. Meriones succeeded. The last event is 
the javelin where both Agamemnon and Meriones wished to compete. But Achilles 
intervened and said that because no-one could beat Agamemnon the event should not 
take place. Achilles then awarded Agamemnon a prize and handed Meriones a 
bronze spear. 
To summarise, conceptions of fairness in Homeric Greece seem to be largely 
determined by the Gods and by the Nobles. There are implicit rules that govern 
conduct. As previously discussed, these rules stem from knowing one's place in the 
order of society. People are judged by their actions and their actions are defined and 
shaped through their position and status within the order of the social structure. 
3 Historic Greece 
In Historic Greece a major change occurs in that Homeric values no longer define 
morality within Athenian society. Here, Maclntyre (1996) identifies a number of 
distinct transformations, all of which illustrate the changes between Homeric and 
Historic Greece. Two main features are identified which serve to demonstrate how 
conceptions of fairness may have changed at that time. First, virtue is no longer tied 
specifically to a particular social role or status. Secondly, whereas Homeric citizens 
had no external appeal to morality, for the Athenian an understanding of the virtues 
provided a distinct set of moral standards. These were then used to question whether 
certain acts, practices, or policies were just ones. 
Ethics belonged to the community that in turn became the embodiment of reason. 
There was no place for any individual ethics or moral consciousness. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that this change would inevitably have had an effect on conceptions of 
fairness; that is, a shift from the internal Homeric conception to the external 
Athenian polis. 
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In order to exemplify the above notion further, it is helpful to consider the role of fair 
play within the Olympic Games. The Games began in 776 B. C and continued to 344 
A. D (Weiler, 1996). They were announced three months in advance, and held in four 
different locations: Isthmia, Nemea, Delphi, and Olympia, the latter being the most 
prestigious whereby, under a truce, athletes made their way from Elis to Olympia. 
An oath was then taken in front of Zeus to signify an athlete's commitment to abide 
by the rules of the competition. 
At the same time the Games began there was a notable increase in political influence 
on society and practice (Weiler, 1996). This serves to illustrate how notions of fair 
play may have changed and become more formal. For example, rules for different 
events intensified and Hellenodikai (judges) were included to referee the Games. 
They were responsible for organising age groups and categories and enforcing 
penalties for those athletes who violated the rules. 
Olympic sports were still placed under the patronage of the Gods. Thus, any athlete 
who violated the rules of the Games was acting unfairly, and in doing so was seen as 
displeasing the Gods (Gardiner, 1955). The Olympic crown signified not simply the 
value of a prize but the feeling of honourable victory for the athlete and the state 
which he represented. This feeling has been assigned the name Aidos and is 
sometimes, perhaps incorrectly, equated with the modern term, sportsmanship 
(Gardiner, 1950). In the work of Pindar we can also see the emphasis given to the 
moral importance of abiding by the rules. 
Pindar (522 - 448 B. C) was an important influence in ancient lyric poetry and his 
work included the "Epinikia Odes" which were poems that honoured Olympic 
victors. The fundamental character of the Odes was to praise moral virtue 
(Yiannakis, 1995). It is in his work that one can find important references to the idea 
of fair play. One of the most important moral values for Pindar was the significance 
of the athlete's oath. Directly connected to taking an oath is the idea of justice; that 
is, by keeping one's oath, man rises to the highest realm, that of "truth" (Yiannakis, 
1995, p. 17). Pindar writes: 
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I have contested rightfully, I have finished 
my race, I have kept my faith, I am waiting 
now for the wreath of justice, which will be 
given to me by the Lord (cited in Yiannakis, 1995, p. 16). 
The Eleans were concerned about the fairness of the regulations and rules of the 
Olympic Games. In an attempt to improve the fairness of the competition they sent 
an ambassador to Psammetichus, the King of Egypt (594-589 B. C) to see if he could 
suggest any improvements. The Egyptians replied arguing that their current method 
was already unfair because they allowed Greeks to compete in the Games. In order 
to make it fair they advised that only strangers should be allowed to compete 
(Gardiner, 1955). Although no such changes were made, in the fourth century, due to 
numerous scandals, it was deemed necessary to forbid judges themselves from 
entering the chariot-races (Gardiner, 1955). 
One of the most gruesome Olympic events was the pankration. The object was to 
bring the opponent to a point where he must admit defeat or die. There were 
certainly rules that governed this event but they varied between cities. For the 
Athenians, biting and gouging were illegal, whilst kicking and hitting were allowed. 
However, the Spartans included biting and gouging, but unlike the Eleans, 
disapproved of strangling. Fair play was enforced by numerous Hellenodikai who hit 
the competitors with rods for any rule infractions. In spite of this, it seems that the 
rules were often broken (Harris, 1964). 
The oplitodromia, or the armour bearing race, illustrates some important points about 
the notion of fair play that are worthy of consideration. The rules of the event stated 
that only an athlete of big stature could take part. This was to ensure that the runner 
could compete whilst wearing the heavy armour and carrying his shield. The athlete 
that could afford the correct equipment manifested that not only did he enjoy full 
political rights but that he was also an honest person (Yiannakis, 1994). Therefore, 
only a select number of athletes were eligible. The Greek state placed immense 
ideological importance on the honour of the shield bearer. This was: 
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... shown by the 
fact that the soldier who would throw his shield on 
the ground and abandon the battle, drawn by fear, enlisted in the list 
of the "dishonest" persons, and he was not allowed by the sacred laws 
to be buried (Yiannakis, 1994, p37). 
This event helps to demonstrate the significance of an athlete being honest, fair, just, 
and truthful. In both the pankration and the oplitodromia there were rules and 
prohibitions to ensure fair competition. Even the Romans were inspired by Olympia; 
they also insisted on exact obedience to the rules of the Games and tried to eliminate 
corruption and unfairness (Gardiner, 1955). At this time, however, it appears that the 
idea of chilvarous generosity, which was described in the Iliad, seems to have 
disappeared. Gardiner (1955) explains that: 
No Greeks ever shook hands after a fight, no Greek ever was the first 
to congratulate his conqueror; defeat was felt as a disgrace, and for 
this reason perhaps the Spartans forbade their citizens to take part in 
boxing competitions or the pankration, because it was disgraceful for 
a Spartan to acknowledge defeat. They could not feel that it was better 
to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all (p. 71). 
Thus, we may conclude that the concept of sportspersonship is missing something 
that much later becomes an important element of the English conception of fair play. 
4 Mediaeval Society and the Middle Ages (440-1485) 
It may be true to suggest that the concept of fair play dates back to Ancient Greece. 
It seems that, however, there is a paucity of literature which acknowledges the 
Middle Ages and its role in developing the modern conception we have of fair play 
today. Many codes of British sport can be traced back along a distinguished lineage 
to the chivalry of medieval Europe. 
We can rightly say that the modem fair play concept has its roots in 
ancient ethics, to the same or to a similar degree as other civilised 
fields in the long history of European culture. But except for this 
general dependency, no further. Contemporary sports ethics, with its 
rule of noble behaviour toward a partner has its real and direct roots 
not in the ancient world, but in the moral standards of medieval 
chivalry (Guttmann, 1986, p. 4). 
It is believed by many historians that the first individual ethics can be found in the 
4th century A. D among the military troops of Caesar Gallien (Liponski, 1988). 
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These troops were organised solely for young nobles and the rich sons of wealthy 
Roman families. In an attempt to distinguish themselves from the masses, they 
produced a set of high moral standards. Consequently, during the Roman occupation, 
young romanised Celts also adopted these standards (Liponski, 1988). 
At the beginning of the 5th century A. D, the Romans withdrew their troops from 
Britain and the "eques cataphractarius" tradition was born. This tradition was 
important because it signified the onset of two things. The first was the initiation of 
knight errants or wandering knights and the second, the subsequent development of 
chivalric rules (Liponski, 1988). 
During the 5th century jousts and tournaments were favourite sports in which 
noblemen on horseback would run at each other with a lance or sword and try to 
knock their opponent from the saddle. Here there were strict rules which governed 
both activities (Hole, 1949). It has been suggested that this unique group of nobility 
aforementioned served to enhance the development of chivalric rules, including 
those of noble behaviour towards both sporting and military opponents (Liponski, 
1988). 
Maclntyre (1996) argues that Homeric society provides the background for 
mediaeval culture. This means that mediaeval society can be considered to have just 
made its own transition out of what Maclntyre also calls Heroic society. Albeit 
tenuous, the re-emergence of chivalry, which seemed to disappear during Ancient 
Greece, supports the claim that Mediaeval Society has links to Homeric Greece. 
Moreover this tradition, which began in the early 5th century, was strengthened and 
substantiated for over one thousand years. Thus the onset of chivalry became an 
important basis for future sports ethics (Liponski, 1988). 
After Knights lost their importance within the social order, the principles of 
mediaeval chivalry were passed down through the social echelons of society. 
Chivalrous efforts, however, were no longer for war but for play and competition. 
During this period, Mediaeval England with its wide-open spaces became a paradise 
for the elite and sporting activity. The early Middle Ages saw increases in numerous 
hunting activities such as: otter hunting, river fishing, hawking, and stag hunting 
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(Hole, 1949). Further past-times included: skating, quoits, and rowing. Also a variety 
of rural games were played by all, mostly in county districts. They included: 
hoodman's blind, blind man's bluff, leapfrog, shuttlecock, hot cockles, and prisoner's 
bar's and hell (Hole, 1949). These games seem more appropriate to children whereas 
nine men's morris or merelles were usually played by Noblemen (Hole, 1949). 
Games of strength and skill were popular such as: wrestling, running, leaping, riding, 
cudgel-play, quarter-staff, pitching bars, and tossing the hammer. Athletic prowess 
was certainly valued and, "even the most sober minded individual considered lawful 
sports to be a necessary part of a young man's education" (Hole, 1949, p. 24). Foot 
racing was perhaps the oldest past time, and was usually included in every rural 
festival or country wedding. Furthermore, recreational past times included: chamber 
music, dance, cards, food, painting, gambling, plays, ballet, opera, church festivals, 
fairs, and markets (McLean, 1983). 
5 Modern History: The Cult of Athleticism 
Before the 1700s, local people organised and controlled games and competitions. As 
a result, rules for different sports were devised by localities. In contrast, during the 
18th century, when social positions were fixed and patronage existed, rules for 
different sports were developed and eventually codified. For example, in 1743 the 
first rules for boxing emerged and in 1744 nationally agreed laws for cricket and golf 
were established and codified. In cricket this was largely in order to provide 
consistency for the sake of gambling which was prolific at that time (Munting, 
1993). 
At Cambridge University, in the 1700s, numerous sports were prohibited for moral 
or disciplinary reasons. Football was thought too rough and likely to promote 
violence and unruly behaviour. In short, it was deemed uncivilised and certainly 
unfit for gentlemen (Twigg, 1996). 
Until the middle of the 19th century public schools actively discouraged most 
sporting activities. This was mainly due to the fear that an increase in gambling and 
drinking would lead to corruption and misconduct (Vamplew, 1988). By 1864, this 
attitude had changed and public schools reserved the word 'idle' for those boys who 
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did not care for games (Holt, 1989). Later in the century, social attitudes towards 
gambling also changed (Munting, 1993). For the upper classes the first rowing 
organisation was established in 1829 followed by the athletic union in 1864, whereas 
the working class followed soccer and in 1863 the Football Association was 
founded. 
The Industrial Revolution bought economic growth and the subsequent improvement 
to transport. This enabled fans to travel easily throughout country in order to support 
their teams. By this time, in 1888, the Football league had been founded. The 
Industrial Revolution had a very significant impact on the growth and development 
of sport (Holt, 1989). By 1870 most workers finished at lunch time on Saturday. 
This meant that more and more people were free to take up their own recreational 
past times. The Rugby Union formed in 1871. The Education Act was established in 
1870 making Elementary school compulsory for all children. This saw the 
introduction of organised physical activities. In state schools, as part of a daily 
routine, drill (Swedish gymnastics and rhythmic exercises) was part of the 
curriculum. Initially, this was an attempt to control pupil behaviour, but later saw the 
beginnings of Madam Bergman-Osterberg's philosophy. 
Rather than drill exercises, the Public school system employed a different method. A 
combination of the rise of the gentleman amateur and the cult of fair play led to the 
idea that sport could be viewed as a form of moral education. Thus, the idea was 
conceived that moral lessons could be taught through physical education. It was 
believed that the best means to achieve this lay in the practice of games not in fives, 
or hare and hounds. This is because games were regarded as unselfish and ennobling; 
they were about winning for the team and not simply for oneself (Mangan, 1981). 
According to McIntosh (1979), the term `Muscular Christianity' was first used by 
T. C. Sandars in a review of Charles Kingsley's (1857) novel, Two Years Ago. Not 
only did Sandars believe that games had a moral basis but that fairness in sport 
guaranteed fairness in everyday life and practice. Many believed that noble 
muscularity was part of an English heritage that must be preserved. For example, Sir 
Theodore Cook's, In Character and Sportsmanship (1927) posited the view that 
Anglo-Saxon superiority was a result of games education. He states: 
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We must be worthy of our heritage. We shall keep it by that sense of 
fair-play which is bred in our bones and courses through our blood, 
which makes a boy play the game (p. xiv; cited in Mangan, 1981, 
p. 203). 
Thus, fair play became inextricably linked to the idea of patriotic male Englishness. 
The gentlemen was no longer a man of "unalleviated leisure; " his gentility became 
measured by his conduct (Eassom, 1994). Moreover, games enshrined the meaning 
of fair play which ultimately became the "watchword of the gentleman amateur" 
(Holt, 1989, p. 98). Fair play signified a new philosophy of loyalty, struggle, 
adversity in defeat, and subsequently a new attitude towards race, religion, and work. 
The infamous phrase, 'Play the Game' is often seen as the most "moralistic 
exhortation" (Mangan, 1981, p. 200). It meant to behave in a certain way, to act with 
dignity, decency, honesty, and above all, to play according to the rules. For example, 
consider the following Harrovian verse about cricket: 
Play the Game! Play the Game! 
Boys of Harrow, 
Play the Game. 
End each match as just beginning, 
Bowl and field as sure of winning! 
Meet your fate, but meet it grinning 
Play the Game! 
(From Harrovian, Vol. Xxvi, no. 5 (26 July 1913); cited in Mangan, 
1981, p. 200). 
Cricket seemed to acquire its own moral identity which came to epitomise the 
essence of fair play. A cricketer required unruffled calm under attack, a sense of 
etiquette, elegance, modesty, and integrity (Holt, 1996). Cricket was thought to be 
the pure game where there was never a charge of cheating brought against the 
players. 
The whites of the players reflected the pristine nature of the sport: 
indeed "it's not cricket" had entered the language as a cry against 
unfair conduct (Vamplew, 1988, p. 264). 
This comment embodies the meaning of unfair play and what it meant to infringe the 
ethos of proper conduct. Victorian attitudes towards cricket epitomised its reputation 
for character-building and instilling good, Christian virtues (Birley, 1995). 
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In 1891 there was disagreement over the legislation of the penalty kick in football 
which was awarded for an intentional offence in the penalty area. Public school 
masters argued that to suggest a player would intentionally foul another tarnished the 
reputation and honour of the person responsible (Dobbs, 1973). As the verse below 
demonstrates, to follow the rules with honourable conduct was of the utmost 
importance. 
Rules that make you obey; 
Courage to Honour is true; 
Who is the fairest in play 
Best and good temperedest, who? 
Tom! (Second verse of `Tom' by Edward Bowen in W. E. Bowen; 
cited in Mangan, 1981, p. 405). 
The above illustrates why Tom was considered to be the ideal school hero, of both 
the football field and his House. In Association football, "The Code of Gentlemanly 
Conduct" was enforced as strictly as possible. For some time, there was no need for a 
referee. When the rules of the game were widened to include accidental penalties or 
misconduct, however, referees were enabled to punish any act considered to be 
"ungentlemanly conduct" (McIntosh, 1963, p. 76). Interestingly this law remains a 
part of the game today although its title is now, `unsporting conduct. ' 
These sorts of examples about fair play provide what Mangan (1981) calls the 
"ignoble rhetoric" of morality which, 
... assisted 
in the development and reinforcement of individual role, 
collective habits and the institutional value system: they both created 
and reflected an ethos. They constituted, in short, a set of symbols for 
believing and acting (p. 206). 
The ethos of fair play involved more than strict adherence to the rules. It included the 
realisation that sports are a form of co-operative competition in which each 
contestant needs all the others (Guttmann, 1986). This idea of a sporting ethos 
marked the onset of the 'Golden Age' where a world of codified rules shaped not just 
'playing the game' but also acting within the spirit of the game. For example: 
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... walking from the wicket without questioning the umpire and 
generally acting with magnanimity in victory and graciousness in 
defeat, playing in an entertaining, attacking style without gambling on 
the outcome or receiving payment (Holt, 1996, p. 53). 
The ethos of fair play also involved a code of conduct for spectators. To ignore the 
excellence of the opposing team was to give the home players an unfair 
psychological advantage (Guttmann, 1986). 
The idea of the gentleman amateur and his adherence to a high standard of fair play 
was not, however, always the case. For example, W. G. Grace was well known to 
have violated cricket's conventions that umpires' decisions were never to be 
challenged (Birley, 1995). This famous cricketer had a reputation for intimidating 
umpires to the point that they were frightened to give him out. Moreover, his 
gamesmanship in international competition provides evidence of the ethos of fair 
play at that time. No longer was the unpaid gentleman amateur a world apart from 
the unethical behaviour of the sordid professional. Birley (1995) mentions a Test 
match of 1882 against Australia where England lost the first Ashes Series. He states: 
W. G., having fielded the ball, had pretended to throw it back to the 
bowler, and then, when the batsman, thinking the ball was `dead, ' 
walked out of his ground to repair the pitch, threw down his wicket 
leaving the umpire no alternative but to give him out (p. 23). 
The gradual demise of the noble, honest amateur signalled a historical turning point 
for fair play. The British team accepted Grace's behaviour. Other members of the 
aristocracy, however, condemned Grace's double standards blaming the nasty and 
corrupting side of professionalism for his infractions (Birley, 1995). We can draw 
similar parallels here with the modern women's game. We will see the criticism of 
the corrupting effects of professionalism on the ethos of the game in Chapter Six. 
The next section provides a brief historical insight into the history of women's 
participation in sport and cricket. 
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Part Two 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to provide some social analysis of how women's 
involvement in physical activity related to the prevailing social ideologies of the 
time. The aim is to explain how conceptions of fair play derived from the particular 
cultural and social belief systems of the day. In other words, notions of fair play and 
ethos were not hermetically sealed within the practice. They derived from the 
specific context of the practice community, its traditions and history. 
2 The History of Women's Participation in Sport and Cricket 
Throughout history the place of women everywhere in Europe was seen as inferior to 
men (McCrone, 1987). The law subsumed a married woman within her husband's 
identity so neither herself nor her children were hers by right, and divorce was 
practically impossible. The role of woman was defined further by her capacity to 
bear children. It is not surprising then that single women were mostly subject to the 
control of their male relatives (Ferguson, 1975). McCrone (1987 states: 
Despite and because of their unique biology women were considered 
innately physically inferior to men, and that inferiority underlay 
fundamental presumptions of mental and social inferiority that were 
translated into masculine skepticism about women's abilities to secure 
independent action and partake in activities like sport hitherto 
monopolized by men (p. 97). 
Under this regime, however, not all women were excluded from sports and other 
active pastimes. Although little is written on their participation, it is possible, using a 
wide variety of sources, to get an idea of what life was like. 
There is evidence of frequent and varied female participation in diverse sporting 
activities as both spectators and performers (Brailsford, 1999). In 1702 Anne became 
Queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland. At that time Britain had a strong sporting 
tradition and there are records of ladies playing nine pins at Epsom. Also bear 
baiting, bull baiting, and fights between other animals gained female interest. In fact, 
Queen Anne is said to have delighted in bear baiting (Hole, 1949). 
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At that time, English ladies hunted and there are numerous records of prize-fights 
between common women. These matches were often staged to attract the largest 
crowds possible and included heavy wagers. For example, Brailsford (1999) notes a 
match in 1722 between Elizabeth Wilkinson and Hannah Highfield for 3 guineas at 
Hockey-in-the-Hole. 
In 1725 horse racing was considered an acceptable spectator pastime and the Ladies' 
Plate race became popular with £15 for the winning rider. In 1744 there is evidence 
of female participation in stool ball. This was invented by milkmaids and aped a 
feminine version of cricket. The bowler sought to strike a player's milking stool with 
a thrown ball. In another version the ball was driven from stool to stool. 
Prenderghast (1977) speaks of a whole mythology of meaning and explanation 
surrounding the application of the game. At this time, labour relations within an 
agricultural mode of life confined women to the private domestic sphere. Women 
found solidarity within the game in a culture where gender played a repressive 
structuring factor in social and economic life. Participation invoked a way of 
thinking and feeling about a particular image of femininity. These factors amounted 
to shared ingrained assumptions about how gender roles were to be reinforced. 
At this time, "the only team game that could be considered to have attained such 
hallmarks of modern sport as rules and umpires was cricket. " (Park, 1994). There 
were women participating in the game at this time as well. In fact, the first recorded 
women's match took place on 26th July, 1745, on Gosden Common. It is believed to 
have been between eleven maids of Bramley and eleven maids of Hambledon. 
Hambledon won by 127 notches to 119. Matches were often played between villages 
sometimes for the prize of a barrel of ale or eleven pairs of lace gloves or plum cake 
(Harris, 1996). 
Cricketing games for women were governed by conventions rather than by written 
rules. The prevailing social and cultural codes of the day defined fair play. The 
organisation of games was very simple and the ethos of the practice played an 
important part in ensuring that the unwritten rules of fairness were followed. 
Women participants viewed their sport as inherently fair and co-operative; the ethos 
of the game subsumed idealised feminine virtues of gentility and honesty (Duquin, 
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1991). In Chapter Six we will see how traces of such an ideology can be found 
within the contemporary game. 
The dominant prevailing social attitude at that time, however, was that physical 
activity for women signified `masculine tendencies' whereby women were labelled 
as unruly feminists (Birley, 1995). At this time, cricket was thought to represent an 
inelegant appearance for women. Their participation was heavily criticised and 
ridiculed by men and women alike. Generally, then, women were not allowed to 
take part in the same activities as men. Organised sport and rigorous activity were 
major vehicles for defining male gender roles. Sport was the private domain of 
males. It served to establish, maintain, and sustain ideologies about the proper sphere 
of women and their prescribed duties and domestic roles (Mangan and Park, 1987). 
As McCrone states (1987): 
In social systems dominated by men, such as that of Victorian 
England, a useful means of controlling women was a projection of the 
view that sport was essentially masculine, requiring physical and 
psychological attitudes and behaviour unnatural to women, and thus 
that it was beyond their proper sphere (p. 98). 
Despite this attitude, the second half of the 18th century saw many cricketing contests 
played between villages and between married and single women. Local parishes of 
married versus unmarried women also played each other in football - `marrieds' 
were always said to have won. Matches were reported to have become quite 
boisterous affairs with crowds in the thousands - betting often took place on the 
result and also there were cock fights on the outfield (Harris, 1996). Females were 
occasionally spectators in cock fighting and there is evidence to suggest that women 
took part in skittles around the same time (Burke, 1978). 
Men's cricket moved and gained popularity from the south-eastern counties to 
London. Important matches attracted thousands of people. The Marylebone Cricket 
Club was formed in 1787 and is still claimed to be the moral conscience of the game 
(Plumb, 1973). The 1790s saw women rowing for cash prizes and in 1797 foot 
racing or smock racing became very popular for women who also participated in 
competitive walking or running. 
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As gambling by male spectators became more and more prolific within sport, 
growing criticisms of the moral tone emerged. This may have had some bearing on 
the significant change in female involvement in sport. For example, the introduction 
of Ladies' Plates may have been used to demonstrate that racing was polite and 
amenable to the fairer sex. This illustrates the important role that women played. For 
example, as this sport was considered acceptable for ladies it was seen to boast a 
high moral content (Brailsford, 1999). 
In 1803 the beginnings of drill and gymnastic exercises appeared on the curriculum. 
Madame Bergman-Osterberg defined the role of physical education for women as 
health, beauty and moral consciousness (Mangan and Park, 1987). Her legacy paved 
the way for a distinct British female tradition in single-sex physical education 
teacher-training institutions. 
Highly structured rule laden games, like cricket, did not emerge until the beginning 
of the 19t" century. Often women became fashionable accessories to their menfolk as 
they strived to become notable spectators. For example, hunting events involved a 
splendid hunt ball and both archery and racing had similar attractions. Early prints of 
cricket matches show mixed groups of spectators who were well dressed and held 
influence. At this time, along with women's cricket, girls' cricket was gradually 
gaining a widening appeal (Brailsford, 1999). 
In April 1803, Sporting Magazine published a letter from the then - late Duke of 
Dorset. He praised the Countess of Derby and her cricketing ladies: 
Let your sex go on, and assert their right to every pursuit that does 
not debase the mind. Go on, and attach yourself to the athletic, and, 
by that, convince ... all Europe 
how worthy you are of being 
considered the wives of plain, generous, and native Englishmen 
(Sporting Magazine, 1803, pp. 13/14; cited in Brailsford, 1999, 
p. 156). 
His implicit chauvinism was ignored and women's cricket, now partly endorsed, 
continued to flourish. In 1811 the first contest between county sides occurred when 
Hampshire played Surrey. It is reported that the players ranged from 16 - 60 years of 
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age. The match was sponsored by two noblemen for 500 guineas per side and 
Hampshire won, after rain had disrupted play (Harris, 1996). 
Polite pursuits such as archery, badminton, croquet, and lawn tennis provided access 
for upper class women to increasingly energetic forms of play. In this sphere, any 
notion of gambling was rejected and such games had strict ordering, where etiquette 
and rules of propriety determined the ethos of the activity and the proper, fair way to 
behave. Attitudes towards fair play derived from the prevailing social attitudes 
towards moral conduct; they did not originate wholly from within the practice. 
Among the upper classes, wealth and privilege could give scope for 
individual sporting enterprise that went well beyond what custom 
allowed, while working class women, less restrained by convention, 
often had wider possibilities for play, if much less leisure to make use 
of them (Brailsford, 1999, p. 142). 
The above quote illustrates, however, that sporting opportunities were limited for 
upper class women in some ways. For example, they could not visit the pugilistic 
tavern, the fives court or make wagers (Brailsford, 1999). It may be argued that 
codes of unwritten conduct were applied differently in those sports practised by 
women of different social spheres or classes. Women who belonged to the lower 
classes participated in a number of activities, like running, where unfair play such as 
the sly trip of a foot-racer or the occasional `unladylike' push were commonplace 
(Brailsford, 1999). This point exemplifies the notion that ideas of fair play are 
inextricably linked to the prevailing social ideologies of the time. They are 
contextually sensitive to a range of prevailing particularities and nuances of the 
sporting culture in question. In 1833 this comment appeared in the Nottingham 
Review: 
Last week, at Sileby feast, the women so far forgot themselves as to 
enter upon a game of cricket, and by their deportment as well as 
frequent applications to the tankard, they rendered themselves objects 
such as no husband, brother, parent, or lover could contemplate with 
any degree of satisfaction (cited in Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, 
p. 20). 
Here, the female version of cricket's `serene bucolic idyll' was not always 
welcomed. Such a comment was probably due to the amount of alcohol consumed, 
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and reflected the tightening restraints that were emerging on women as this period 
drew to a close (Brailsford, 1999). 
As previously noted, in 1870 the Education Act made Elementary school for all, 
compulsory for the first time. Prior to this the popularity of women's cricket had 
started to decline. It waned during the early years of Queen Victoria's reign but the 
late 19t" century saw a revival particularly within the country manor scene (Harris, 
1996). The first recorded women's cricket club was The White Heather Club 
founded in 1887 at Nun Appleton in Yorkshire. Eight noble women, who had time 
on their hands, formed the club. Women wore long dresses, with hooped skirts, hats, 
ribbons and stockings. 
Stopping the balls with their petticoats, a favourite form of fielding 
with some lady cricketers but definitely `bad form' and unworthy of 
`real cricket' ... and whatever 
decision the umpire gives you must 
implicitly acquiesce outwardly. We may swear inwardly as much as 
we like but if we are given out, out we must go! (cited in Heyhoe Flint 
and Rheinberg, 1976, p. 86). 
The above citation illustrates the influence of the umpire. There was no question of 
undermining the umpire's decision. If a player was given out then they must tacitly 
accept the umpire's decision. Fair play was to `walk' from the wicket if one was 
given out. It is interesting to note the type of attire worn at the time. It is widely 
accepted that, as a result, women invented over arm bowling as a means to get round 
their long skirts. As Lady Milner of the White Heather Club said in 1888: 
It is no uncommon thing to see a lady holding onto her hat with one 
hand, striving to catch a ball with the other and succeeding in doing 
neither! Boots are better than shoes! (cited in Heyhoe Flint and 
Rheinberg, 1976, p. 86). 
At this time it was not generally acceptable for women to undertake too much 
physical activity. This is partly because women's participation was seen as a direct 
threat to the cult of male athleticism. It was imperative, therefore, for women games 
players to present themselves as `ladylike' and fair. Women did not want to give the 
impression that they were trying to infiltrate a masculine world, and, as a result, 
strived to retain a feminine image of gentleness, beauty and self-discipline 
(McCrone, 1987). Women took care not to violate behavioural rules and upheld the 
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strictest standards of propriety. Here we can see how the prescribed social rules of 
politeness and etiquette determined concepts of fair play for women's sport. 
It was quite an achievement for women to have set up their own sporting clubs at a 
time when mind and body were seen as needing protection for the important task of 
domestic labour and child rearing. Men were concerned that women would try to 
emulate them and encroach on their male preserves (Birley, 1995). The church had a 
powerful influence on sustaining this ideology. Ideas that God had imbued woman 
with qualities to serve her man, nurture his children, and protect his home were 
prevalent (McCrone, 1987). Nevertheless, it was a few upper middle class women, 
who had time on their hands, who set up the Women's Cricket Association (WCA) 
in 1926 (Harris, 1996). 
In the 1930s the English Women's Cricket Federation thrived in the industrial north 
of the country. This federation championed limited over league cricket, usually 
played in the evenings after work. At this time the WCA eschewed the concept of 
limited overs. This was probably because `real' cricket was perceived as Test match 
cricket. The limited overs game was not accepted by the WCA until 1933 (Harris, 
1996). In Chapter Six, we will see how the tension between limited overs and Test 
match cricket continues to resonate throughout contemporary elite women's cricket. 
The first women's County Associations emerged in 1933. They had adopted the 
limited overs game. Principally this meant increased competition within a domestic 
programme which made the selection process for England and International matches 
easier. The first international women's test series was played in 1934 between 
England and Australia. Women had to find £80 in order to participate. The poem 
overleaf appeared in the press in 1951 when England toured Australia. It captures the 
moral sentiments of the time and provides an insight into the perception of the 
participation of women: 
Bowl the googly, swing the bat, 
Shout in unison "Owzzat"? 
"Owzzat? " that screams from lovely lips 
From beauty crouching in the slips. 
Down the pitch and kill the spin 
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Played! And may the best girls win. 
Keep the wicket, snatch the bails, 
We can play as well as males. 
Hold the the hot `uns, hold the stingers, 
Hold it, Mrs. Butterfingers. ' 
The game of cricket is no joke 
To us who neither drink nor smoke; 
Games are won and runs are made 
By girls who stick to lemonade. 
Moreover, if some wolf in flannels 
Diverts our minds to other channels, 
Then this would-be lady killer 
Gets the works from Mrs. Miller. 
Shapely legs concealed by pads 
Shall not be looked upon by cads. 
We play the game; we never yield, 
On, or off the cricket field (Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, p. 86). 
Mrs. Miller was the Australian team manager and 6th Hon. Treasurer of the 
Australian Women's Cricket Council. The poem illustrates the importance placed on 
adhering to a strict code of conduct off the field. Implicit in the poem is the dominant 
ideology of femininity. The players are beautiful; they have `shapely legs' and 
`lovely lips. ' They are graceful and would not dare to entertain the idea of such 
unethical conduct as drinking or smoking. Such immoral behaviour was discouraged 
by the team's chaperone who ensured that the women were saved from the 
debaucheries of alcohol and `wolves in flannel. ' 
In 1958 the inaugural meeting of the International Women's Cricket Council was 
held at the Victoria Cricket Association in Melbourne. In 1973, England hosted the 
first ever World Cup in which they beat Australia. This time saw an emerging new 
trend assisted by government help and sponsorship. Shortly after the one-day game 
had been introduced into men's cricket, it emerged in the elite women's game in the 
1970s. The concept of limited overs had a significant impact on the climate of the 
game. This point will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
It may be argued that for women to have experienced increased opportunities in 
sport and international competition, prevailing social attitudes towards women in 
general had had to change. This represented a significant turning point for women's 
participation. Gradually women's sport became an accepted sphere. The image of the 
29 
new sportswomen emerged. She would be unable to break free, however, from the 
masculinity of sport preserved as a male defined arena. As McCrone (1987) states: 
Girls came to understand that they could play games but only if they 
took great care to demonstrate their basic femininity, and they learned 
that there would be no autonomous assessment of their real athletic 
worth as long as the standards of men were the universal criteria of 
excellence. Thus, women in sport remained the `other, ' the `second 
sex, ' well into the twentieth century (p. 119). 
3 Summary 
Conceptions of fair play have undergone changes throughout different periods of 
history. It has been argued that historical turning points have shaped our current 
understandings of fair play. In order to understand the meaning and philosophical 
content of fair play today then it is vital to consider not just its recent historical past 
but Homeric, Ancient, and Mediaeval traditions also. It is also important to recognise 
the Eurocentric nature of the analysis offered in this section. Investigations of non- 
Western notions of fair play would be of considerable use to an analysis of fair play. 
It is sufficient to argue here, however, that the concept of fair play is socially and 
historically constructed and, as a result, should not be eschewed when formulating an 
account of ethos (Eassom, 1998). It is essential to recognise the contextual 
relationship in which these ideas were formulated. 
Chapter Six defines the ethos of contemporary elite women's cricket. It examines the 
concept of ethos as `dominant meaning' whereby inherited cultural norms from past 
traditions serve to form new meanings. Herein different interests are constantly re- 
worked, struggled over, and re-negotiated. Links between the history of women's 
cricket and the modem game are analysed. 
The next chapter examines traditional moral theory and recent feminist ethical 
literature. It attempts to develop a context-respectful theory that takes into 
account the notion that fair play is a socially and historically constructed concept. 
30 
Chapter Three 
Feminist Ethics 
1 Introduction 
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to examine the commitment of traditional 
moral theory to a principled requirement of impartiality. It has been the strict 
adherence to moral impartialism that has been the central target of feminist, and 
certain non-feminist, critiques of traditional ethics. The paradigmatic exemplars of 
deontological ethics, consequentialism, and social contract theory will be outlined. 
The aim here is not to explicate in detail a complete exegesis of Kant's ethics, 
utilitarianism, or Rawls' theory of justice. Rather, the approach to moral theory 
offered by each proponent is examined with regard to its incorporation of a principle 
of impartiality. Then, virtue ethics, a non-feminist alternative to the dominant 
tradition, is explained. Next, in an attempt to show how feminist ethics differs from 
these recent critical alternatives, the diversity of feminist ethical approaches is 
considered. This chapter concludes with an analysis of context-respectful theory and 
its relation to a principle of impartiality. 
2 Ethics 
Most modern Western theorists pursue one of four distinct approaches to moral 
philosophy: (1) deontological ethics; (2) consequentialism; (3) social contract theory; 
and (4) virtue ethics. The paradigmatic exemplars of these approaches may be 
located within those traditions associated with Kantianism, Utilitarianism, 
Hobbesian philosophy, and Aristotelian ethics, respectively. 
2.1 Deontological Ethics 
Deontological theories are those that prescribe certain acts regardless, of the 
consequences of performing or not performing them. Consequently, certain acts are 
believed inherently to be right or wrong. For example, lying is seen as wrong in 
itself irrespective of the consequences of doing so. 
Kantian ethics is probably the paradigm case of an impartialist ethical theory 
(Friedman, 1997). Kantian ethicists purport that moral obligation can be derived 
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solely from reason. For Kant, duty is the irreducible starting point whereby good 
intentions promote right action for its own sake; that is, duty for duty's sake 
(Louden, 1992). Kant attempts to identify the maxims, or fundamental principles of 
action, that moral agents ought to adopt. His central move is to construct the 
principles of ethics according to rational procedures. He begins by identifying a 
good will as the only unconditional good and uses an account of the principles of 
ethics to determine what it is to have a good will. He asks what maxims or 
fundamental principles can be universalised as nothing can be a moral principle 
unless it can be generalised for all. This idea is formulated as a demand, which he 
calls, "The Categorical Imperative. " 
Kant offered three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. The first is concerned 
with the form of the imperative (one `ought' morally to do x), the second with its 
content (the standard of moral justification), and the third links both form and 
content together (Raphael, 1994). 
(1) Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law; 
(2) Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person, or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end 
and ever simply as a means; 
(3) Act as if you were the subject of all ends as every rational being is 
an end in himself (Kant, 1785, pp. 429-432). 
The first of these principles is often referred to as `the formula of universal law' and 
is a method of avoiding partiality. Kant sometimes referred to this as: act as if you 
were laying down a universal law of nature. In other words consider your decision 
was taken by God and it would affect everyone (Raphael, 1994). The second 
formulation demands that people are not just treated as means but must be shown 
regard as ends-in-themselves. The last formulation connects both one and two. It 
states that people should act as if they are members of a realm or political State. 
Thus, each community member must recognise that other people are capable of 
universally legislating and hence, all men (sic) are to be considered equal. 
The adoption of the Categorical Imperative is the keystone to Kant's ethics, and is 
used to classify which maxims agents may or may not adopt. According to Kant, 
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then, morality begins with a rejection of non-universalisable principles. He argues 
that the moral law transcends personal considerations. 
The moral law is objective and not person dependent, it holds 
universally, without regard for any contingent conditions that may 
subjectively differentiate one person from another (Sullivan, 1989, 
p. 1). 
This point has been interpreted and misinterpreted within the body of feminist 
ethical literature. Sherwin (1991) contends that the above means the moral law is 
independent of the emotions of those people involved in particular applications. She 
states: 
The moral evaluation he called for explicitly disallows consideration 
of the specific circumstances of the agent or of other parties affected. 
Rather, moral conclusions must be reached through reasoning that has 
been abstracted from the circumstances of application, whereby 
agents decide if the maxims under which they would act could be 
willed to be universally binding (p. 6). 
It could be argued that Sherwin (1991) has misconstrued Kant's position here. It is 
not that consideration for specific circumstances must be disallowed but that these 
circumstances must be considered in an impartial way. Impartiality, here, requires 
the purely rational apprehension of the moral law (Friedman, 1997). Thus, a sense 
of duty and commitment to the moral law itself provides the rational motivation to 
disregard one's own personal attachments and consider all persons as valuable ends- 
in-themselves. 
Defenders of the impartiality requirement concede that impartiality plays a restrictive 
role as the close personal commitments we feel for particular others cannot be felt 
for all persons equally. Impartialists distinguish between the abstract viewpoint and 
the practical standpoint that a moral agent adopts when in a particular situation or 
context (Friedman, 1997). The abstract viewpoint, its defenders argue, is a stance 
necessary for the justification of moral judgement and not necessarily a formula that 
can be applied to concrete circumstances involving those people we may or may not 
care about. It ought to be the case, however, that it is considered morally acceptable 
to favour those special obligations and commitments we have to specific others. 
These loyalties must be justified from an impartial standpoint and not simply 
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endorse favouritism. So, although it may be morally permissible to care 
preferentially for our own children, the rightness of such care must be impartially 
recognisable and not simply seen as arising out of subjective preferences (Friedman. 
1997). To care preferentially for one's own child is the morally right thing to do and 
hence provides the justificatory reason for doing so. Thus, impartialists espouse, a 
moral motivation to act in accordance with duty can accommodate the particular 
concerns of emotional attachments. Friedman (1997) argues that this is a new 
defense of impartiality, one that admits its limited position in moral deliberation but 
insists on its transcendent role in moral justification. As will be argued in detail 
later, feminist ethics has criticised this defense of impartiality and challenged 
whether the impartiality requirement really serves as an adequate standard of moral 
justification at all. 
In summary, it may be argued that deontological ethics pay little attention to the 
specific details of individuals' moral experiences and relationships (Sherwin, 1991). 
Although these theories acknowledge that special obligations and commitments do 
arise from specific relationships, for example, to friends and family, they fail to 
account for the demanding effects this has on a required principle of impartiality. 
2.2 Consequentialism 
According to consequentialist theories, the morality of actions is determined by the 
results of those actions. Thus, acts should be judged as right or wrong according to 
the consequences they yield. For example, telling a lie is not wrong if it serves to 
produce a good outcome. Consequentialism is seen, for the most part then, in 
opposition to deontological theories. 
Utilitarianism is a family of theories and is commonly accepted as the paradigm of 
consequentialism. It has its origins in the work of Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick who 
considered the maximisation of pleasure as the touchstone for all moral deliberation. 
Mill advocates the principle of utility that states that: 
... actions are right 
in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness 
is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure (Mill, 1861, p. 7). 
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The fundamental command when deciding which action to take is to maximise 
utility. A central feature of utilitarianism is its incorporation of a principle of 
impartiality. Mill explains, "as between his own happiness and that of others, 
utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and 
benevolent spectator" (Mill, 1861, p. 16). This principle gains its substance from 
happiness for it is in respect of happiness that all persons are to be treated impartially 
unless pertinent reasons for bias or discrimination can be provided (Barrow, 1991). 
When evaluating the possible consequences of different actions, each person's 
interests are to be weighed equally; everyone is to count for one and no one for more 
than one. 
One of the main reasons for rejecting consequential ism is the abstract notion of what 
is thought to constitute utility and the promotion of `good. ' The idea that agents 
could perform unethical actions if they hoped to maximise utility or promise best 
consequences in the name of the greater good is abhorrent. How do we try to 
measure what will maximise happiness? It would be unwise to require agents to have 
to calculate the moral prognoses of every option they might take. Furthermore, it is 
expecting too much to require that people always opt, even if they know how, for 
promoting the greatest interest for society as a whole. It is impossible to shed one's 
personal commitments ignoring all relevant and particular circumstances to the 
ensuing context. 
2.3 Contractarianism 
Social contract theory was developed in the seventeenth century and may be 
attributed to such theorists as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and more recently, Rawls. 
For Hobbes morality could have no binding authority over behaviour unless it was 
backed by political authority. Hobbes argued that men (sic) should enter a contract 
with one another to restrict their liberty in the name of peace. There was, however, 
according to Hobbes, no moral obligation to uphold the nature of such a contract, so 
the sovereign enforced the contract in the name of everyone. It was mutually 
advantageous for everyone to accept those conventions designed to protect 
everyone's interests. 
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John Rawls' social contract theory has dominated political philosophy as a paradigm 
of contractarianism. For Rawls the principles of justice, which form the basic 
structure of society, become the basis of the agreement of the social contract. 
They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association 
(Rawls, 1994, p. 362). 
Rawls considers the role of impartiality as a hypothetical social contract, where the 
reasoner is positioned behind a `veil of ignorance. ' We must imagine ourselves in a 
position of equality, in which we do not know the significant features of our own 
standing. Then, we must agree what principles to adopt to further our aims and 
interests. Because we do not know what our own position is then we are driven 
impartially to consider the good of all those concerned. Rawls states: 
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his 
place in society, his class position or social status ... 
The principles 
of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no 
one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the 
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. 
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles 
to favour his particular condition, the principles of justice are the 
result of a fair agreement or bargain (emphasis added, Rawls, 1994, 
p. 363). 
Most contractarians limit their assumptions about human beings to the characteristics 
that are assumed to define moral agency, those of rationality, autonomy, and self- 
interest (Sherwin, 1991). They do not allow any room for the particulars of a 
situation as they propose that the only relevant features are the abstract ones, 
common to all persons. Details of a subject's contingent circumstances are 
considered morally irrelevant and left out of the equation. Thus, the terms of the 
social contract are devised on the basis that we are all similarly situated. The 
`reasoner' chooses to accept those principles of justice that any rational person 
would adopt in furthering the interests of all within society. Rawls portrays the 
subject, like Kant, as a disembodied observer, beyond the realm of experience 
(Hekman, 1995). Contractual thinking takes places as "isolated reflection" protected 
from the coercive and corrupting influences of subjective knowledge (Friedman, 
1997, p. 400). This constitutes a major problem for Rawls because it is unrealistic to 
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require that a moral agent abstract her/himself from the contingent particularities of 
everyday life in order to decide which principles should be followed for the 
attainment of an ideally just society. 
2.4 The Impartiality Requirement of Traditional Ethics 
Deontological, consequentialist, and social contract theories require moral agents to 
abstract themselves from their personal feelings and special commitments as all 
approaches reject the idea of allowing individuals' preferences to interfere with 
moral outcomes. Our obligations depend on an impartial assessment of the 
consequences of our actions, hence, "the details of the emotional lives and the 
relationships of the particular persons affected are rendered irrelevant from the moral 
point of view" (Sherwin, 1991, p. 8). 
This principle of impartiality necessitates that moral thinking is free from prejudice 
as everyone counts equally. A moral agent must assume the view from nowhere, she 
must become, "omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent, but in all 
respects, `normal"' (Friedman, 1991, p. 162). Sherwin (1984) contends that: 
Virtually all contemporary moral theorists, despite their major areas 
of disagreement, assume a common meta-principle of abstraction 
which directs moral agents to disregard most of the special features of 
a particular moral situation, including, in particular, the actual 
identities and relationships of those concerned; morality is thought to 
require that agents concentrate on the essence of either the act in 
question or its likely consequences (p. 705). 
In varying degrees, the dominant ethical theory governing public life today pertains 
to all three of the above traditions. It is collectively referred to as the ethic of justice 
(or the rules view) in which universality, rationality, and impartiality serve as the 
stalwart foundations of contemporary theorising therein. This view is based on 
universal abstract principles, conformity to rules, legal elaboration of rights, and the 
rational resolution of conflict (Duquin, 1991). It is a formalist universal approach 
which focuses primarily on the logic of impartial moral reasoning, rights, duties, and 
issues of fairness and justice. 
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Lövlie (1997) explains that the rules view attempts to establish particular norms and 
maxims by applying them to universal or transcendental principles. These norms are 
justified on the basis that they serve the viewpoint of all. What characterizes the 
rules view of ethics is the search for a systematic approach to moral standards of 
justification. Philosophers are primarily concerned with determining which rules 
ideally should be followed and what justifications can be considered adequate to 
found such proposals. 
In summary, it can be seen that the adherence to a principle of impartiality is 
articulated within the above different ethical traditions in different ways. Impartial 
reasoning involves the non-biased consideration of all relevant interests. Those 
theories that include an impartiality requirement claim an internal consistency when 
deliberating between moral cases. Manning (1992) describes such theories as, 
deductivist, mechanical, and foundationalist. They are deductivist because they 
prescribe that whenever A, then one must always do B. They are mechanical in that 
they presume that if the facts are described correctly then one principle can be 
automatically applied. Lastly, they are foundationalist because the judgments are 
taken to have the status of knowledge and not mere belief or caprice. This means that 
the principles themselves are considered to be a priori true. The essential picture is 
that when principles are applied to facts they yield specific judgments (Manning, 
1992). 
Recent trends in ethics have attempted to criticise the impartiality requirement 
central to Western philosophy. Next, virtue ethics is considered as a non-feminist 
approach that represents an alternative to this dominant tradition. Following this will 
be an examination of feminist ethics and the alternative approach of context- 
respectful theory. 
2.5 Virtue Ethics 
Arguably, moral philosophy began with the Sophists of the Greek world in the fifth 
century. They raised critical questions about the kind of moral life we ought to live, 
and what the nature of morality is. They began by asking the following questions: 
Why should we be moral? What kind of person is a moral one? So, for virtue ethics 
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the primary object of moral evaluation is agent relative rather than about acts 
themselves or their consequences. 
Plato reflects Socrates to a certain extent in his search for the traditional definitions 
of the virtues. In, "The Republic, " Plato argues that the four cardinal virtues 
(temperance, wisdom, justice, and courage) are those qualities essential for a good 
life. He suggests that the good life consists in the harmonising of the soul with the 
virtues. Together the soul and the virtues produce an underlying condition of psychic 
harmony. When we are in this psychic state we are happy and thus leading a morally 
good life, that is, one that is in accordance with the virtues. 
Although there are some important distinctions between the philosophy of Plato and 
that of Aristotle, the latter continues to employ a similar framework. In the 
Nichomachean ethics, Aristotle claims that the ultimate end to all human action is 
happiness, or eudaimonia. He defines this goal in terms of arete or virtue. Happiness 
is to be located in our capacity for reason which provides a basis for an account of 
the virtues. The virtues are dispositions in which our feelings are guided by reason so 
that our behaviour is appropriate to the situation. The guidance of reason requires the 
avoidance of excess or deficiency, and thus, each virtue is a mean between extremes. 
As Prior (1991) states: 
[v]irtue or excellence ... consists in observing the mean relative to us, 
a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of 
practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean by 
reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency 
(Aristotle; cited in Prior, p. 159). 
Aristotle believed that there were different virtues for free women (those of 
obedience and silence) compared to free men (those required for freedom and 
political life) (Sherwin, 1991). The male virtues were considered to be the only ones 
that held genuine moral worth. To lead a happy and flourishing life, one was to strive 
to attain the median virtue as this signified excellence. 
Initially, then, a virtue-based ethics was the way in which ancient moral philosophers 
attended to questions about morality. The rise of modern science, however, bought 
with it a skepticism that denied such a portrayal of ethical life. The focus for modem 
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science became the impartial commitments of a liberal individualism. Recently, 
there has been considerable renewed interest in virtue ethics and the Aristotelian 
approach. A major proponent of this movement is Maclntyre (1996) who offers a 
critique of the enlightenment by presenting a narrative of arguments from the Middle 
Ages to the present. His approach is historical and contextual and relates to 
intentions, motives, and character. He rejects a morality of universalising principles 
and doubts whether it can be used to settle rationally the types of moral 
disagreements that characterise ethical debate today. 
Maclntyre (1996), like most feminist ethicists, criticises traditional ethical theory 
and the impartial standpoint it employs. He labels the abstract self of modern thought 
as the "emotive self, " a subject devoid of social identity and contingent 
circumstance. Emotivism argues that there is no rationality in ethics. It is the result 
of those failed attempts to provide a rational justification for an objective morality. 
In other words, emotivism attempts to replace the rational justification of objective 
morality. 
Maclntyre's alternative to the traditional transcendent self is the "narrative self' or 
the "narrative" character of human life. Our lives become enacted stories that find 
their construction in a narrative that links birth to death. It is through the practice of 
virtue that subjects find their identity and unity. And, the unity of human life lies in 
the unity of its "narrative quest. " 
Maclntyre's vision includes a return to local communities, and relatively shared 
conceptions of the good life. Here virtues operate in such a way that each individual 
has a specifically defined role and status. Moreover, it is virtue that sustains people 
in that role. 
Every individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and 
highly determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures are 
those of kinship and of the household. In such a society a man (sic) 
knows who he (sic) is by knowing his (sic) role in these structures; 
and in knowing this he (sic) knows also what he (sic) owes and what 
is owed to him (sic) by the occupant of every other role and status 
(MacIntyre, 1996, p. 122). 
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Maclntyre's concept of self is defined by the roles that are prescribed in a given 
community. He claims that the roles that a society prescribes for its occupants are 
open to a plurality of definitions and that the narrative self emerges in the 
individual's own interpretation and adaptation of the role assigned to him or her. In 
essence, this means that an individual has the capacity to define selfhood within the 
narrative of a prescribed given role or status. 
Hekman (1995) argues that there are a number of problems with Maclntyre's 
alternative account of selfhood. The virtue-based societies that Maclntyre describes 
are obviously hierarchical. Everyone knows what his or her prescribed duties and 
commitments are because everyone knows their place within society. The roles and 
dominant positions of power become fixed, thus, permanently ascribing to women an 
inferior role and status. As can be seen in Aristotelian accounts, these societies are 
thoroughly patriarchal, where the celebrated and recognised virtues belong 
dominantly to the male sphere. Hekman (1995) states: 
Maclntyre's approach exemplifies a disturbing characteristic of much 
communitarian literature; in praising community, they ignore the 
hierarchy and oppression endemic to them. Narrative selfhood comes 
at a high price (p. 55). 
So, although Maclntyrean ethics criticises the impartial standpoint that characterises 
traditional thought and situates the role of the individual in an ethics based on 
context, he leaves scant room for the plurality of other voices that become, once 
again, subjugated to the invisible realm of the periphery. In other words, issues of 
power, dominant moral discourses, and hegemony within particular cultural settings 
are ignored. 
3 Feminist Ethics 
Recent trends in feminist philosophy have paralleled the critical opposition to 
impartiality outlined above. However, feminist criticism brings to this movement a 
distinct concern for the cultural practices of gender, hierarchy, and oppression, and 
the role that impartiality has played in sustaining the subordination of women 
(Friedman, 1997). 
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It may be argued that, traditionally, women have been virtually excluded in the 
construction of moral theory. To varying degrees, the above versions of ethics do 
not express any specific interest in accommodating feminist concerns. Consequently 
these moral theories are considered incomplete for feminist ethicists, who explicitly 
focus on the contexts of individuals in their moral deliberations. 
Contemporary `feminist ethics' is now regarded as a legitimate family of approaches 
to ethics at all levels of theory (Card, 1991). Feminist philosophers pay attention to 
modem ethical issues, express their concern about traditional moral theory, and 
question some of the deep-rooted assumptions of moral epistemology. It is important 
to state, however, that despite a few common assumptions, feminist ethicists differ 
considerably on a whole range of theoretical, methodological, and conceptual issues. 
There is no single feminist ethical theory. Consequently, feminist ethics, like ethics 
in general, is characterized by disagreement and includes theorists who may be 
considered: Aristotelians, Humeans, Kantians, utilitarians, existentialists, contract 
theorists, virtue ethicists, communitarians, post-modernists, as well as carers and 
maternal thinkers (Jaggar, 1991). Thus, we must speak of feminist ethics in the 
plural. 
Feminist ethics is not concerned with applying traditional ethical theory to 
contemporary problems. Neither does it seek to simply add a woman's perspective to 
moral theory. Rather, it is about challenging some of the fundamental ways in which 
traditional philosophy has conceptualised and investigated philosophical issues. As 
Garry and Pearsall (1989) state: 
Feminist philosophers are trying in many diverse ways to reconstruct 
philosophy. We want to redefine the methods and subject matter of 
philosophy in ways that value women's experiences and enable 
women to move from the position of object to positions of subject, of 
knower, and of agent. We want to redeem philosophy, to "get 
philosophy right, " recognizing the difficulty in even thinking about 
what standards, if any, there are for doing it "right" (p. xii). 
Card (1991) claims that there are two sorts of history pertinent to the development of 
feminist ethics. The first is a sort of `history of reflection' upon traditional ethical 
theory. The second approach has arisen from politically active experience whereby 
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feminists have striven to combat sexist society by building new relationships and 
engaging in new social practices (Card, 1991). 
Within this genre of writing, feminist ethicists have tried to develop three general 
areas of concern. First, they have sought to find appropriate ways of knowing 
women's experiences. Secondly, they have examined the structures that shape those 
experiences, and lastly, they have attempted to develop theoretical accounts of 
knowledge that retain continuity with those experiences (Code, 1989). 
In approaching problems of social life with a feminist consciousness, then, feminist 
ethics has enlarged the traditional conceptual domain, and enabled it to address new 
issues (Jaggar, 1991). Feminist ethics can be considered to comprise two distinct but 
not entirely separate perspectives, namely, `Feminine Ethics' and `Feminist Ethics 
proper'. The next sections will consider each distinct approach. 
3.1 Feminine Ethics 
Feminine ethics mainly consists of criticisms about how the traditional approaches to 
ethics fail to fit the moral experiences and intuitions of women. Here feminists have 
criticised and re-examined issues of epistemology and methodology. Some theorists 
have paid attention to particular ethical concepts, such as, justice, equality, 
rationality, and caring with a view to developing new formulations of these concepts 
(Held, 1993; Baier, 1994). While other research has presented philosophical critiques 
of traditional philosophers' views about women (Harding, 1987; Whitbeck, 1984; 
Elshtain, 1981; Okin, 1980; ) or considered previous women philosophers and their 
work (Fallaize, 1998; Moi, 1987; Duchen, 1986; and Jardine, 1985). 
Care-focused approaches to ethics, however, have dominated the feminine 
perspective. They stem from the work of Carol Gilligan, a Harvard psychologist, 
who in 1982 published the book, In a Different Voice, which challenges the 
influential work of Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development. This was an 
empirical and interpretive analysis of the moral reasoning of women when 
confronted with both hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas. 
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Formerly, the established orthodoxy among moral pedagogues was that the aim of 
moral education was to familiarise children with the prescriptive and universalisable 
form of moral statements which are to be applied impartially to particular areas of 
concern (Wringe, 1997). The paradigmatic exemplars of this style are Piaget (1932) 
and later Kohlberg (1981) who pioneered cognitive moral development as 
approaches that considered moral maturity to be the extent to which an individual 
respects rules and principles of justice. 
Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development proposes that agents may progress 
through six distinct phases in order to reach moral maturity. The highest stage 
culminates in our ability to apply universal principles to the facts of moral dilemmas, 
which then yield judgements about how we should behave. Kohlberg (1981) argues 
that it is possible to test a person to determine at which stage their moral reasoning 
can be located. This is achieved by measuring the complexity of universal principles 
the agent appeals to when deliberating over the proposed hypothetical moral 
dilemmas. 
Kohlberg shows that women's moral reasoning is to be consistently located in the 
lower stages of moral development whereas men's reasoning often reaches the 
highest level. Kohlberg (1981), thus, espoused in his studies that men were more 
capable of superior moral development than women. Gilligan (1982) criticises 
Kohlberg's research and argues that women do not deliberate based on this type of 
hierarchical moral pattern. She advocates that Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning 
measure male moral development as opposed to human moral development, and 
concluded that women, for a variety of cultural reasons, articulate their responses, in 
a "different voice. " 
Women's experience, Gilligan (1982) maintains, is vastly different from men's and 
has largely centered on nurturing, caring, and motherhood. It may be argued here 
that Gilligan offers an unacceptable generalisation of male and female experience. 
Neither men's nor women's experience should be considered as singular. Her initial 
premise, however, provides the foundation for a different model of ethical human 
relations, an `ethics of care, ' that stresses relationships and responsibilities over 
universal principles. Gilligan (1982) suggests that women are far more likely to call 
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on an ethic of care when trying to solve moral problems whereas, men are more 
likely to employ an `ethic of justice' that stresses universal principles, rules, duties, 
obligations, and rights. Gilligan (1982) does not suggest that all men are focused 
solely on the justice perspective and all women on the care perspective, rather that 
while both men and women raise concerns in each perspective they tend to favour 
one approach. 
An ethic of care characteristically grounds morality in relationship and response. In 
other words a care-focused approach rejects the impartiality requirement and 
embraces the concept of special obligations to particular others. Manning (1992) 
states that as moral agents people belong to and share moral networks within a 
community. In that sphere people have certain obligations to respond to those 
members who need our care within our network. Thus, one's own concern for the 
welfare of particular others itself defines the caring point of view: 
In responding, we do not appeal to abstract principles ... rather we 
pay attention to the concrete other in his or her real situation. We also 
pay attention to the effect of our response on the networks of care that 
sustain us both (Manning, 1992, p. xiv). 
This is clearly in opposition to a Kantian perspective which requires an impartialist 
duty-driven moral motivation based on a fundamental respect for the moral law, 
whereas, a care-focused approach calls for a moral motivation based on a direct 
emotional concern for particular others. 
Noddings (1987) similarly argues for a caring approach to ethics. Her ethics of care 
is embedded in personal relations and the relationships held between two parties: one 
that is doing the caring, and one that needs to be cared for. She places emphasis on 
the fact that we are dependently connected to concrete interactions between 
particular persons, and that we decide what we ought to do and value by asking 
ourselves what an ideal caring self would do in that situation. 
Baier's (1994) views may also be considered compatible with a care-focused 
perspective. Morality, she explains, is about preserving the conditions of care and 
mutual care. Care ethics should be reframed as an ethics of love and responsibility 
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based on trust and obligation. In "appropriately trusting" relationships we find the 
model for good human relationships, a model that uses a language that can 
accommodate both male and female points (p. 10). Baier (1994) states: 
A moral theory that made trust its central problem could do better 
justice to men's and women's moral intuitions than do the going 
men's theories (p. 17). 
Baier (1994) also discusses the nature of power within her approach to ethics (see 
below) as she criticises the justice perspective and its patriarchal past. She believes, 
"traces of the old patriarchal poison still remain in even the best contemporary 
theorising" (p. 27). Baier (1994) concentrates much of her work on considering 
whom we should trust with coercive power. She analyses moral obligations from the 
point of view of those without power and advocates that trust relationships are better 
than contractual ones because the essence of trust relies on the good will of others. 
In trusting someone we make ourselves vulnerable, but we need to be able to trust 
others, because we are not self-sufficient. 
Baier concludes that theorists should not become preoccupied with the justice 
perspective as justice is simply one virtue among many and not necessarily the 
primary virtue of social institutions. An adequate moral theory must leave room for 
other values and listen to "differences in tone of voice, " as these differences do 
make a difference to the way we conceptualise moral problems (Baier, 1994, p. 19). 
There is much more to be said on this point but it is not the purpose to elaborate 
further here in the thesis. 
Closely related to this approach are the works of Ruddick (1989) and Whitbeck 
(1984) who assert that traditional theories have relegated the proper care of children 
to the private peripheries. Ruddick (1989) proposes that one type of specific 
relationship, that is, mothering person to child, provides the blueprint for the ideal 
model of human interaction. 
Held (1994), Ruddick (1989) and Whitbeck (1984) criticise the notion of human 
relations founded upon equally informed and equally powerful adults as such 
transactions are mostly carried out between unequals. Tong (1997) also argues that 
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ethics is not gender-neutral because it has continued to favour theories like the 
contract model, which speak much more to men's experiences than to women's. 
There are many criticisms of the feminine perspective of ethics. First, it must not be 
assumed that justice and care are necessarily gender-correlated. An ethic of care 
should not replace an ethic of justice. Both are important facets of morality. As 
Hekman (1995) states, getting it right in ethics will not mean a massive 
reconstruction of moral theory; it is self-defeating to suppose that the feminist ethics 
can counter the masculinist ethics. There is no singular truth. A feminist absolutism 
would be indistinguishable from the masculinist tradition it purports to critique. 
Hekman (1995) calls for a non-absolutist approach that welcomes pluralistic 
theories. 
Secondly, many theorists argue that it is in women's best interests that this supposed 
gender-correlation is denied (Jaggar, 1991). It is problematic to assign to women the 
kinds of traditional gender stereotypical roles that they have fought for so long to 
break away from (Tong, 1997). As Sherwin (1991) states: 
. .. 
it is necessary to be wary of the implications of gender traits 
within a sexist culture. Because gender differences are central to the 
structures that support dominance relations, it is likely that women's 
proficiency at caring is somehow related to women's subordinate 
status (p. 18). 
3.2 Feminist Ethics proper 
Feminist ethics is different from feminine ethics. The notion of feminist ethics 
proper or power-focused ethics derives from the explicitly political perspectives of 
feminism and offers suggestions for how ethics must be revised if it is to understand 
the patterns of dominance and oppression as they affect women (Sherwin 1989). 
Hence, feminist ethics, in this sense, incorporates a critique of the specific practices 
that constitute women's oppression and is concerned with the elimination or 
modification of any structure or set of norms that contribute to this oppression. 
Political critiques of the discipline of philosophy as a masculine and biased preserve 
form the substantive works of this approach. Theorists argue that dominant 
conceptions of equality, justice, rights, liberty, and autonomy are more or less 
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sublimated portrayals of a male rather than a gender-neutral mode of being. 
Feminists were initially concerned with specifying the nature of masculinist bias in 
moral and political theory. For example, Lloyd's (1995), Man of Reason and Okin's 
(1979) examination of women's exclusion from the political realm. The association 
of masculinity with rationality and objectivity effectively excludes women from both 
the moral and the political realms. 
In her influential book, Lloyd (1995) considers the extent to which philosophy is 
deeply permeated with masculine values and how such values are indelibly 
imprinted on underlying methodologies and epistemologies. She explains that 
reason is promoted to the realms of masculinity and that this becomes reinforced and 
consolidated by particular social structures. Consequently, it is argued that 
traditional theories have neglected women's interests and favoured male experience. 
Theorists consider how this bias can be corrected and how patriarchal modes of 
thought can be eliminated (Frazer et al., 1992). Jaggar (1991) argues that it is 
imperative to acknowledge and critique the gender-biased character of most non- 
feminist approaches to ethics and to begin from the position that the moral 
experience of women is just as worthy of respect as men's. 
Among recent power-focused feminist approaches to ethics are the so called lesbian 
approaches to ethics (Hoagland, 1988; and Daly, 1984). Here heterosexism rather 
than sexism in general is viewed as the primary cause of women's subordination 
Tong (1997). Daly (1984) argues that ethics must undergo a radical transformation 
of its traditional male values. She rejects the concepts of men's justice and women's 
care and proposes a model of morality based on Nemesis and the importance of 
retributive justice. Hoagland's (1988) book, Lesbian Ethics, is one of the strongest 
voices denying masculinist ethics. Her basic premise is that, if we embrace any part 
of a traditional ethics, then we will never escape bias or the grounding assumptions 
of traditional ethics. She argues that capturing ethics in terms of principles will 
always be considered necessary. Hoagland, however, champions the notion of 
attending to one another and individual needs. In doing so, she argues, we increase 
the capacity of our moral agency. The goal of such attending is not power or control, 
but, rather, empowerment and enablement. Although Hoagland's analysis is intended 
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only for lesbians, Hekman claims it makes a number of important points. Hekman 
argues rightly that Hoagland is elaborating a position frequently heard in feminist 
ethics today, that is, the claim that we need many theories of ethics to reflect the 
different situations of different women, not just one feminist ethic. For example, 
Hoagland (1988) believes lesbian women ought to create and celebrate their own 
particular values without insisting that anyone follow them. 
Although diverse and often contradictory, feminist approaches to ethics have one 
thing in common: that is, they are sensitive to women's disempowerment morally 
and personally as well as politically, economically, and socially (Tong, 1997). 
Frazer, Hornsby, and Lovibond (1992) similarly identify that a common purpose 
involves the shared desire to understand the social reality of gender relations. 
Feminist ethicists, then, characteristically argue for the necessity of gender 
considerations in any adequate moral theory. For example, both Pateman (1988) and 
Eisenstein (1988) state that liberal political theory is rooted in a concept of the 
individual that is gendered rather than neutral. Moreover, they advocate that women 
can only achieve equality in a political world by denying their embodiment as 
women. Consequently, they both argue for an equality that can celebrate and 
encompass the embodied female. 
Benhabib (1987) points out that very few theorists have overcome their `gender 
blindness' when postulating theories of justice and the community. Held (1993) 
concurs when she alleges that none of the nonfeminist theorists have paid any 
attention to the different experiences of women. 
Even the most cursory feminist review of the work of the leading 
moral theorists reveals that the existing proposals of philosophic 
ethics do not constitute the objective, impartial theories that they are 
claimed to be; rather, most theories reflect and support explicitly 
gender-biased and often blatantly misogynist values (Sherwin, 1991, 
p. 10). 
Thus, feminist ethicists say in a number of different ways that gender matters, even 
in very abstract theories. Moreover, in order to correct the gender bias, it is 
necessary to make gender an explicit element of ethical theorising (Calhoun, 1988). 
Feminist ethics should never begin by assuming that all men and all women are 
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similarly situated. As Gatens (1996) contends, we are culturally and historically 
situated in a society that is divided and organised in terms of gender. In this 
structure the male body and the female body have quite different social value in that 
male bodily experience is often a privileged site of significance where, "women's 
experience is experience within patriarchy, and the male perspective is systematic 
and hegemonic" (Sherwin, 1989, p. 27). 
As a result ethics ought to be sensitive to the ways in which gendered norms affect 
different groups differently (Jaggar 1991). The concept of gender and an ensuing 
understanding of power relations should be made an explicit component of ethical 
theorising. Hekman (1995) states that issues of: 
[p]ower and hegemony must arise, because within any given culture 
there will be a plurality of moral voices and, necessarily, a hierarchy 
of moral discourses (p. 40). 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider how gender influences the ethos of 
any given sporting practice. It does, however, form an essential component of further 
research on fair play. A consideration of the role that gender plays within the 
hierarchy of moral discourse that both determines and constitutes the boundaries of 
the concept of ethos will be paramount if new methodologies and ways of exploring 
fair play are to be adopted. 
Feminist ethics is not entirely distinct from feminine ethics as they both share a 
number of important commitments. For instance, both approaches reject a morality 
based solely on purely abstract reasoning. They advocate the necessity of rooting 
ethical discussion in particular contexts, thus directing us to consider the specifics of 
experience when evaluating the morally relevant features of practices. Feminist 
ethics also shares with feminine ethics the rejection of the notion of moral subjects 
as isolated autonomous agents. As Sherwin (1991) explains: 
In place of the isolated, independent, rational agent of traditional 
moral theory, feminist ethics appeals to a more realistic and politically 
accurate notion of a self as socially constructed and complex, defined 
in the context of relationships with others. Moral analysis needs to 
examine persons and their behaviour in the context of political 
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relations and experiences, but this dimension has been missing so far 
from most ethical debates (p. 19). 
In summary, feminist ethicists have challenged most non-feminist approaches to 
ethical theory in a number of general ways. They have criticised the concept of 
abstraction and argued that universalism cannot cope with the multiplicity of life 
contexts and situations with which we are confronted. They have denied the ideal of 
impartiality which traditional theory adopts as canonical in an espoused gender- 
neutral conception of moral personhood. But, although feminist approaches to ethics 
criticise the lack of previous consideration given to women's interests, not all 
feminist ethicists want to ignore men's interests (Tong 1997). A number of feminist 
ethicists want to try to re-focus non-feminist approaches to ethics providing 
theoretical frameworks, "that embody aspects of equity, empowerment, and social 
change for women and men" (Henderson, et al., 1996, p. 13). 
A feminist approach to ethics ought not claim superiority over traditional ethics. A 
feminist approach considers questions about human conduct with specific reference 
to gender and to the liberation of women from sexual injustices. Hence, "the focus 
of feminism is on redefining the value of women's lives by empowering individual 
women and by making women visible in society" (Henderson et al., 1996, p. 13). 
In the search for an alternative approach, then, some feminist philosophers argue that 
we should favour a more context-respectful theory over an abstract epistemology 
(Held, 1993). This thesis adopts the position that the nature of morality is founded in 
the particular. That is to say, moral systems are specific to particular cultural 
settings. More will be said on context-respectful theory later in this chapter. 
Rule based ethical theories that are detached from concrete human experience and 
developed from the hypothetical point of view are incomplete because they represent 
only one `voice' or theme within morality. Whereas theorists, such as Benahabib 
(1987), Hekman (1995), Young (1990), and Lövlie (1997) argue that context- 
respectful theory `localises' ethics by legitimating norms on the basis of everyday 
practice. This point will be exemplified further in Chapter Six. This perspective 
places perception and particularity as central concerns because it involves those 
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special obligations and commitments that impartialist theories, even if they 
acknowledge as pertinent, fail to account for. 
4 Feminist Morality 
It is not the case, then, that there is a distinct feminist morality "out there" which is 
in some way superior to a `masculinist' version of ethics or inaccessible to male 
theorists. As previously discussed, a feminine ethic that holds the key to 
understanding responsibility and obligation is also incoherent. Rather the case 
proposed here is that a feminist understanding of morality offers a more complete 
way to analyse and examine ethical dilemmas. In the context of sport, we need to 
distinguish what the purported inadequacies of previous moral philosophical 
accounts of fair play are, and what a context-respectful approach offers that a 
universalist perspective does not. More particularly, we may ask how the inclusion 
of a feminist perspective can help our understanding of the concept of ethos in 
sporting games? And how can this perspective help to paint a fuller picture of the 
ethics of sport more generally? What is new with feminist ethics? What can a 
feminist understanding of a context-respectful approach offer us that other theories 
cannot? 
There have been many other theories that have challenged traditional ethics and rules 
based approaches to morality. A number of non-feminist moral philosophers have 
expressed objections to the claims of a universal, impartial, and impersonal 
standpoint (Held, 1993). For example, Williams (1973) criticises utilitarianism for 
its incorporation of a principle of impartiality and believes that such a requirement is 
both too demanding and flawed. He speaks of a loss of integrity arguing that 
impartiality rules out the commitments one has to personal projects which become a 
condition for the integrity of one's own life. Impersonal demands undermine the 
commitments and special obligations to significant others which are conditions of 
love and friendship. It is this cost that Williams (1973) claims renders the theory too 
demanding. Impartiality means a loss of identity, and integrity, thus, utilitarianism 
alienates the individual from one's own moral feelings. He says, "how can an I that 
has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life 
that respects its own interest? " (Williams, 1985, p. 69). Utilitarian morality cannot 
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adequately describe the complexity of the relations between people's and their 
actions. 
It may be argued that feminist ethicists do share some commitments with present- 
day utilitarians. Whilst adopting the formal characteristics of utilitarian thought these 
theorists focus on the overall state of affairs which one can reasonably be expected to 
produce. This move adopts a form of direct utilitarianism which evades the charge 
of `demandingness' as it includes an account of particular feelings and attitudes both 
of agents and of those affected by the actions in question. So, in this sense, a 
utilitarian analysis can focus on concrete experience within the particulars of a 
context. 
Another example may be taken from the communitarian critique of the self as 
autonomous and isolated. Communitarians also emphasise the embedded and 
embodied nature of individuals rather than a picture of the self as a disembodied and 
abstract component of moral judgement. Communitarians, like Maclntyre (1996) 
espouse the value of tradition and practice. Thus, communitarian approaches share 
with feminism a commitment to considering moral judgments within an explicitly 
social context. 
It might be argued that feminist ethics is simply a re-formulation of virtue ethics. 
However, this is not the case. Although both approaches adhere to the notion of the 
importance of character coupled with context, feminist ethics seek to situate and 
evaluate an agent's position within a hierarchy or plurality of moral voices. Louden 
(1993) suggests that virtue theory tells us little about specific moral dilemmas and 
the real positions that moral agents find themselves in. He states: 
Due to the very nature of the moral virtues, there is thus a very limited 
amount of advice on moral quandaries that one can reasonably expect 
from the virtue-oriented approach. We ought, of course, to do what 
the virtuous person would do, but it is not always easy to fathom what 
the hypothetical moral exemplar would do were he (sic) in our shoes, 
and sometimes even he (sic) will act out of character. Furthermore, if 
one asks him why he (sic) did what he (sic) did, or how he (sic) knew 
what to do, the answer - if one is offered - might not be very 
enlightening (p. 195). 
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The criticism of many feminist ethicists is that virtue theory does not allow people to 
speak about the self as they experience it; that is, the self in relation to power 
hierarchies (Addelson, 1991). So, while other criticisms of the ethic of universal 
rules are valuable, a feminist interpretation is apt to be different. Feminist theorists 
pay attention to the kinds of details that are so often missing from hypothetical, 
abstract examples, such as a consideration of gender. Held (1993) argues that 
previous non-feminist theories have failed to listen to other voices in their accounts. 
They have not considered their alternatives from the points of view of women, and 
they have not listened to the voices of women expressing our thoughts, our feelings, 
our concerns. These omissions make a difference (Held, 1993). 
5 Context-Respectful Theory 
The fact that moral theories primarily concerned with justice and rules have been 
favoured has served to fuel a growing dissatisfaction with ethical theories that are 
detached from concrete human experience and developed from a hypothetical point 
of view. The adoption of a principle of impartiality has led these theories into 
trouble. Why should someone who is not already committed to a recognition of 
another's interests take any account of them? Is such "disengaged reasoning" even 
possible (Benhabib, 1992)? This position neglects the importance of particularity: 
Because persons do not exist in abstraction, apart from their social 
circumstances, moral directives to disregard the details of personal 
life under some imaginary veil of ignorance are pernicious for ethical 
and political analysis. These injunctions trivialise many of the most 
important moral facts (Sherwin, 1991, p. 19). 
It seems that impartiality includes a tension between an individual's own specific 
interests and the interests of others. In this regard, Allison (1990) recognises 
Hume's point, how do we square the impartiality requirement with the greater 
sympathy that most people feel instinctively towards their family and friends, 
compared to unknown others? 
Nagel (1986) believes this criticism stems from an attempt to juxtapose the objective 
and subjective standpoint toward actions and their motives. It illustrates the clash 
between the personal viewpoint, and the objective, impersonal viewpoint with which 
the rules view of morality is connected. It must be recognised that each person has 
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desires and beliefs that stem from the perspective of her/his own life. These cannot 
provide reasons for all others. How can we secure fairness by reflecting no point of 
view? 
It is important to include some more detail on the concept of particularity here. Blum 
(1994) argues that there are three aspects or modes to particularity: (1) perceptual 
particularity; (2) the particularistic attitude; and (3) detail particularity. Each term 
will now be explained. 
Perceptual particularity involves the way in which we perceive particular situations. 
Particular situations come to have a particular character for different people. Blum 
(1994) explains that particular aspects of particular situations become salient for 
different people. In other words, we perceive the morally relevant features of 
situations differently. We will see this more clearly in Chapter Six when considering 
some of the conflicting views about acts of fair play in sport. 
Blum (1994) calls the second mode of particularity the particularist attitude. This is 
the attitude that a moral agent has towards particular situations. It requires us to be 
sensitive to the morally relevant details of context and: 
... not 
being quick to assume that a principle which has been 
conclusive in similar situations will be conclusive in the current one, 
and the like. This attitude corresponds to an injunction to keep in 
mind the particularity of situations (Blum, 1994, p. 52). 
The third aspect of particularity is called detail particularity. Here, Blum (1994) 
argues, adequate moral concern for intimates requires a more detailed understanding 
of the context. It involves the process of actually gaining detailed and specific 
knowledge of a situation. This is one of the reasons why the context-respectful 
approach offered here champions the importance of empirical research. It is crucial 
to find out the particular details of the ethos of EWC if we are to understand and 
situate the ethically relevant features of fair play within the practice. 
In summary, it may be argued that principle-based theories cannot adequately 
account for moral perception or moral agency with particular contexts. Abstract 
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theories cannot recognise the personal point of view because agents do not typically 
view the world from an objective or impersonal standpoint. Moreover, their 
behaviour does not stem from the impersonal point of view. Consequently, feminist 
theorists, among others, have found the impartiality requirement of deontological 
ethics, utilitarianism, and social contract theory objectionable. Sherwin (1984) 
argues that, if we accept this impartialist structure, we must sacrifice the significance 
of our own personal feelings and attitudes towards particular persons and 
commitments. She believes that this leads to depersonalising in a serious way for we 
are required to generalise by abstracting ourselves as far as we can from the specifics 
of a particular context. Furthermore, Benhabib (1987) argues that impartial 
reasoning cannot deal with the indeterminacy and multiplicity of contexts and life 
situations with which it is presented. A context-respectful approach must be able to 
cope with conflicting feelings and interests. Here, in some cases, impartiality may be 
useful even necessary but this should not be at the expense of jettisoning contextual 
particulars. 
Friedman (1997) states that the traditional impartiality requirement of ethical theory 
has contributed to the subordination of women in two distinct ways. First, 
impartiality underwrites modern moral theory's commitment to rationality which 
operates to the exclusion of moral emotions. Women have long endured the 
stereotype of being considered more emotional and less rational than men are. Thus, 
Friedman continues, impartiality defines a rational level of moral achievement which 
women have long been deemed incapable of achieving. The work of Kohlberg, 
rooted in the Kantian tradition, provides evidence to support this claim. Secondly, 
the fact that impartiality rejects any bias towards personal commitments demands 
that the moral agent detach her or himself from particular relations and special 
obligations. Consequently, Friedman (1997) argues, it is not surprising that the 
emphasis on impartial reason has coincided with a theoretical neglect of the morality 
of close personal relationships. 
Feminist ethicists have criticised some impartialist theorists for what they consider to 
be their obsessive preoccupation with notions of distributive justice (Friedman, 
1997; Young, 1990; Benhabib, 1992). For example, social contract theory is 
criticised as a deeply individualistic approach that has led to the cultural 
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marginalisation of women. Rawls' `heads of households' are seen as male citizens 
reinforcing the notion of traditional stereotypical roles of men's dominance within 
the private sphere. 
It is presumed that impartialist theories offer a high degree of conceptual consistency 
and clarity because norms are tested against universal principle rather than case. 
They fail in their approach, however, to capture the particulars of contexts (Lövlie, 
1997). Even if universal normative principles were identified, they would have to be 
formulated in an abstract way. This, Jaggar (1991) explains, would mean that they 
would remain indeterminate and vague until they were interpreted in specific 
contexts. Whilst hypothetical abstract reasoning has assisted our ethical 
understanding, on its own, it lacks the depth and perception needed to capture the 
particulars of ethical dilemmas. 
Rawls uses the idea of an imaginary veil of ignorance as a heuristic device. Appeals 
to imaginary cases, however, are problematical as examples ignore the contextual 
features of cases (Jamieson, 1993). It is not the case that we live in morally isolated 
vacuums under an imaginary veil of ignorance. The moral point of view does not 
emanate from nowhere but from somewhere within the narrative of the self as a 
socially constructed being that is part of a community, tradition, and history (Elanen 
et al. 1997). So, the justice perspective or the notion of a principally rule-based ethic 
is criticised with regard to what Blum (1994) calls, "its completeness as a conception 
of moral agency or the moral life itself' (p. 38). The charge here is that impartialist 
theories fail to account for or emphasise appropriately the particularity of moral 
situations. Blum (1994) states: 
The accurate or adequate assessment of particular situations -a 
knowledge or perception of particulars - is not accounted for, or 
guaranteed by, the mere possession of rules themselves ... It 
is not 
the rule but some other moral capacity of the agent which tells her that 
the particular situation she faces falls under a given a rule (p. 38). 
Thus, it may be concluded that an abstract epistemology fails to incorporate the 
importance of needs and emotions, social relationships and responsibilities, and 
sensitivity to context-specific circumstances (Benhabib, 1987). Held (1993) 
explains: 
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Ideal theories of perfect justice or purely rational theories for ideal 
societies leave the problems of what to do and what to accept here and 
now unsolved, even unaddressed. They usually provide no way to 
connect moral theory with our actual experience (p. 23). 
Furthermore, Held (1993) maintains that moral behaviour arises in the context of 
particular lives that are embedded in particular kinds of relationships. Therefore, she 
believes ethics ought to deal with the nature of the relationships that hold between 
those involved in moral practice. Thus, a feminist understanding of morality should 
be seen as a recurrent modification of experience, and context-specific circumstance. 
Thus, in order to examine morality and the nature of ethical concepts we must direct 
our concern to particular concrete activities (Archetti, 1997). In doing so, it becomes 
possible to see how gender affects the concept of fair play and the plurality of 
contested meanings within a given ethos. The experience to be considered is that of 
real individuals enacting discourses embedded in history and tradition. Held (1993) 
explains: 
The experience needed for morality is the experience of persons who 
are at least partly constituted by relations with other persons, not 
autonomous individual agents as such. What we may look to morality 
to provide is guidance as we navigate within our actual, embodied, 
historically located relationships. The morality that will then give us 
unqualified reasons to act, when it can give us reasons at all, will be 
quite different from what would be prescribed for innumerable 
autonomous but essentially abstract and timeless and non-existent 
individuals (p. 38). 
In this sense, moral analysis can be seen as a dynamic cultural code that informs, 
creates, and gives meaning to social relations within practices (Archetti, 1997). 
Whilst there is scope for disagreement with the above in terms of the problematic 
nature of defining particularity, it is enough to throw doubt on the adequacy of the 
rules perspective. The main point, then, is that while there are different emphases 
and inflections in moral theories there is a tendency for some feminist philosophers 
to doubt whether a total reliance on universal and impartial rules is appropriate for 
assessing fully moral problems. Few feminist ethicists regard the impartiality 
requirement of traditional moral theory to be an adequate or necessary standard of 
moral justification. There is more to an understanding of morality than the provision 
of a justificatory standard of moral evaluation. As Friedman (1997) states: 
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Many feminist philosophers argue either that (1) impartiality is 
altogether useless as an ideal of moral justification, or (2) that it is 
useful, perhaps necessary, but insufficient in some way, either 
because it needs to be supplemented by other moral capacities and 
resources, or because it applies only to a limited domain of morality 
(p. 396). 
It is the aim of this work to develop a notion of context-respectful theory that aligns 
itself with the latter position. The feminist understanding of morality advocated in 
this thesis will be used to situate the individual and to determine what it means to be 
an individual in a particular social context. In the next section, it is argued that a 
context-respectful approach can couple the necessary role that impartiality has to 
play on the one hand, with a strong commitment to particularism on the other. 
6 Impartiality and Context-respectful Theory 
The important question becomes how we can capture what is missing in theories 
which focus only on the universal or the general (Blum, 1994). Context-respectful 
theorists attempt to respect the role of impartiality and, at the same time, 
accommodate personal projects and commitments. Moreover, they recognise that 
morality is influenced by social context and its underlying structures. 
There is quite clearly a tension with regard to the most accurate way in which 
morality and social practice can be represented. As Morgan (1994) recognises, the 
debate concerns advocates of impartiality on the one hand, and a socially and 
historically depicted identity on the other. But, as already shown, not only is this 
identity to be considered impartial, but remotely abstract and genderless also. 
In order to offer a meaningful and critical account of any given social practice, the 
philosopher, whilst retaining a commitment to impartiality, must adopt a context- 
respectful approach. Impartiality is not an inherently flawed concept: rationality, 
rules, and principles must not be abandoned altogether. Impartiality plays an 
important role but it is not enough to champion impartiality at the expense of 
recognising the embodied agent situated within a hierarchy of moral discourse. 
Rather, rules and principles should be considered in the light of moral experiences 
offering a morality that encompasses normative principles whilst at the same time 
retaining a strong commitment to particularism. 
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If ethical theory is concerned with treating people as they ought to be treated, then a 
principle of impartiality must be incorporated. What is needed, however, is a theory 
that accepts impartiality, while at the same time allowing room for personal projects 
and commitments. Rules based views on ethics, however, do not have a monopoly 
on impartiality. So, although some ethicists have rejected the notion of the rules 
perspective altogether, arguing that such principles are vague in guiding action 
(Jaggar, 1991; Young, 1990), this is not the case here. 
A context-respectful approach reflects partialities whilst at the same time advancing 
the interests of those concerned. Thus, in terms of fair play, a meaningful critical 
appraisal needs general principles of `fairness' to throw light on the problematic 
nature of moral behaviour in sport. We need more than empirical observation of the 
social practice to construct a high quality evaluation (Saunders, 1995). A 
philosophical analysis is also required in order to conceptualise and interpret the 
moral complexities of the social practice in question. In other words, the conclusion 
of this approach is not that moral principles or rules have no significance at all for 
morality. Indeed, the importance of rules will be developed later in the thesis in 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
Nussbaum (1985) argues that, in order for a moral theory to yield useful outcomes 
when applied to concrete cases, we appeal to general rules based on our previous 
experience rather than universal rules. Although, there may be occasions when rules 
need to be contextually sensitive, it is unwise to consider all rules as mere 
generalisations based on previous experience. Rules do provide guidance and must 
be applied impartially. Nussbaum (1985) argues for combined approach, one that 
links universal normative principles and contextual factors. Central to this premise is 
the notion of perception, "the ability to discern acutely and responsively the salient 
features of one's particular situation" (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 95). 
Most feminist moral theory rejects a pure reliance on particular judgments, and 
recognises that general principles are necessary and that `vagueness' is not the 
inherent enemy. Sherwin (1991) argues that proponents of abstraction are right to 
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insist that we should guard against allowing personal preferences to always come 
first in ethical decision making. She says: 
Morality must include respect for sentiments, but it cannot give full 
authority to particular sentiments without considering both their 
source and their effects (Sherwin, 1991, p. 18). 
Feminist ethics recognises that preferential concern for certain others may be 
problematic, for example, racism and sexism. A morality based solely on individual 
preference is not enough to guide adequately moral action but neither is the pure 
reliance on a principle of impartiality. What is needed is the incorporation of a 
principle of impartiality into the wider framework of a context-respectful approach. 
Thus the feminist position advocated throughout the remainder of the thesis is 
concerned with rules. It neither relies on an abstract account of justice nor endorses 
a relativist stance. Louden (1993) argues that: 
Virtue theorists are correct in calling for some account or analysis 
concerning character/nature of persons, and that no ethics of rules, 
pure and unsupplemented, can do the job, but NO ethics of virtue, 
pure and unsupplemented, can be satisfactory... We need to be able 
to juxtapose irreducible strong notions of virtue along with irreducible 
or strong conceptions of the various act notions into our conceptual 
scheme of morality (p. 202). 
A morality that encompasses normative principles and has a commitment to 
particularism is needed. The impartial standpoint requires that situations are 
conceptualised into general categories. But, as will be discussed in the context of fair 
play and sport, this leaves much rich detail unaccounted for. 
Recently, some feminist theorists have attempted to re-formulate the concept of 
universalism. Elanen et al. (1997) argue that a re-formulation of universalism is 
possible by rejecting the abstract formulations of universalism and opting for a more 
contextually sensitive approach. They state: 
Such universalism would be interactive not legislative, cognizant of 
gender difference not gender blind, contextually sensitive and not 
situation indifferent (Elanen et al., 1997, p. 3). 
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Such an approach is compatible with the type of context-respectful theory advocated 
here. Not only does it make the moral point of view gender-sensitive but also it 
allows for universalism and context specific moral judgements to live together. 
Ethics becomes situated, plural and local adopting general principles to challenge the 
inequalities of social justice. Elanen et al. (1997) argue that an interactive 
universalism incorporates the self as embedded and constituted narratively. It renders 
the abstract procedures of universalism to a continuum where morality extends from. 
... universal respect for all as moral persons at one end to the care, 
solidarity and solicitation demanded of us and shown to us by those to 
whom we stand in the closest relationship at the other (Elanen et al., 
1997, p. 3). 
7 Summary 
The theoretical background provided above has fuelled the approach offered in this 
thesis. This chapter has argued that context-respectful theory represents a significant 
critique to principled-based theories and their commitment to impartiality. An 
account of context-respectful theory and its implications for an understanding of fair 
play in women's cricket will be developed further in Part Two of the following 
chapter. Part One, however, examines current theories of fair play and their 
philosophical foundations. It examines the perspective of formalism and the role 
that rules play in defining the concept of fair play. Context-respectful theory and fair 
play will then be scrutinized. The importance of empirically informed theory will be 
established and the purpose and rationale of `Immanent Critique' explored. 
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Chapter Four 
Fair Play and the Ethos of Sporting Games 
Part One: Theoretical Foundations of Fair Play 
1 Introduction 
Chapter Three examined traditional ethical theories and their commitment to a 
principle of impartiality. The area of feminist ethics was discussed and the notion of 
context-respectful theory proposed. The aim of this chapter is to critically examine 
previous approaches to the study of fair play and the philosophical foundations of 
these approaches. 
Contemporary debates around fair play have concentrated on a number of different 
issues. What is the meaning of fair play? Which ethical principles, if any, has the 
concept of fair play been grounded upon? Has fair play been conceived as a 
normative ideal? Should we accept it? Can we achieve it? Is it empirical 
description? If so, are these descriptions accurate? 
Part One begins with a discussion of formalism and the role that rules play in 
defining the concept of fair play. A consideration of those theories based on the 
virtues and the nature of character and sportspersonship follows. Next, Schneider 
and Butcher's (1998) recent approach to fair play as, "respect for the game" is 
analysed in detail. This leads to an initial examination of D'Agostino's (1981) 
concept of ethos. Fair play conceived as a social contract is discussed along with 
Loland's (1998) interpretation of fair play as a rational discourse ethic. Part One 
concludes by eschewing abstract accounts of fair play in favour of more 
contextualised versions of fairness in sporting games. 
Part Two considers the role of context-respectful theory and fair play. This section 
provides a detailed account of the concept of ethos, and in particular examines 
Arnold's (1997) "moral ethos argument. " Part Two also offers a defence of an 
empirically informed concept of fair play. What constitutes fairness in sport is more 
than just the formal rules of the game. This chapter concludes by arguing that moral 
behaviour in sport cannot be defined in universal terms. To appraise meaningfully 
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the concept of fair play, it is necessary to gain some first hand experience of the 
sporting practice in question. 
2 Rules, Laws and Fair Play 
It is of interest to note how particular games use either laws or rules to guide the 
sporting conduct of their members. In cricket, it is the laws of the game that have 
been developed and codified, whereas, in other sports, such as hockey, netball, and 
football, the concept of rules is employed. The term, `Law' originates from Old 
English, `lagu, ' meaning to be laid down or fixed. Laws of a game serve a variety of 
functions. We think of law in the sense of a legal code, constitution, or charter. In 
sport, laws are the accepted guidelines that govern, limit, and define the relations of 
game playing, thus setting up the basis for fair play. Laws are employed to control 
the actions of players by prohibiting what is considered morally unacceptable. They 
serve to maintain a state of fair play and to provide the means to resolve any disputes 
that may occur. 
The rules of a game may be considered to function in a similar way. Rules have a 
binding force that requires players to conform to specific principles of action. They 
regulate and prohibit certain kinds of actions and are enforced by penalties. As 
Fraleigh states: 
Rules specify the goal-within-the contest which all participants must 
necessarily pursue, the means all participants must use and are 
allowed to use in pursuing that goal, and the means all participants 
may not legally use to pursue the goal (Fraleigh, 1988, p. 268). 
Rules are mostly proscriptions of certain means. For example, in cricket, it may be 
useful to trip the incoming batter but it is proscribed. Constitutive rules prohibit the 
use of more efficient means in favour of less efficient means (Suits, 1978). For 
example it would be more efficient to decrease the length between the wickets but 
this is prohibited. Rules offer directives that are useful in achieving specific ends. 
For example, if you want to be a good cricketer then you must practise your bowling 
and fielding skills. Rules impose external limitations on the means of the given end 
that is sought. For example, do not verbally abuse an opponent. Players accept the 
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conditions imposed on the game and agree to obey the rules. In 1978, Suits proposed 
the classical definition of game playing: 
... to play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by the rules [lusory 
means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted 
just because they make possible such an activity [lusory attitude] 
(p. 41). 
The specific state of affairs that players try to achieve in cricket amounts to scoring 
more runs than the opposition. This is the prelusory goal of cricket, because it can be 
described independently beforehand. The lusory goal is to win the match by 
voluntarily accepting the formal rules of the game (to use means permitted by the 
rules to achieve the desired ends) (Suits, 1978). The lusory means account for those 
actions which are permitted and the limitations placed on players to achieve the 
prelusory goal. Players accept the rules because they make the activity possible and 
because obedience is a necessary condition of engaging in the activity. Players have 
a lusory attitude when they accept the rules and agree for the sake of playing the 
game to abide by those rules (Suits 1978). 
Adopting Searle's (1969) use of the terminology of constitutive rules, Suits (1978) 
defines the same as those that specify the conditions of play within a game, "to break 
a constitutive rule is to fail to play the game at all" (Suits, 1978, p. 38). The formal or 
constitutive rules of a game are those which prescribe and proscribe what can be 
done in the attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs. They dictate which acts 
may be considered permissible or impermissible, obligatory or forbidden. Thus, 
constitutive rules are those that set out the formal conditions necessary to play the 
game. For example, in cricket, an over constitutes either six or eight balls bowled 
from each wicket alternatively (1992, Law 22(1)). There are also other kinds of rules 
that are extensions of constitutive rules and may be deemed regulative rules (Meier, 
1995). They make provision for sanctions in the event of rule-breaking and specify 
which penalties are applied when constitutive rules have been broken. For example, 
if a bowler bowls a `no ball' a penalty of one run is awarded to the batting team (as 
long as no runs were made otherwise) (1992, Law 24(8)). Meier (1995) introduces 
the notion of a third type of rule; namely, auxiliary rules. These relate to conditions 
65 
that govern participation externally and regulate pre-contest requirements, such as: 
eligibility, age, training, court size and so on. For example, in women's cricket, the 
ball should weigh between 140 and 150 grams (1992, Law 5(1)). 
3 Formalism 
Formalism is a theory of games that claims many philosophical advocates. In this 
section, the content of formalism is explained. It is argued that formalism is an 
inadequate account of games. Proponents of formalism include theorists such as: 
Suits (1978), Pearson (1973), Delattre (1976), and Reddiford (1985). Formalism 
refers to accounts of games in which games are defined solely in terms of their 
formal rules. As Morgan (1987) explains: 
According to formalism, the various derivative notions of a game are 
to be defined exclusively in terms of its formal rules. What it means to 
engage in a game, to count as a legitimate instance of a game, to 
qualify as a bona fide action of a game, and to win a game is to act in 
accordance with the appropriate rules of that game. All instances and 
actions that fall outside the rules of the game, therefore, do not count 
as legitimate instances or actions of a game (p. 1). 
The central tenet within formalism, then, is that a game is only realised if 
participants adhere strictly to the formal playing rules. Hence, what it means to be a 
particular game (G) can be defined strictly in terms of the formal rules of the game. 
As Pearson (1995) contends, "a game is identified, or defined, as being just that 
game by the rules which govern it" (p. 183). Hence, games and game playing can be 
defined solely by their rules. D'Agostino (1981) proposes that the thesis of 
formalism includes four distinct statements. These are summarized as: 
1) "is playing G" 
For a player to be playing a game she must follow the formal 
rules of the game. 
2) "is action in G" 
Any action that is to be considered game playing must be 
action in accordance with the formal playing rules. If one of 
the formal playing rules is broken, the player ceases to play 
the game. 
3) "is an instance of G" 
Any activity within the game that is to be considered in 
accordance with the formal rules of the game. Activity that 
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does not conform to the formal rules is to be discounted as an 
instance of game playing. 
4) "wins G" 
To win means to succeed by activity in accordance with the 
formal rules. A player cannot win the game if she does not 
play by the formal rules (D'Agostino, 1981, p. 7). 
The most important element within formalism is the supposed logical 
incompatibility between winning and cheating (Morgan, 1987). This thesis states 
that a player cannot win if she resorts to cheating; that is, it is logically impossible to 
win a game if actions are not in accordance with the formal rules of the game (see 
D'Agostino's claim, no. 2, cited above). D'Agostino (1981) takes issue with the 
formalist account on two points. First, he argues, it makes no sense to say that a 
player is not playing the game if she breaks a formal rule. Rather, it makes more 
sense to say that the player has ceased to play fairly, not that she has ceased to play 
the game in any form. This leads into D'Agostino's second criticism; that is 
Platonism. He interprets the meaning of formalism in the following way, "no activity 
is an instance of some particular game G if any rule of G is violated during that 
activity" (p. 9). So, if an athlete breaks a formal rule then they are not playing the 
game because the game is constituted, and made possible only, by the rules. 
Consequently, the problem with formalism is that games become Platonistic; ideal 
types that are never realised because of particular rule infractions. Games are rule- 
governed to the extent that the rules define the practice and what actions constitute 
fair play. 
Whilst Morgan (1995) agrees that formalism is an inadequate account of games, he 
repudiates a number of the claims that D'Agostino makes. In particular he denies 
D'Agostino's criticisms of the distinction between not playing the game and not 
playing fairly. He also throws doubt on the espoused Platonistic element of 
formalism. The notion that formalism implies a competitor is not playing the game if 
she/he breaks a formal rule of that game is rejected as a condition of formalism 
(Morgan 1988). This is because of the distinction already made between constitutive 
and regulative rules. 
The unqualified claim formalism makes with respect to the 
observance of rules applies to only one kind of rule, namely the 
constitutive rules. It is only the latter [constitutive] kind of rule that 
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defines what a game is in the sense of setting out all the conditions 
that must be met in the playing of the game (p. 51). 
In other words, if players break the regulative rules of a game, then they are still 
considered to be playing that game. Thus, breaking the regulative rules does not 
count as an instance of not playing the game. Only constitutive rules count as 
defining rules of games. Morgan (1988) continues by arguing that the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative rules also resolves the problem of Platonism. If 
the violation of regulative rules still counts as game playing, then games do not 
become idealised types at all. However, although D'Agostino (1981) may have 
misinterpreted the exact nature of formalism when applied to game playing, there are 
three significant problems for the formalist position. The first is that formalism, on 
its own, remains an abstract account of games which has little explanatory power 
when it comes to defining the nature of games and fair play within particular games. 
Secondly, formalism fails to account for the notion of ethos or social contexts in 
which games occur. Thirdly, formalism makes no reference to the fact that rules 
(both constitutive and regulative) are interpreted and applied in concrete 
circumstances within particular games. The foregoing claims will now be considered 
in that order. 
It is not sufficient abstractly to define game playing in terms of strict adherence to 
different types of rules. Likewise, a satisfactory account of fair play will not be 
derived from a consideration based solely on the nature of rules themselves. The 
formalist account, on its own, serves only to provide a limited account of game 
playing that barely touches on the rich, multiplicity of diverse meanings within fair 
play. Games and conceptions of fair play have rich social histories that formalism 
ignores. For descriptions of sporting practices to be more than a consideration of 
abstract, formal rules the researcher must explore the meanings of an ethos in game 
playing and its contextualised constitution. For there is a multitude of actions that 
may be considered, `non-game behaviour, ' which influence fair play but which are 
devoid of all mention within a formalist account. We cannot find out about the 
nature of fair play in cricket, for example, by simply referring to the formal laws of 
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the game. Formalism leaves a void of unaccounted action that is vital to an 
understanding of fair play. As Leaman (1981) argues: 
... if we are profitably to discuss the notion of the rules of the game, 
and of cheating and fair play, we must address ourselves to the ways 
in which players and spectators perceive those rules rather than to an 
abstract idea of the rules themselves (p. 30). 
The second criticism of formalism, then, is that it fails to account for the social 
context of fairness in games. Formalism, on its own, is an inadequate account of the 
nature of games as it fails to offer any understanding of how we say whether an 
action is to be considered fair or unfair. As Reddiford (1981), an advocate of 
formalism, acknowledges: 
The reference to authority and rules settles questions about to whom, 
or to what, disputes concerning the laws and procedures should be 
referred. It does not logically rule out of court questions about the 
morality or immorality of the practices themselves (Reddiford, 1981, 
p. 9). 
Lehman (1981) also denies formalism and argues that before we can make 
judgments about cheating and fairness we must consider more than just the rule book 
and should look at the context in which the game is played. Similarly, Eassom 
(1998) argues that: 
... rather than seeing the problem 
in terms of what is meant by 
cheating (via some sort of definitional analysis) or considering 
whether cheating is immoral or amoral, the approach ought to be one 
examining the appropriateness of the particular conceptions of fair 
play used in any such analysis and by examining what conception of 
morality is being assumed (p. 58). 
Adopting a formalist approach leaves so much rich detail about the nature of games 
unaccounted for. Following the rules of a game creates a minimal standard or 
framework for fair play but it is the case that fair play applies to those particular 
situations that occur within the context of the game but are outside the jurisdiction of 
the rules. Defining fair play in a formal manner does not allow for the multitude of 
actions that occur within the realms of fair play but which cannot be found pertaining 
to any formal rule. It must be supplemented, therefore, with an additional account of 
games as social practices. Consequently, it is argued that an interpretation of the 
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social context of games must be incorporated within a formalist approach if we are to 
understand what constitutes fair play in sporting games. As Leaman (1981) suggests: 
The next step is to determine what notion of fair play is applicable 
within the context of the ways in which players actually participate in 
sporting activities. An injection of realism into philosophical 
discussions of cheating and fair play is long overdue (p. 30). 
This thesis hopes to `inject some realism' into previous philosophical considerations 
of fair play. The third criticism aimed at formalism is the notion of rules and their 
interpretation. As Wittgenstein explained, a rule cannot determine its own 
application (McNamee, 1998). In other words, the meaning of a proposition must be 
understood in terms of its context; that is, in terms of the rules of the game of which 
that proposition is a part. Hence, the key to the resolution of issues of fair play is the 
process of examining and describing rule application in context. 
Fair play includes not only formal rules but also social rules. They are both part of 
the framework where human standards of acceptability, values, and norms, become 
incorporated within the context of an ethos. Thus, what is seen to be fair play in sport 
can change historically and differ between groups within a sporting tradition. Thus, a 
consideration of practices surrounding the application of rules to games is of vital 
importance (Nilsson, 1997). An examination of the application of rules enables the 
researcher to determine what characterises a particular sport: their interpretation 
helps determine which characteristics will be emphasised and what will be 
overlooked (Nilsson, 1997). Reddiford (1998) refers to the interpretive nature of 
rule application when he states: 
... the shape that the rule makes possible can 
be attained and 
preserved in the face of sporadic wrong doing provided the 
motivations of most players (and spectators, coaches, and 
management) are strong enough to exclude persistent defection, in 
response to persistent defection (p. 229). 
So, although games are partly defined by rules, these rules always have to be 
interpreted in practice. For example, the polymorphous character of laws in cricket 
often calls for the need for interpretation and judgement to decide how, if, and when, 
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a particular law should be applied. For example, consider the law in cricket that 
governs Leg Before Wicket (LBW). This law stipulates that: 
1 Out LBW 
A) The striker shall be out LBW if he (sic) first intercepts with any 
part of his (sic) person, dress, or equipment a fair ball which would 
have hit the wicket and which has not previously touched his (sic) bat 
or a hand holding a bat, provided that: - 
(i) The ball pitched, in a straight line between wicket and wicket 
or on the off side of the Striker's wicket, or was intercepted 
full pitch. 
and 
(ii) the point of impact is in a straight line between wicket and 
wicket, even if above the level of the bails. 
B) Striker Making No Attempt To Play The Ball 
The striker shall be out LBW even if the ball is intercepted outside the 
line of the off-stump, if, in the opinion of the Umpire, he has made 
no genuine attempt to play the ball with his (sic) bat, but has 
intercepted the ball with some part of his (sic) person ad if the other 
circumstances set out in (A) above apply (emphasis added, 1996, Law 
36, p. 40). 
As will be examined in Chapter Six, this law, like many other rules in competitive 
games, calls for the subjective interpretation of the umpire. In summary, if no game 
can be completely defined by its rules then formalism fails, on its own, as an 
adequate account of games. Formalism cannot be used to define what is meant by 
fair play because fair play as adherence to rules does not account for the variety of 
sporting actions as played and practised. It is clear, then, that more than just an 
account of the formal rules is needed to ascertain the complex nature of fair play. 
Fair play concerns not only the formal rules of the game but also the context in 
which those rules are applied. Fair play in cricket, then, concerns both the formal 
laws that govern play and the ensuing cultural norms as to how those laws ought to 
be administered in practice. It is not that formalism is redundant but that it must be 
supplemented with an account of games that is situated and embedded in context. 
This is the linchpin of my argument, and, accordingly, will be defended throughout 
the remainder of the thesis. In an attempt to explain the nature of fair play, different 
authors have adopted different approaches. The following section briefly considers 
accounts of fair play based on notions of virtue, good character, and 
sportspersonship. 
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4 Fair Play and Virtue Theories 
Within the body of sport philosophical literature, the notion that fair play is 
integrally bound to connotations of sportspersonship and good character is 
commonplace. Theorists look to the essence or purpose of sport and seek to generate, 
from that nature, the moral ideals of sportspersonship and fair play. 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) after Kohlberg (1981) call this the bag of virtues 
approach to fair play. This is because theorists try to take a list of not necessarily 
related virtues (praiseworthy attributes) and associate them, or apply them to 
sporting conduct. For example, Bredemeier and Shields (1994) propose four 
elements of character: compassion, fairness, sportspersonship and integrity. The 
elements are derived from their developmental model of moral reasoning, and then 
applied to particular sporting situations. The point of defining character in this way is 
to allow the researcher operationally to define measurable behaviours. This means 
that data can be collected and analysed in different sporting situations. Fair play is 
defined positively. For example, shaking hands with opponents, congratulating 
teammates and so on, whereas actions such as violence, dissent, or abuse of other 
players is defined negatively. 
Lumpkin, Stoll, and Beller (1994) adopt a similar approach. They offer us an 
analysis of fair play based on a Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning. They argue 
that the greater our ability to reason the better able we are to solve moral issues. 
Moreover, they propose we must develop an impartial reasoning system in order to 
be fair. Lumpkin et al. (1994) argue that moral character is made up of three 
different components: moral knowing, moral valuing and moral action. They also 
propose four fundamental moral values that underlie character: justice, honesty, 
responsibility and beneficence. Together these are proposed as the basis of a 
reasoning strategy for fair play behaviour. Schneider and Butcher (1998) state that 
the impetus to the above approaches comes from the desire to use sport as a vehicle 
to teach social values. Desirable character traits are identified and then sport is used 
to teach such values through structured sport programs. 
Both Bredemeier & Shields (1994), and Lumpkin et al. (1994) argue that sports 
encompass ethical decision making because they are played by human beings. They 
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propose that universal moral rules apply to sporting situations. Investigations are 
made to discover what sort of behaviour is necessary if we are to be considered 
morally good sports persons. 
Feezell (1995) uses an Aristotelian account arguing that sportspersonship is a mean 
between non-seriousness and dedication and commitment. He states that 
sportsmanship: 
... 
is a mean between excessive seriousness, which misunderstands 
the importance of the play-spirit, and an excessive sense of 
playfulness, which might be called frivolity and which 
misunderstands the importance of victory and achievement when play 
is competitive (p. 158). 
In other words, sportsmanship is a virtue that is a mean between two extremes. 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) argue persuasively that we should dismiss the bag of 
virtues approach because it offers no defensible method of deciding which 
characteristics or actions should fall within the relevant definitions of sportsmanship 
proposed. Moreover, there is no way of deciding between competing claims. In 
summary, fair play in sport cannot be simply understood as set of praiseworthy 
attributes or virtues displayed by the performer. 
5 Fair Play as Respect 
The notion that fair play is fundamentally about respect is a common thread among 
philosophical accounts (International Council for Sport and Physical Education 
(ICSPE), 1996; International Council for Fair Play, (ICFP), 1994; Council of 
Europe, 1993; Schneider and Butcher, 1998). Fair play is defined as much more than 
a strict adherence to the written rules of the game. Such accounts employ the concept 
of respect to incorporate notions of, respect for the spirit of the rules, respect for 
opponents, and respect for the game itself. 
For example, ICSPE (1996) defines fair play, first and foremost, as respect for the 
rules of the game. However, they suggest that respect for the rules is due to a respect 
for the spirit of the game, rather than for the letter of the rules. It is about the attitude 
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and conduct that players display. Similarly, ICFP (1994) incorporates the notion of 
respect when describing the meaning of fair play: 
Fair Play does not only mean adherence to written rules; rather it 
describes the right attitudes of sportsmen and women and the right 
spirit in which they conduct themselves: showing respect for the other 
and care for his or her freedom from bodily or psychological harm 
(ICFP, 1994, p. 12). 
As a minimum requirement, then, fair play is about abiding by the rules of the game. 
But the concept of fair play implies that much more is required and expected. Rule 
following extends to include the concepts of respect for others' interests, and 
sportspersonship. For example, Keating (1995) examines fair play as sportsmanship. 
The idea of acting within the spirit of a game is central to the adherence of a legal 
code or list of formal rules. The Council of Europe (1993) speaks of fair play in 
much the same way, adding further the concepts of cheating, gamesmanship, unequal 
opportunities, and violence: 
Fair play is defined as much more than playing within the rules. It 
incorporates the concepts of friendship, respect for others and always 
playing in the right spirit. Fair play is defined as a way of thinking, 
not just a way of behaving. It incorporates issues concerned with the 
elimination of cheating, gamesmanship, doping, violence (both 
physical and verbal), exploitation, unequal opportunities, excessive 
commercialisation, and corruption (Council of Europe, 1993, p. 1). 
The ICFP argues that fair play should be considered in two different ways; namely, 
individual and structural. The perspective of the individual refers to the personal 
responsibilities that participants have towards others. For example, respecting one's 
opponents, trying to achieve success, accepting the rules and decisions of the referee, 
self-control, and self-discipline. The perspective of structural fair play refers to the 
responsibility of governing bodies to make rules that are fair and also ensure sport is 
exciting and attractive (ICFP, 1994). 
One of the most recent and comprehensive accounts of fair play employs the notion 
of respect and this will be considered in detail next. It is Schneider and Butcher's 
(1998) definition of fair play as respect for the game (RFTG). They offer an eclectic 
position but do not commit themselves to the importance of empirically informed 
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theory. They start by arguing that there are two similar senses to the notion of 
respect. First, one can respect merely by observing or following. For example, 
when driving, we observe and abide by the laws of the road. We wear our seat belts, 
pay our tax and insurance, and so on. In the second sense, respect involves 
connotations of honouring, holding in regard, esteeming, or valuing. This is the view 
operative in moral discussions of respect for autonomy, or equal respect for persons. 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) contend, from a moral point of view, we should value 
the rights and preferences of others as we value our own. The authors propose that 
the two senses of respect run together within the context of sport. Their argument 
can be summarised as follows. Sports are games that are made up by their rules. As 
such, there is a requirement that we respect the rules of the game. We do not treat the 
rules of the game in the same way that we treat the rules of the road rather we honor 
or hold in esteem the rules of sport. Thus, they argue, fair play is best defined in 
terms of respect for the game. Moreover, if an athlete `honours' her sport, she will 
want to exhibit fair play. 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) believe that this provides a coherent conceptual 
framework for arbitrating between competing claims and actions. However, their 
distinction between respect and rules is unclear. Just because games have rules does 
not mean that athletes respect those rules in the manner described by Schneider and 
Butcher. Indeed, rules of games are treated in the same ways as rules of the road. For 
example, consider auxiliary rules. Such rules are not held in esteem or honoured in 
some way. Perhaps this is not intended. It seems that Schneider and Butcher are 
referring to the types of rules that preserve some kind of goodness or essence of 
sport that would otherwise be spoiled. If this is the case, then such rules may indeed 
be accorded greater weight. These rules might include honouring or valuing the law 
that stipulates the seam of a cricket ball must not be lifted or damaged by the fielding 
team. Leaving this distinction aside, the authors state further that: 
... sports are practices and that practices are the sorts of things that 
can have interests. Respect for the game will thus entail respect for the 
interests of the game (or sport) as a practice (p. 9). 
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The next part of their argument states that sports are games that have been artificially 
constructed from their rules. Schneider and Butcher (1998) suggest that sport 
participation is chosen and takes one outside of everyday life. They state that a game 
creates its own standards of excellence in that what counts as skill and winning is 
defined through the game. Rules make the game possible where activities of the 
sport are inherently worthwhile. Thus, the rules that make those activities possible 
are due honour and respect. Therefore, respect for the game entails respect for the 
rules of the game. The jump made between the notion that games create their own 
internal standards of excellence, that rules make inherently worthwhile activities 
possible, and that rules should be respected remains, at best, unclear. Schneider and 
Butcher (1998) fail to articulate the reasons why such rules should be respected. 
Rules are due honour and respect precisely because they are the means to preserving 
the internal goods of the practice. 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) support the view that games can be defined using a 
combination of rules and ethos. Their use of the term ethos, however, implies that 
there must necessarily be one ethos of a game. 
Because there are choices to be made about the way the game is to be 
conducted, we need to agree on what will count as fair and what will 
not. Otherwise we run the risk of engaging in different enterprises and 
thus failing to contest at all. If players wish to contest, they must agree 
on the precise nature of the contest (p. 10). 
Such a position implies that the very nature of ethos is a singular system of knowing 
that can be precisely agreed upon. It is argued here that an ethos consists of a 
plurality of different voices often in disagreement as to exactly what constitutes fair 
and unfair play. Despite such discord, however, it is not the case that teams are 
engaged in different enterprises or have ceased to compete at all. The latter point 
illustrates D'Agostino's (1981) criticism of formalism. The contested plural nature 
of an ethos will be illustrated with empirical evidence later in the thesis when 
considering internal and external disagreements within elite English women's cricket 
and their international competitors. 
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Next, Schneider and Butcher (1998) champion a Maclntyrean defintion of sports as 
practices. The definition of a practice according to Maclntyre (1996) is: 
... any coherent and complex 
form of socially established co- 
operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and the human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended (p. 187). 
Maclntyre makes the distinction between external and internal goods. Internal goods 
are those benefits or goods only available through the practice itself, whereas, 
external goods may be described as money or fame. Practices have internal standards 
of excellence, rules, authority, traditions, and are living, dynamic, and changing 
entities (Schneider and Butcher 1998). Any changes that occur must originate within 
the practice itself. Maclntyre argues that, as a member of a practice, one's attitudes 
and preferences become shaped by the practice. Schneider and Butcher argue that 
this is most significant, since to respect the game requires that one takes on or 
assumes the interests of that game. They argue that to be engaged in a practice means 
you respect the practice and acquire and assume a new set of interests. The interests 
of the sport become the interests of the athlete. 
One of the problems here is that the authors have not considered the sorts of interests 
that games have. Questions concerning the specific interests of games must be 
asked. For example, in this thesis the interests of elite women's cricket as a game 
and as an institution will be considered. Moreover, Schneider and Butcher (1998) 
argue that if you respect the game you honour the standards of excellence defined by 
that game. To accept the standards of the game is to act accordingly. The authors do 
not explain where these internal standards come from or elaborate on how they are to 
be justified. If the interests of the game provide a means of judging one's own 
actions in relation to the sport then an account of the means in which they do so 
ought to be provided. It is not clear in their account what it means to assume the 
interests of the practice and to strive for the good of the game. Furthermore, the 
authors suggest, taking the interests of the game seriously means that we ask 
ourselves whether or not an action we were contemplating would be good for the 
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game concerned, if everyone did it. This seems like a revised version of the 
categorical imperative discussed previously; namely, act in such a way that at the 
same time you can will your action to become universal law. 
Lastly, Schneider and Butcher (1998) contend that fair play as RFTG has important 
practical implications. The first is on a personal level where RFTG offers a 
guideline for an athlete to decide which appropriate action she should take. The 
second concerns actions and decisions at the level of policy. Fair play as RFTG 
means that the institutions of sport make decisions based on the best interests of the 
game concerned. 
The approach offered by Schneider and Butcher (1998) provides an excellent 
framework for asking some important questions. For example, what are the practices 
that make for better sport? Where do the internal standards for games-as-practices 
come from? The authors acknowledge the important role that an examination of the 
idea of ethos has to play for a contextually rich account of fair play. Moreover, the 
importance of rules, our attitudes toward them, and the notion of a particular 
discourse for fair play within games-as-practices represent significant developments 
in the way that fairness has been conceived in previous literature. 
They argue that fair play as RFTG offers an alternative powerful conception that is a 
process grounded in sport that possesses its own sport-based motivations for 
fairness. Indeed, on the issue of intimidation, Schneider and Butcher (1998) admit 
that a sport-by-sport analysis is most relevant. However, what is missing is the 
conviction to the importance of empirical examination. Such an account must be 
present if we are to `get at' a richer, deeper understanding of fair play. Later in this 
chapter, more will be said about the concept of an empirically informed theory and 
its importance for understanding fair play. 
In summary, under the promising guise of offering a more realistic grounding of fair 
play in the gratuitous logic of sport itself, fair play as RFTG remains disappointingly 
an abstract and speculatively remote account. It is incomplete and leaves a whole 
range of considerations unaccounted for. What are the interests of sport that are to be 
held internally worthwhile and hence respected for the good of the game? The reader 
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(athlete? ) is left wondering how RFTG can deal effectively with issues of fair play 
that occur not within the general sphere of sport but within particular games. Such 
dilemmas must be considered within context. The next section provides a 
preliminary understanding of the idea of ethos. 
6 Ethos -A Preliminary Understanding 
As previously discussed (Chapter 4, Part 2), following the rules of a game creates a 
minimal standard or framework for fair play. But, as Reddiford (1985) explains, 
rules leave a wide range of options open as they do not legislate for motives and 
purposes. Often, the interpretation of the rules, strategies, and tactics is left open for 
the players to decide the appropriate actions. 
The notion `ethos' has a relatively clear conceptual boundary. Within the fair play 
literature accounts of the idea of ethos attempt to explain the multiplicity of diverse 
meanings attached to practices that formalism cannot account for. For example, 
Midgley (1974) argues for an account of games that recognises more than just the 
formal rules but allows for the context or manner in which such rules are enacted. 
She states: 
The restraining rules are not something foreign to the needs or 
emotions involved, they are simply the shape which the desired 
activity takes. The Chess Player's desire is not a desire for general 
abstract intellectual activity, curbed and frustrated by a particular set 
of rules. It is a desire for a particular kind of intellectual activity, 
whose channel is the rules of chess ... The Football player 
does not 
just want to rush about kicking things. He wants to do so in a special 
context of ordered competition with companions ... 
(p. 243). 
In the literature on ethos and sports D'Agostino (1981) is the locus classicus. He 
coined the term ethos based on the idea that rules are applied in games within 
particular contexts and circumstances. He argues that the ethos of a game should be 
considered as those conventions in which the formal rules of a game are interpreted 
and applied in concrete circumstances. By introducing the notion of an ethos over 
and above the mere existence of game-defining rules D'Agostino attempts to capture 
the distinction between the acceptable and the unacceptable, the permissible and the 
impermissible. He states: 
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... any particular game has an ethos as well as a formal set of rules. By the ethos of a game I mean those conventions determining how the 
formal rules of that game are applied in concrete circumstances (D' 
Agostino, 1981, p. 7). 
D'Agostino (1981) advocates that game derivative notions of rules and fairness fail 
to account for the context in which such rules are applied. Formalism lacks 
understanding of the distinction between the game as a system of ideas and as a 
system of action (Loland, 1998). The former describes those actions expressed by 
the system of formal rules and the latter includes the conduct of persons within the 
particular context that the rules are applied. In other words, formalism, although able 
to define abstractly the permissible, fails to account for the multitude of actions 
outside its jurisdiction but within the boundaries of fair play. D'Agostino thus ends 
with the following revised position: 
The ethos of a game G is that set of conventions which determines 
how the rules of G are to be applied in concrete circumstances. The 
ethos of G should thus figure in the definition of various game- 
derivative notions in the following way ... 
"is an instance of G" 
should be understood as meaning "is activity in accordance with the 
formal rules of G" as these are interpreted by the ethos of G. Any 
alleged instance of some game G is, according to our non-formalists 
account, a genuine instance of G so long as it is activity within the 
limits jointly defined by the formal rules of G and the ethos of G ... (D'Agostino, 1981 p. 17). 
D'Agostino (1981) criticises the strict formalist account and goes part way to 
offering an alternative framework for the role that the notion of ethos has to play in 
defining fair play in sporting games. However, Loland and McNamee (1997) believe 
two revisions of his thesis are required. First, we should avoid the formalism that 
D'Agostino incorporates in his own thesis. His account is incomplete as it 
presupposes an analytical interpretation of games as rule-governed practices. To 
interpret a game merely as a system of rules is to ignore its context: its social and 
historical situatedness. Secondly, the ethos of a game is more than the conventional 
interpretation of the rules; it is based in a larger framework concerning the 
significance and value of that practice in people's lives and within society. We may 
have a moral obligation to keep the formal playing rules but we must consider more 
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than this if we want to know about fairness. The rules alone do not constitute what 
the inner norms and values of that game may be. In Part Two of this chapter a more 
sophisticated account of the concept of ethos is offered, one that considers games as 
culturally constituted practices. Next, a brief examination of theories that interpret 
fair play as a social contract is offered. 
7 Fair Play as a Social Contract 
The use of social contract theory and the prisoner's dilemma to explain the nature of 
fair play in sport is commonplace (Shogan, 1988; Breivik, 1992; and Eassom, 1995). 
The basic idea is that athletes have an obligation to play fairly because they have 
accepted the contract to compete. It is in the interest of all athletes to accept the 
conditions of the contract as it is designed to ensure that competition is carried out in 
a fair and just manner. The Rawlsian notion of principles of justice as fairness 
becomes the basis of the agreement of the social contract. This perspective is similar 
to formalism's idea of fair play as respect for the rules of the game. Fair play as a 
social contract begins from the premise that games are created and maintained by 
their rules. To engage in playing a game is to accept the tacit contract to compete 
within the rules of that game. Athletes must agree what principles to adopt to ensure 
fair play. Thus, any actions that break the conditions of the contract are to be seen as 
unfair or even cheating. The content of the agreement is taken as the acceptance of 
the formal rules of the game. Thus, fair play is merely doing no more or no less than 
you said you would do. In this context, the importance of an ethos is virtually 
ignored. 
Fair play is framed as a negative concept. In other words, fair play is the absence of 
unfairness or cheating, as unfairness is defined by breaking the contract to compete. 
But, issues surrounding fair play are not as simple as this. As Leaman (1981) states: 
... 
it is not at all clear what "equality, fairness, and impartiality for 
all" means in a sporting context ... It 
is not a simple matter to 
determine when the rules of a game are being kept ... (p. 28). 
Notions of fair play are far more complex than the ideal notions of justice as fairness 
which are proposed as a re-formulation of the principles of a social contract 
(Eassom, 1998). Questions surrounding the nature of moral rules must be 
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considered. For example, in the context of sporting games, what counts as a rule in a 
moral sense must be examined. Also, the foundations of our obligations to obey the 
rules of the game need to be discussed. Eassom (1998) suggests that examples from 
sport history can be used to illustrate the potential in a critique of social contract 
theory. In doubting whether sports are really like social contracts at all, he argues: 
Our understanding of playing fair and foul in sport must begin with an 
understanding of sport itself, through history, through sociology, and 
through participation and engagement. It is difficult not to see the 
contractarian project applied to fair play in sport as that of the 
`unphysically intellectual' too far removed from the lived reality of 
the game (Eassom, 1998, p. 74). 
The use of game theoretical accounts, founded on the notion of hypothetical 
contracts, to explain the concept of fair play provides insufficient accounts of games 
as cultural practices. They are not concerned with the idea of ethos and consequently 
they leave out much rich contextual detail about the ethos of a practice. Such 
conceptions are incomplete as they do not allow any room for the consideration of 
the particular moral nuances of the sporting practice. This, we will see later, is 
crucial to an understanding of an ethos and fair play. 
Fairness in sport is framed as a universal agreement; that is, all terms of the contract 
are to be applied to all sports in the same way. Hence, the only relevant features of 
the social contract are the abstract formal conditions of the rules. The details of 
athletes' contingent circumstances are considered morally irrelevant and omitted 
from consideration. Ultimately these accounts remain remote and abstract. The 
following section looks at Loland's (1998) formulation of fair play as a rational 
discourse ethic. 
8 Fair Play as Discourse Ethics 
Recently, Loland (1998) has constructed an account of fair play using Habermas' 
notion of a discourse ethic. He tries to demonstrate how a common moral code of 
conduct can be used to govern sporting behaviour in a cultural setting of pluralism 
and diversity. Traditional ethical theories, he explains, aim to transcend local 
moralities by establishing general ethical principles that are valid for all human 
practice. Choosing the right theory is complex: 
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... the choice of one particular ethical theory or tradition often 
excludes proponents of other views at the very outset of the argument 
(Loland, 1998, p. 80). 
Loland (1998) contends that such abstract theorising fails to account for the 
historical and social dimension of lived human practices. Pluralism and moral 
diversity are taken seriously and discourse ethicists doubt the potential of moral 
philosophy to provide universally valid answers to fundamental ethical questions. 
Loland then goes on to ask, how a common moral code of conduct can be 
articulated. 
Loland (1998) maintains that a principle of fair play is established through reasoned 
agreement among participants in a practical discourse. This may be considered as a 
type of contractualism. As a way of dealing with ethical issues in multi-cultural 
settings Loland (1998) does not consider the implications of a hierarchy of gender 
within a moral discourse. He begins by asking what norms the concept of fair play 
embodies. The point is to establish fair and impartial procedures in which conflicting 
interests can be accommodated and normative claims adjudicated. He establishes: (1) 
a fairness norm; (2) a norm for fair play; and; (3) that one must always play to win. 
Pilz and Wewer (1987) first introduced the idea of formal fair play and informal fair 
play. The former describes adhering to the written rules of the game whereas the 
latter prescribes a certain attitude towards the game; do one's best and respect one's 
opponents. Formal playing rules provide a conceptual framework necessary to 
realise a game in practice. Loland (1998) argues that keeping the formal playing 
rules provides no justification for moral action norms. We need ethical reasons for 
abstaining from rule violations. Loland (1998) offers a Rawlsian interpretation of 
why it is necessary to keep the formal rules of a game. He says, when voluntarily 
engaged in a social practice we enter a tacit contract to abide by the formal playing 
rules of the game. This, he continues, is the core justification of the fairness ideal. 
Loland (1998) asserts that the idea of an `ethos' allows for a more dynamic 
understanding of the game. This is because: 
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... an ethos of a game draws 
distinctions between permissible acts 
which are in accordance with the rules, acceptable acts in terms of 
certain rule violations which are considered as `part of the game, ' and 
rule violations which are considered unacceptable (Loland, 1998, 
p. 87). 
Loland argues that, when voluntarily engaged in sport practice, athletes must keep 
the shared ethos of the practice. But what happens when the shared norms of the 
practice conflict? How does one decide which ethos to keep? How can we determine 
an ethically acceptable ethos? Such questions will be considered in detail in Chapter 
Seven. 
For Loland, an ethically acceptable ethos is one that does not violate basic ethical 
principles. But how do we establish the content of these basic ethical principles? He 
does not elaborate on what such general ethical requirements on social practices 
might look like. What about breaking the unwritten rules of a practice, and as a 
result, contravening the ethos of the activity but not violating any basic ethical 
principles? He alludes to the possibility of Rawls' norm of upholding of justice. It is 
not exactly clear what he means by justice. Why pick justice? This leads Loland 
(1998) to conclude the fairness norm: 
When voluntarily engaged in sport competitions, keep the shared 
ethos of the practice as long as the ethos does not violate basic, ethical 
principles and includes a sense of fairness! (p. 90). 
Loland raises a significant objection to his hypothesis: how can an athlete adhere to 
vague, tacit, unwritten norms, or to an ethos of a game that is unfamiliar to her? He 
explains the idea that an ethos arises through an interactive process between formal 
playing rules and the norms for their interpretation. A player learns and internalises 
the ethos of a practice through experience of the game. 
Loland (1998) states that the fairness norm serves as a basis for reasoned agreement 
among free and equal parties in a practical discourse. This is one element in a 
common moral code of conduct for sport. Another element, he says, ought to be 
included: a norm on the realisation of good games. A good game is exciting, 
challenging, fun, dramatic, and joyful. To achieve these the game must be played 
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with intensity and devotion. This underlines Loland's (1998) description of an 
informal fair play norm: do your best and treat your opponents with respect. Finally, 
Loland (1998) argues that athletes should play according to the shared ethos of the 
practice to win. He calls this a rational action norm. 
9 Summary 
In summary, it is unintelligible to speak of the ethos of sport or the common moral 
code to govern sporting behaviour. We can only ever refer to an ethos as a particular 
set of constructed values belonging to a particular context within a sporting practice. 
To hanker after an essentialist definition of a moral code of conduct that is 
rationalised by reasoned agreement betrays the contextual integrity of the idea of 
ethos and signals allegiance to an inadequate abstract formalist interpretation of 
fairness in games. Part Two of this chapter examines context-respectful theory and 
the idea of ethos in more detail. 
Part Two: Empirically Informed Theory and Fair Play 
1 Context-Respectful Theory and Fair Play 
In order, then, to provide a conceptually dense and detailed account of morality and 
fair play within sporting practice it seems evident that an alternative representation is 
required to that offered by traditional theorists. The need for an alternative arises 
due to the lack of a complete account of fair play that eschews a total abstract 
reliance and allows for an empirical consideration of precise meanings in context. 
As Fleming (1997) recognises: 
... notions of 
fair play are enshrined in the rules and laws of many 
games, yet the precise meanings attached to these, are (at best) 
unclear; and whilst athletes might themselves be intuitively 
comfortable with the value and ethoses of the sport(s) into which they 
have been socialised, this does not serve as a useful, transferable, 
analytical conceptualisation (p. 2). 
The result is that most of the literature that deals with the concept of fair play is in a 
state of "conceptual limbo" (Wigmore and Tuxill, 1995) providing little guidance for 
practical application. Such a position seems odd when the idea of an ethical theory is 
presumably to offer some moral guidance about what one ought to do or how one 
ought to behave. 
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Adopting solely a rules-based perspective cannot adequately solve important issues 
of fair play. Moreover, if the rules view is unable to address the moral nature of these 
very different experiences, then further attention is needed if we are to consider 
actual moral problems as they arise for embodied human beings in specific contexts 
(Duquin, 1991). An alternative account is required that is able to embrace the 
significance of impartiality whilst appropriating the necessity of socially and 
historically constructed identities. Comprehending the particularities of a given ethos 
is crucial to a complete understanding of fair play in sport. 
In order to achieve this our current conceptions of fair play must change. We need 
to couple empirical investigation - what is and what is not fair play in a particular 
sporting context - with critical philosophical analysis. This will ensure a deeper 
understanding of fair play. For, how can we develop a theory of fair play (how 
athletes ought to behave in sport) without seeing what such a theory looks like in 
context? Manning (1992) poses a similar question that is relevant here, "Why 
would anyone think that a theory, presumably about what one ought to do, could be 
worked out independently of its practical application? " (p. 8). To conceptualise 
fairness in sporting games simply as a list of rules or principles oversimplifies and 
misrepresents the complex and dynamic character of an ethos. 
A feminist approach to context-respectful theory and fair play offers an alternative 
account of morality and game playing and serves to re-draw previous philosophical 
perspectives outlined in Part One. The starting point for such an approach begins in 
the practice. Sport is understood as a moral practice within a particular cultural 
constitution that is embedded in a social and historical context. Instantiations of fair 
play are articulated by concrete particulars and legitimised through interpretive 
analysis. The norms of a practice are interpreted by examining contexts and concrete 
discourses. 
Moral meanings in sport are thus considered as essentially indexical; that is, 
dependent on context. It is through their situated use in action and interaction that 
they become concretely meaningful in terms of fair play. In broadening our concept 
of fair play in this way, we are compelled to address issues that otherwise might 
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remain remote and abstract. As will be explained in the next section, the way to 
achieve this is through empirical analysis. 
2 Empirically Informed Moral Theory 
Such a theory of fair play will be context-respectful and empirically informed. It is 
necessary to distinguish exactly what is meant by the notion of an empirically 
informed theory. Louden (1992) notes that moral theories do not simply consist of 
high-order empirical generalisations about moral practice in that, "empirically 
informed moral theories are not the same as empirical generalisations about moral 
practices" (Louden 1992, p. 127). The conjoining of moral theorising with empirical 
work, thus, provides a richer, deeper understanding of social reality. The adoption of 
such an approach ensures that empirically informed moral theory can derive 
understanding from accounts of social practice that are grounded in experience. 
Louden (1992) maintains that moral theory must be empirically informed for two 
reasons. First, knowledge about individual social practices can be acquired 
empirically. The moral inquirer can gain insight and knowledge about the particular 
values and moral beliefs of the group under investigation. In this way an 
understanding of the practice originates from the deliberations of first hand 
experience (Saunders, 1995). Empirically informed moral theory, then, develops and 
constructs depictions of social practice. 
Secondly, empirical knowledge is group or context-specific. Moral issues involve 
facts that are particular to either individual members or groups. Thus, empirically 
informed moral theory can situate these specific circumstances in deriving a context- 
respectful account of the social practice under study. Therefore, it becomes evident 
that the intention is not merely to provide a collection of descriptive generalisations 
about the moral beliefs or attitudes of a particular group. The normative 
commitment of moral theory ensures, 
... that reflections and criticisms concerning 
how to live and act have 
a proper footing in who and where we are and what we are doing at 
present, rather than floating aimlessly above or beyond actual 
practices (Louden, 1992, p. 142). 
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Louden (1992) is too harsh in his depiction of the rules view as aimlessly wandering. 
floating, and ignorant of all relevancies. Nevertheless, his point is clear; we need to 
situate moral action in context. Some might argue, however, that the adoption of 
such an approach amounts to nothing more than a descriptive account of experience 
which is embedded in the traditions and customs of a social practice. This is not the 
case as more than empirical observation is required for a successful analysis. The 
philosopher, when interpreting experience, has no cause to denounce the standpoint 
of critical reflection. Indeed, effective moral appraisal relies on critical reflection. 
3 Ethos - Some further comments 
Arnold (1997) proposes the "moral ethos argument" as a way of understanding fair 
play. He states that the rules of sport are based on the principles of universality and 
impartiality and that the ideal of sport is dependent upon those virtues that serve to 
define and sustain it. It will be argued that Arnold has used unsuccessfully a 
miscellany of traditional philosophical theory in an attempt to explicate an account 
of fair play. 
Initially, Arnold (1997) offers a Kantian approach by arguing that the rules of sport, 
like the moral law, do not permit exceptions. They are universal and impartial 
because they are applicable to all people who compete in the same way. The 
principle of impartiality means that rules are to be applied in a disinterested manner 
where they do not favour one person or team. Arnold (1997) says that athletes must 
understand that not only are they obliged to follow the rules but also they must act in 
accordance with them. 
The reason for participating in sport, Arnold suggests, is the attainment of a valued 
form of life, one which has "its own values and standards" (p. 28). Such a premise, 
while laudable, seems nevertheless utopian when considering contemporary 
professional sport. The rules of sport, Arnold continues, are not just constitutive but 
moral. However, as already discussed, not all rules in sport are moral rules. In 
cricket, the Law that states the bat must be no more than 38 inches in length is not a 
moral rule. Moral rules, Arnold (1997) goes on to say in more detail, are those that 
are concerned with the manner in which players conduct themselves in relation to 
others. 
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... they are based upon such commonly accepted moral 
injunctions 
as: don't cause pain, don't disable, don't deceive, don't cheat, keep 
your promise, do your duty (p. 28). 
Arnold fails to explain why he has chosen these particular moral injunctions. It can 
be argued that the rules of sporting games are rarely framed in such ways. Arnold's 
use of the term, `moral injunctions' illustrates the position on the nature of abstract 
accounts in the fair play literature. They are commonly employed to describe some 
kind of universal fairness criteria, considered attributable to all sports, when they 
should be considered as vague and unhelpful. Consider Arnold's first moral rule, 
"don't cause pain. " He does not explain what this means or in what contexts it 
should apply. Do not cause pain to oneself, to others, or both? What about those 
sports that intrinsically require a considerable amount of pain to even train or 
compete? For example, sports such as gymnastics, endurance sports, rugby, and so 
on. Admittedly, this is probably not what Arnold means for he is referring to the 
intentional infliction of pain on one's opponent. So, what about the case of boxing, 
where arguably the intention is to inflict pain on one's opponent? One only has to 
listen to pre-match hype to hear of the pain (even death) that one boxer wants to 
inflict on another. Perhaps, Arnold would reply that boxing is not a sport at all. The 
point is to argue that the distinctive nature of an ethical ethos in sports cannot be 
captured by appealing to some kind of universal criteria. This is because an ethos is a 
plural, contested set of narratives that produce, sustain, and are constituted by the 
practices in which it lies. Games are played in different settings in different ways. 
The important point made here is that games are played in a particular context, a 
context that uses more than just the rules to define cheating. 
There are moral rules in sport that specifically deal with the manner in which players 
behave in relation to others. But these cannot be simply described with a list of 
abstract "moral injunctions" that are of little use when considering particular games 
and their contextual makeup. Such rules are best examined through an empirical 
consideration of the ethos of the practice and an analysis of the rules or laws of the 
game. 
Like many other theorists, Arnold (1997) argues that at the heart of moral rules in 
sport is the notion of respect for one's opponent. He contends that, for an ethos to be 
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preserved, goodwill and virtues are needed. By goodwill, he means, acting with good 
intentions and for athletes to agree to act in accordance with the rules. It is at this 
point that Arnold (1997) adopts a theory of virtue to support the notion that the ideal 
of sport (which he does not offer an account of) is founded on the principles of 
impartiality. Virtues are needed to save the practice from a "withering death" (p. 29). 
By acting virtuously athletes continue to preserve the values, standards and best 
traditions of the practice concerned. 
Sport as an ideal practice, in keeping with its best traditions, demands 
from its participants that they be fair, courageous, determined, as well 
as friendly, beneficent, and caring (Arnold, 1997, p. 29). 
The point that sport demands that athletes act fairly is a coherent one. Indeed, we 
shall see later, that Law 42 in cricket documents thirteen accounts of unfair play. It is 
difficult to see, however, how sport as an ideal practice demands courage, and care. 
Arnold (1997) continues: 
To be fair and honest in sport is not only to act in accordance with the 
ethos of the ideal but to act virtuously in a moral way (Arnold, 1997, 
p. 29). 
Arnold confusingly talks about the essence of sport and its idealised ethos but he 
fails to offer an account of either. He speaks of the ethos of the ideal: however, it is 
unclear what he means by either of these terms. Hence, his nebulous choice of 
trustworthiness and honesty as the virtues integral to this ideal seem arbitrary. 
Moreover, Arnold fails to consider that the ethos of a sporting game may be 
considered ethically unacceptable. 
Arnold (1997) advocates that sport is a universal phenomenon; that is, it is the same 
wherever it is played. He says that sport is founded on the principles of justice as 
fairness and that ideal performances come through an exhibition of virtues. 
Moreover, he argues that sport is a form of moral universalism. But, as can be seen 
through empirical investigation, sport is not universal in its practice or form. The 
Laws of cricket might be universal but the ethos or ethically evaluative components 
that constitute fair play are not. 
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In summary, Arnold (1997) argues for an account of fair play that is more than a 
consideration of the rules. He attempts to juxtapose a formalist account of games, 
served by universal moral injunctions, with a Maclntyrean account of practices and 
virtues. There is no elaboration on the content of the ideal of sport as a practice or 
the espoused universal morality that shapes and "demands" its assumed ethos. 
What is at the heart of these injunctions ... 
is a respect for the 
participant as a person to whom consideration should be shown, not 
only as a person, but because the ethos of sport as a practice demands 
it (Arnold, 1997, p. 28 emphasis added). 
Arnold speaks of the ethos of sport as if it is something singular, clearly tangible, 
and operating with a consciousness that demands respect for persons. To consider an 
ethos in this way is to misunderstand its dynamic, plural nature - one which cannot 
be defined abstractly as if applicable universally to all sport as one coherent practice. 
Next, it seems necessary to consider a more detailed analysis of the concept of 
`ethos. ' 
An ethos should be considered as an ethical discourse where many voices represent, 
and contest, different values, and norms. The basic assumption here is, that it is 
possible to speak of and to seek, "the characteristic spirit, the prevalent tone or 
sentiment, of a people or a community" (Nielson, 1997, p. 2). The idea of ethos, 
then, in this context is a social concept tied up with attitudes, beliefs, principles, 
standards, and values. The Greeks considered this notion in a more individualised 
way whereby an ethos defined a person's nature, disposition, and moral standard. 
Foucault (1987) argues that the Greeks believed: 
Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject's 
mode of being and a certain manner of acting visible to others. One's 
ethos was seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise 
with which he reacts to events, etc... The man (sic) who has a good 
ethos, who can be admitted and held up as an example, he is a person 
who practices freedom in a certain manner (p. 117). 
It is useful here to consider the idea of ethos as it derived in the Greek language; 
h8oq (ethos) means one's temper, character, manner, personality or attitude towards 
living (Crighton, 1960). It encompasses the values that a person holds, and the way 
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he or she faces problems in life and tries to find solutions. In Greek tragedy one of 
the basic elements of the story is that the hero's ethos must be revealed. As time 
progressed, ethos came to mean those characteristics that one must have in order to 
be a good Christian. This is the meaning which has survived in the modern Greek 
language today. 
In the English language ethos is used both for the singular and plural. However, in 
Greek, r i1 (ethe) is the plural of ethos (Crighton, 1960). The ethe of a society 
refers to many collective versions of ethos. The word, rl6iuog (ethicos) is an 
adjective. It is used when describing the moral content of a person's ethos. The word 
`ethicos' is sometimes used to describe a conservative person. Interestingly, ((xv) 
r 6tivoq means immoral. We can see how the main stem of the word derives from 
rj6tuoq or ethicos. To be immoral means to be lacking ethicos (Crighton, 1960). 
Furthermore, the word sbtµa (customs) refers to those habits used in the practical 
application of the ethe (Crighton, 1960). Next, it is important to consider the 
constituting elements of ethos. 
McLaughlin (1991) offers five necessary interrelated elements constitutive of an 
ethos: (1) dominant; (2) pervasive; (3) established; (4) enduring; and (5) unitary. He 
argues that the values and norms that constitute a given ethos must be dominant and 
shared by most members. They must be pervasive and established and not negotiated 
or concocted. An ethos, he continues, is not directly taught. It is enduring and forms 
a coherent, unitary, stance. It may be the case that an ethos is maintained and 
established by dominant attitudes and by the concrete procedures and practices that 
sustain those beliefs but, as we will see in Chapter Six, McLaughlin is too 
conservative when he argues that the norms and values of an ethos are non- 
negotiable and unitary. To be established does not mean that the boundaries of an 
ethos never come up for re-negotiation. The concept of ethos, its ideas, values, and 
norms are constantly being tested, reworked, and re-negotiated. Thus, a sixth 
element should be added to McLaughlin's list; namely, the dynamic evaluative 
nature of ethos. The idea of ethos embodies a particular determinate and substantive 
set of values which incorporate stability and the homogeneity of value (McLaughlin, 
1991). This does not mean, however, that that stability forms a set of values that are 
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rigid and steadfast. It is precisely because the dynamic evaluative character of an 
ethos can allow for change that it strengthens its ability to continue, adapt, and 
maintain its identity. The fluid nature of an ethos allows the practice to survive, and 
adapt to ensuing historical contexts. Roberts' (1997) Rortian understanding of 
cricketing lives illustrates this point further. He states: 
... cricketing 
lives can be understood as a matter of progressively 
and, to ever more subtle levels of detail, more comprehensively 
acquiring those shared habits of action peculiar to the culture. Any 
change to the collection of beliefs that constitutes the practice will 
reconfigure the practice and what one is, believes, and does as a 
rational practitioner (p. 70). 
Roberts refers to shared habits of action. The idea of ethos can be understood in a 
similar way. The ethos of a sporting practice can be described as a set of shared 
habits of actions and beliefs. Loland and McNamee (2000) concur, when they 
describe an ethos as the relatively shared interpretation of the basic norms, rules, and 
values that justify and regulate behaviour in that game among its members. The 
ethos of a game incorporates a common perception of how the rules are to be applied 
in an ethically acceptable manner. Moreover, it includes common ideas of what it is 
that constitutes a good game and a good player. It also relies on a relatively shared 
understanding of the roles and duties of players, coaches, officials, administrators, 
governing bodies, and spectators. 
The ethos of a game, then, has a strong moral evaluative element. It embodies the 
underlying attitudes and values that athletes have towards themselves and each other. 
An ethos provides the game with a distinct character, meaning, or guiding belief 
(Overman, 1997). In Walzerian (1994) terms, an ethos generates a "thick" set of 
values. The notion that ethos is a thick concept may be conceived as the culmination 
of generations of shared habits of action that have been worked out over a long 
period of time through complex social interactions. That is not to say, however, that 
a new game cannot have an ethos. The point is that an ethos develops with a practice 
and is sustained through complex interaction within. Together these shared 
interpretations constitute the ethos of a sporting game. As Roberts (1997) explains: 
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Collectively they form a highly textured, complex, and largely 
coherent web of beliefs which, as manifested principally in 
nonvoicing actions, largely constitutes both the practice of cricket 
and, to varying degrees, cricketing selves (p. 69). 
The idea of ethos, or the notion of a coherent web of beliefs, constitutes what it 
means to be a particular sporting self-engaged within a practice. Roberts (1997) 
suggests that we: 
... think of a developing cricketing self also as a more or less 
complex web of beliefs and desires that is continually reweaving itself 
to accommodate new cricketing relevant beliefs and desires (Roberts, 
1997, p. 69). 
The ethos of a practice, then, adapts, changes, and reinvents itself to accommodate 
new cricketing values, beliefs, and norms. In order to analyse fair play we must be 
able to describe what traditional values were upheld within the ethos of the practice. 
What was the social context in which the sport arose? We need to define which 
positions people hold in a certain social field and how those positions relate to 
dominant beliefs and value hierarchies within the field (Nilsson, 1997). What are the 
traditions, habits, and norms of this social field? 
Rules form the stable core of an ethos and dictate the boundaries of that ethos. They 
are important instruments in stability and change. An ethos gets its sense of identity 
from the rules. Rules and their application become objects of struggle. As Morgan 
(1988) states: 
But the formal rules, and the above specifications they stipulate, 
comprise as it were, only the outer shell of a game. It is the history of 
the game - its sustaining traditions, lively passions, storied 
commitments, and evolving standards of excellence - that flesh in that 
shell, and enliven it as the specific kind of human practice that it is. 
This is what makes up what I call the ethos of the game as a social 
practice (Morgan, 1988, p. 61). 
Thus, if an analysis of a given ethos is to be successful, it must uncover what 
Morgan calls the "flesh" of the practice. In Chapter Six specific examples will be 
discussed in an attempt to explain how the fluid, plural nature of an ethos operates. 
The passions. beliefs, and storied commitments of the people involved are explored. 
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4 Immanent Critique 
It is essential to consider where the internal standards that justify a set of relatively 
shared web of beliefs originate. In his book, Leftist Theories of Sport, Morgan (1994) 
adopts the method of "Immanent Critique. " This method relies on the normative 
standards within a practice to provide the foundation of a critical appraisal therein. 
In other words, the resources for a potential critique originate from within the 
practice itself; it is immanent to it. Morgan rejects transcendent critique in favour of 
an ethnocentric approach whereby social traditions provide a frame of reference to 
evaluate sporting practices. This frame of reference provides the starting point or 
conceptual material used to bring to fruition a critical appraisal. Immanent critique 
subjects the sporting practice to critical appraisal by making explicit the normative 
standards inherent within. These standards are then used to examine the actual lives 
of the social actors involved within the practice community. 
Morgan (1994) speaks of certain social practices, including sport, as possessing an 
internal logic. The internal logic of a practice consists of a fabric or network of what 
he calls cautiously, "deep structures. " Deep structures, a term borrowed from 
Chomsky (1970), are considered by Morgan to be those that inform, shape, and 
sustain those cultural narratives inherent to a social practice. They allow the 
researcher to `get at' those norms and values that cannot be determined by a 
consideration of the formal rules but are the preconditions underpinning that sporting 
practice. Moreover, they provide the normative standards that a particular 
community should adopt at that time. Hence, Morgan's argument that the reason 
embedded in the normative standards of a particular social practice is immanent to 
them. This is why, he continues, the acceptable normative standards of one social 
practice cannot be used exhaustively to define what those of another should be. 
The moral enquirer takes the experience of the members of the social practice to 
consolidate and legitimise a critical appraisal therein. In this thesis, the experience 
of elite women cricketers provides the frame of reference for the moral enquirer to 
critique the normative standards of the sporting practice. 
Our various experiences and conceptions of the social world are, 
therefore, to be examined and scrutinized by way of principles and 
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standards that are intrinsic to them, that are, in other words, not 
imposed on them from the outside (Morgan, 1994, p. 10). 
The immanent critique here, then, takes as its point of departure the sporting 
experience of elite women cricketers. It considers the `deep structures' of EWC and 
the cultural standards that frame and support cricket as a sporting practice. These 
standards are then used to inform a critical appraisal of actual conduct within the 
practice. In this way the moral enquirer can examine the particulars of a practice to 
place moral issues within a wider context. Thus, allowing for a more conceptually 
detailed understanding of the relationship between fair play and ethos than has 
previously been explained. The researcher is able to explain which ethical standards 
of acceptability ought to apply; that is, she is able to determine whether a given ethos 
should be considered as ethically acceptable. 
In a recent article Roberts (1998) criticises the foundation of Morgan's reflective 
ethnocentric approach by arguing that the effectiveness of Morgan's (1994) 
argument is weakened because he refuses to carry his position of ethnocentrism to its 
coherent conclusions. This is an important claim and will be explored throughout 
the remainder of this chapter. 
Roberts proposes that Morgan's ethnocentrism is founded incorrectly upon the 
search for "epistemic principles. " Epistemic principles (a notion borrowed from 
Geuss 1981) may be considered as a collection of rational standards of acceptability 
inherent within a given community. The search for epistemic principles entails the 
uncovering of second order, justificatory beliefs about the kinds of first order, beliefs 
actually held. The researcher seeks for those beliefs that it is rationally acceptable to 
hold within the traditions that frame sporting practices. 
Within ethnocentrism, Morgan (1994) provides the distinction between, "vulgar 
ethnocentrism, " and "reflective ethnocentrism. " The notion, `vulgar' is itself a 
value-laden term that conjures up connotations of the uneducated, distasteful, and 
crude account. It is not surprising, then, that Morgan rejects such an account in 
favour of a reflective ethnocentrism. Roberts (1998) argues the distinction between 
vulgar and reflective arises because Morgan is unwilling to accept the full coherent 
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(or vulgar) position of ethnocentrism; that is, one that goes "all the way down" 
(p. 72). Morgan, however, remains steadfast that the only way to offer a critical 
appraisal of sport is to adopt a reflective ethnocentric approach and eschew a vulgar 
one. Both approaches share the same reliance on traditions and local practice, but it 
is reflective ethnocentrism only that allows the researcher to adopt a critical 
appraisal. This is because vulgar ethnocentrism has taken-for-granted, precritical 
standards that become internalised as the dominant prevailing beliefs, whereas, 
reflective ethnocentrism consists of those reflectively secured critical norms of a 
practice that can be used to criticise such beliefs (Morgan, 1994). 
Morgan (1998) identifies three significant differences between these two positions 
that amount to the researcher's necessary commitment to a reflective ethnocentric 
approach. The first concerns how the moral enquirer selects standards of 
acceptability. For vulgar ethnocentrists standards of acceptability are simply the 
prevailing dominant beliefs. There is no reason to accept them just because they are 
dominant. Whereas, for reflective ethnocentrists, standards are cultural beliefs that, 
"prove their critical mettle - that is, that survive reflective scrutiny" (Morgan, 1998, 
p. 83). Here, Morgan uses the terms of vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism to 
distinguish between the right sorts of beliefs that form a starting point for 
examination and the wrong sorts of beliefs. The crucial point to be explained is how 
the moral enquirer knows what constitutes the `right' starting point for a critical 
appraisal. 
Roberts (1998) suggests that the distinction between vulgar and reflective 
ethnocentrism is inherently problematic as it is impossible for the researcher to be 
able to distinguish between a principled conviction and a dominant belief. He states: 
The distinction between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism is beset 
by practical problems: problems such as knowing when one has 
discovered a "principled conviction" as compared with a mere 
"dominant belief, " and with explaining how, in dynamic cultures, 
long-standing "principled convictions" are modified or replaced by 
what are thought to be more principled "dominant beliefs" (Roberts, 
1998, p. 73). 
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It is important, then, to clarify precisely what is meant by `principled conviction' and 
`dominant belief. ' Principled convictions are those standards that may be considered 
justified beliefs; that is, there are good moral grounds for holding them. Dominant 
beliefs, on the other hand, may be considered as unprincipled if they do not pass or 
are not subjected to reflective critical scrutiny. Even though dominant belief may be 
shared belief, it does not necessarily mean it will be morally justifiable belief. 
Similarly, it may not be the case that shared dominant belief will be unprincipled or 
that justified belief will in fact be shared belief. For example, an ethos might not be 
dominant, it might only be shared by the minority but it may occupy the only 
morally justifiable position. In order for the researcher to conduct a critical 
appraisal, it is paramount that she can distinguish between those values that are 
shared and justifiable and those that are not. 
For the vulgar ethnocentrist, justificatory belief is founded on `mere consensus. ' 
Argument and critical appraisal, however, play a large part for proponents of 
reflective ethnocentrism where justificatory belief is to be located in a "consensus 
based on good grounds" (Morgan, 1998, p. 84). In order to criticise, the researcher 
must be able to appropriate the principled beliefs without being fooled by the 
dominant beliefs. So, using critical interpretation to search for normative standards, 
the researcher looks for starting points that can be justified on good grounds. The 
critical question, then, becomes how the moral inquirer decides what constitutes 
`good' grounds. 
The ethos of the practice is represented in the thesis through the voice of the 
interviewees. By scouring the experience of elite women cricketers and the formal 
rules, the researcher can assemble the justifications for standards of acceptability 
within the sporting practice. A checking procedure is obtained from the justifications 
for these internal standards and applied to the beliefs of those involved. Adopting a 
reflective, critical role, it is possible to evaluate whether an ethos may be considered 
as ethical. The researcher asks whether the beliefs of the social actors involved 
concerning fair play can be adequately justified; that is, are they based on `good' 
grounds? 
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The second difference between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism concerns the way 
in which epistemic principles are applied to actual beliefs. The vulgar ethnocentrist's 
views derive from normative standards that may be considered morally wrong. 
Consequently, they could prove incoherent in the search for epistemic principles; 
that is, when justificatory beliefs are called for in order to appraise critically actual 
beliefs. The reflective ethnocentrist, however, strives to identify and eliminate those 
inconsistent beliefs which are at the heart of society in order to ensure that dominant 
beliefs are not justified merely by reference to their extant status or just because they 
happen to be dominant. 
Roberts (1998) believes that Morgan's account is pragmatically flawed because it 
promotes certain communities, irrespective of what their foundational beliefs might 
be. He goes on to say that the critical theorist is, thus, severely restricted when it 
comes to telling a `we' whether their ethnos is ethical or not. Roberts uses the term, 
`ethnos, ' meaning Nation, rather than ethos. Nevertheless, his point is relevant also 
to the idea of ethos. He states: 
... ethnocentrically 
inclined critical theorists are severely curtailed in 
what they can tell members of a given ethnos [read ethos] with respect 
to their `true' and `rational' interest (Roberts, 1998, p. 77). 
Thus, Roberts concludes, the critical theorist can only help communities to see and 
maintain their consistent beliefs. This is not the case, however, since the researcher 
is able to say what the interests of a community are because the critical appraisal has 
been derived from the interests of the actors-within-the-practice themselves. The 
account rests on the articulation of those interests that prove good interests for a 
community to hold. These interests, noted earlier, must be based on good reasons 
and not simply on an abstract appeal to transcendent criteria or the dominant 
interests just because they happen to be the dominant ones. Morgan (1998) replies 
by stating that it is not only whether communities' first and second order beliefs are 
consistent but what those beliefs are in the first place. It concerns the quality of 
substance of the epistemic principles. The interests of cricket stem from what it 
means to be a good player, a fair player, to play a good game, to play fairly, to be a 
good institution, and a fair institution. These critical issues are addressed in the 
empirical section of the thesis. The moral enquirer searches for the inside concrete 
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presuppositions of the practice to enhance a critical appraisal of fairness and ethos. 
The internal goods of cricket serve to drive the argument and an understanding of 
fair play. 
The third difference, Morgan (1998) identifies, between these two types of 
ethnocentrism is the alleged "space they make available for argument" (p. 84). 
Proponents of vulgar ethnocentrism juxtapose shared beliefs and justified ones. As 
these beliefs may be considered inconsistent or shallow they cannot be made explicit 
without jeopardising the hegemonic forces that hold them securely in place. 
Consequently, arguments that challenge the dominant, prevailing beliefs are given no 
space. Adopting a reflective ethnocentric approach, however, allows the philosopher 
to stand back from the particular context, along with its ensuing dominant beliefs, in 
order to achieve a perspective of critical reflection. Morgan (1994) states: 
Because this second version of ethnocentrism requires the critic to 
stand back from the particular social relations of dominance and 
authority, and from the dominant set of beliefs of his (sic) culture, it 
can function in a genuinely immanent manner. And because it doesn't 
require him (sic) to retreat to some imagined point beyond the culture 
he (sic) occupies, it can function in a genuinely immanent manner" 
(p. 190). 
Morgan (1998) asserts that one can be a reflective ethnocentrist without resorting to 
a transcendental position. It is possible, once you have rejected transcendentalism, to 
show which epistemic principles are to be favoured. The researcher makes 
considered judgements about which epistemic principles are to be accepted on good 
grounds. She looks for good epistemic principles, that are internally consistent, 
explanatory, and point us to right actions in sport. The reasons for their `rightness' 
are explained and can be extended to consider other examples of fair play and ethos. 
Roberts' (1998) strongest criticism of Morgan's (1994) account is his incorporation 
of a universal, abstract understanding of sport. Morgan repeatedly refers to a 
generalised sporting practice community that appears `genderless. ' Morgan (1998) 
concurs that his initial account of sport was much too abstract and formulaic and 
states that there are many different and particular practice communities within sport. 
Although there is no specific mention of gender, Morgan acknowledges that power, 
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dominant beliefs, and hierarchies within specific communities, have strong 
implications for standards of acceptability. 
Roberts (1998) takes issue with Morgan's insistence that the gratuitous logic of sport 
provides the right starting point for a reflective, critical appraisal. According to 
Morgan (1994) this gratuitous logic is "socially grounded, contingent, universal, and 
transcultural" (Morgan, 1994, p. 215). Roberts (1998) contends, however, that while 
social groundedness and contingency are hostile to transcendentalism, universalism 
and transculturalism cannot be aligned with ethnocentrism. Thus, Roberts 
concludes, Morgan is left stranded between a transcendental approach and an 
ethnocentric approach that "goes all the way down. " This is what Roberts calls 
Morgan's "half-way house: neither transcendental because socially grounded and 
contingent, nor fully ethnocentric because universal and transcultural" (Roberts, 
1998, p. 78). But, to frame the dichotomy in such a way is to miss the point. It is 
possible for beliefs to be specific to particular cultures (context-respectful) and at the 
same time be intrinsic to others (transcultural). There are some ideas that can be 
meaningful to a number of cultures without necessarily being universal. Such a 
combination may be aligned with ethnocentrism. As Morgan states: 
For to claim that the values, beliefs, and standards of rational 
acceptability are internal to cultures and the traditions that house and 
sustain them, what I take to be the core premise of ethnocentrism, is 
not to claim that those beliefs, values, and standards are, and must be 
specific to those cultures (Morgan, 1998, p. 87). 
The right starting point is to be found in neither abstract transcendentalism nor 
vulgar ethnocentrism. Rather, it is located within the empirical investigation of the 
sporting community in question. It is not the case that the researcher subjects a 
sporting practice to a list of pre-established criteria in order to say whether a given 
ethos may be considered ethical. It is also, as previously noted, not the case that a 
given ethos would be considered ethically acceptable just because it was constituted 
by dominant belief. 
In order to determine whether a given ethos is ethical, then, the researcher must 
consider more than just the rules or the social context of the sporting practice. 
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Neither the ethos, alone, nor the formal rules provide the capacity to distinguish 
standards of acceptability within a sporting practice. The moral legitimacy of certain 
practices can be found in an analysis that enshrines both considerations of ethos and 
formalism. Together they enable the researcher to access an internal perspective 
which provides the critical standards necessary to judge an ethos and what actions 
constitute fair play. An ethos gets its sense or identity partly from the formal rules of 
the game. The formal rules of a game are vital as they provide part of a critical 
standard necessary to judge ethos. 
In this study, the empirical investigation has its starting point in the sporting 
experience of those involved within elite level women's cricket. A critique of fair 
play focuses on the moral issues constitutive of an ethos, and the formal rules of the 
game. The researcher establishes the normative standards of acceptability within the 
practice at that time. We must say, "at that time, " because the deliberative force of a 
practice community endures only as long as the standards it prescribes are acceptable 
within these communities (Morgan, 1998). This illustrates the dynamic, fluid nature 
of an ethos and the changing perceptions of what constitutes fairness in sporting 
games. The empirical work here considers a number of important facets. It looks at 
what standards are considered acceptable within the deliberative forces of the ethos 
of elite women's cricket. Moreover, it examines what actions are believed to be "just 
not cricket" and what actions are deemed acceptable that may once have been 
prohibited. 
5 Summary 
It has been argued that a context-respectful approach to ethics and fair play offers 
many advantages. It provides an empirically informed theory of fair play, grounded 
in experience, recognising the plural contextual features of sporting games and not 
simply any strict adherence to formal rule following. 
We will not get to the kind of ethical knowledge we require by defining moral 
behaviour in sport in universal terms. Sport, as a moral practice, is culturally 
constituted. Consequently, we must seek to understand what this contextualised 
constitution means. In order, therefore, to understand and investigate issues of fair 
play and the concept of ethos, for example, it is necessary to analyse the particular 
102 
cultural form of the sport in question. What is required is an account of how these 
constituting elements of an ethos can be explained and justified. 
The next chapter outlines the rationale for the methodology used. It attempts to 
operationalise a different way of doing philosophy; that is, juxtaposing philosophical 
analysis with empirical investigation. This is an attempt, as Baier (1989) says, to get 
moral philosophers to escape the dogma of analytical philosophy. Manning (1992) 
concurs, when she states: 
Moral philosophers seldom if ever feel the need to get out of their 
armchairs and do or even look at empirical research (p. 22). 
The process is not an attempt to discard completely analytic approaches to fair play. 
Rather, the point is to supplement such accounts with empirically informed analyses 
of fair play. Such an approach attempts to retain continuity with the actual practice 
and to safeguard theoretical insight from offering a solely abstract or remote 
perspective. 
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Chapter Five 
Methodology 
Part One 
1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are: (1) to operationalise the juxtaposition of ethical theory 
and empirical investigation; and (2) to provide a framework for how such a 
methodology can be applied. Part One offers a justification for the methodological 
approach used in the study. It examines the foundations of previous philosophical 
theory and considers the relationship between moral theory and experience. In doing 
so, a number of questions are considered. What does a feminist epistemology look 
like? How, if at all, is this approach any better than previous methodologies already 
available to us? Part Two details the construction of the analytical framework used to 
explore fair play and ethos in EWC. The method and process of constructing 
categories and codes for the analysis is described. 
2 Paradigmatic Authority and Epistemology 
The grounds for knowledge, how we begin to understand the world and 
communicate it to others is called "epistemology. " Epistemology (from the Greek 
episteme, meaning knowledge, and `logos' meaning study) is concerned with the 
nature, scope and justification of knowledge claims. Epistemology seeks to inform 
us how we can purport to know the world. 
The concept `paradigm, ' originally used by Thomas Kuhn (1963), is an ambiguous 
term that has been employed in different ways. Among many other claims, Kuhn 
argued that a paradigm provides a taken-for-granted way of looking at things. It may 
be considered as the basic belief system or worldview that underlies a particular 
methodology. Paradigms act as patterns or models for the conduct of research and, 
hence, consist of particular theoretical, and methodological commitments. Kuhn 
(1963) argued that those working within a paradigm share these commitments. 
Thus, a paradigm represents the distinct way in which a researcher makes sense of 
social reality. 
104 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue that over the past few decades `wars' have 
raged regarding the superiority of one or the other of two major paradigms. These 
two models are known as positivist and constructivist. 
In Western culture, the dominant paradigmatic authority in all philosophical enquiry 
has been, until recently, 'positivism'. There are many uses and misuses of the term 
positivism. In this sense, it is Comtean positivism that holds that the Scientific 
Method can be applied to all objects of study including the study of morals. One of 
the assumptions made is that the social world exists as an external empirical entity. 
Positivism assumed the chimera of value-free, objective, rational observation in 
identifying and solving `scientific' problems (Duquin, 1994). This explains why the 
epistemological task of positivism was taken to be the formulation of rules of 
inference guided by observable, objectively determined phenomena. Those working 
within this paradigm believed the only true knowledge was scientific knowledge. 
Positivism prescribes that scientific knowledge must be capable of "intersubjective 
verification: " that is, it stipulates that trustworthy knowledge can be gained only by 
methods that neutralise value (Jaggar, 1989, p. 129). The contention here is that 
researchers should strive to adopt a detached and impartial position from no-place- 
in-particular in the world so that their emotions and values do not influence the 
object or phenomena under study. The core of this logic is the desire for a certain 
kind of objectivity and its presumed epistemological superiority. As Jaggar (1989) 
explains: 
The separation of supposedly natural fact from human value meant 
that reason, if it were to provide trustworthy insight into reality, had to 
be uncontaminated by or abstracted from value [where] the validity of 
logical inferences was thought independent of human attitudes and 
preferences; this was now the sense in which reason was taken to be 
objective and universal (p. 130). 
In other words, reason provides access to the objective structures of the world and 
hence is universal. Consequently, reason provides a safeguard against a depiction of 
reality distorted by intrusive emotions and subjectivity. A theory was therefore 
espoused as the rational formulation of some aspect of a pre-existing reality "out 
there". 
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One of the last bastions of positivism can be found within analytical philosophy, 
where rationality, impartiality, and universalism serve as the stalwart foundations of 
theorising therein (Hekman, 1995). Under this position, Addelson (1991) argues, the 
goal of philosophy is objective knowledge; that is, the search for one world truth, a 
unity of morality for all humankind. 
The philosophical enterprise is dominated by the analytic method that stems from 
abstract reasoning and the articulation of moral principles that are free from 
ideological constraint. There are generally two separate ways of theorising within 
this genre of writing. These are (1) "The adversary paradigm, " and (2) "The negative 
theses method. " Moulton (1989) explains that the adversary paradigm is an 
unimpassioned debate between antagonists who defend their views among counter- 
examples, through deductive reasoning. She asserts that this paradigm seems to 
dominate the methodology of philosophy. Moreover, it restricts philosophical 
reasoning as it strives to achieve abstract universality which is manifested in the 
enchantment philosophers seem to have with hypothetical and imaginary counter- 
examples (Moulton, 1989). The negative theses method attempts to disprove the 
analysis that someone else has offered. The logic of the argument becomes the most 
important feature of the philosophical position posited even more so than the 
credibility or plausibility of the claims being made. Proponents `battle it out' to see 
who can represent the truth more clearly and forcefully than anyone else (Trebilcot, 
1993). 
The paradigmatic consequences of this method lead to the belief that reason rather 
than emotion is considered to be the essential capacity for attaining knowledge. 
Consequently, it seems that the philosophical method becomes trapped by positivism 
into the dogma that only scientific knowledge is true knowledge (Sockett, 1993). 
This approach is removed from the historical particulars of social practice. The 
adoption of such an isolated, abstract approach has met with increasing criticism: 
The achievement of individuality is at the cost of a detachment from 
the particular, the specific, the transient, in order to turn one's 
attention increasingly to the general, the universal, the unchanging, to 
what is common to all (Lloyd, 1989, p. 119). 
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These sentiments are echoed by a number of theorists who assert that some moral 
philosophers have been too focused on rational principles, impartiality, generality. 
and abstract rules in ethics (Blum, 1994; Duquin, 1994; Nussbaum 1993; and Held. 
1993). As we saw in Chapter Three, it can be argued that there is a current of 
intellectual thinking that rejects the adequacy of universal abstract principles in 
dealing with ethical considerations (Clarke and Simpson, 1989). This illustrates the 
beginning of a nascent movement away from the abstract universalism of positivist 
epistemology towards the concreteness and particularism of a subject situated in 
practice. 
We experience the world as a complex web of interdependent relationships, where 
interacting with specific others in particular situations is integral to our moral 
experiences. Sherwin (1989) states, "the abstract reasoning of morality that centers 
on the rights of independent agents is inadequate for the moral reality in which they 
live" (p. 14). This is precisely because such reasoning is divorced from the context 
that it purports to explain. Baier (1985b) also calls into question the value of a theory 
that commits itself solely to abstract reasoning and universal principles that are 
divorced from the context of actual experience. She advises us to abandon 
completely the search for a rationalistic impartial moral epistemology, based on 
purely theoretical terms, and to concentrate instead on the search for a more 
complete understanding of moral experience. However, perhaps this advice wrongly 
throws the impartial baby out with the positivist bath water. As Louden (1992) 
asserts: 
The philosopher's quest for universal principles should not be 
dismissed entirely but it needs to combine forces with a genuine 
conviction that a wide variety of historical, psychological, and cultural 
forces are clearly relevant to any critical understanding of human 
morality (p. 127). 
The emergence of mixed model approaches attempts to make peace between the two 
paradigmatic positions of positivism and constructivism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998). Authors such as Howe (1988) and Reichardt and Rallis (1994) have presented 
the idea of a compatibility thesis, based on the paradigm of pragmatism. 
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Pragmatically oriented theorists use the philosophical and/or methodological 
approach that works for the particular research problem in question. 
A distinction must be made here between mixed model and mixed method 
approaches to study. A mixed model approach refers to studies that combine the 
paradigms of positivism and constructivism. Mixed methods, on the other hand, refer 
to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods such as in the data 
collection phase of a study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). This thesis is committed 
to a mixed model approach. The ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC is in line 
with those feminist commitments to context-respectful theory outlined in Chapter 
Three. It retains, however, the tenets of those rule-based ethical theories that also aid 
the evaluation of fair play in sporting games. Brewer and Hunter (1989) argue that 
most major areas of social research embrace multiple models. It may be proposed, 
however, that this is not the case in philosophy generally or in the philosophy of 
sport in particular. 
Some theorists may argue that, "researchers who try to combine the two methods are 
doomed to failure due to the inherent differences in the philosophies underlying 
them" (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 1 1). To counter this claim, the model 
offered here investigates the efficacy of a combined approach that integrates 
different theoretical perspectives: 
Pragmatism is appealing (a) because it gives us a paradigm that 
philosophically embraces the use of mixed method and mixed model 
designs, (b) because it eschews the use of metaphysical concepts 
(Truth, Reality) that have caused much endless (and often useless) 
discussion and debate, and (c) because it presents a very practical and 
applied research philosophy: Study what interests and is of value to 
you, study it in the different ways that you deem appropriate, and use 
the results in ways that can bring about positive consequences within 
your value system (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 30). 
3 Moral Experience and Gender 
Not only is reason associated with the rational and universal but also, feminist 
philosophers claim, with notions of `Man, ' and masculinity (Code, 1989; Card, 
1991; Hekman, 1995). Conversely, emotion is juxtaposed with images of the 
irrational, the particular, the private, and the feminine (Calhoun, 1988). Lloyd (1993) 
describes the rationality attributed to the rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth 
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century. She argues that `The Man of Reason' of rationalist moral theory promised a 
universal test for the correctness of fundamental ethical principles. Consequently, 
`He' was thought to be detached from changeable objects of passion, and removed 
from the contingencies and vicissitudes of interactions with individuals (Lloyd, 
1993). 
Hekman (1995) argues that there is an increasing attack on the foundation of this 
epistemology that places `Man' as the abstract, rational, constitutor of knowledge. 
More particularly, feminist philosophers suggest that the espoused universal norms 
of morality are in fact male norms and the result of generations of male-defined 
theorising (Calhoun, 1988). This amounts to a gender bias and often a denial of the 
ethical significance of the importance of women's experiences, perspectives, and 
concerns. To varying degrees, then, it can be claimed that previous moral theories 
have failed to account for the experience of women and the different structures that 
shape those experiences. 
The same may be said for theories of fair play in sport. Sport has been 
conceptualised as masculine experience and, in turn, this has led to male experience 
being portrayed as human experience. Parratt (1994) argues that researchers have 
failed to tackle critical methodological issues; that is, they accept the assumptions 
and constructs of a male defined scholarship. This means that research design has 
proved insensitive and remote from women's actual lived experience in sport. 
Held (1993) calls for moral theories to investigate those regions of experience that 
have been central to women's lives, but as yet, neglected by moral theory, an 
example of which is sport. She believes that new theories will be better as they will 
be applied to and tested in new domains of human experience. Our experiences 
should not be considered as antagonistic to, irrelevant to or detached from the search 
for ethical knowledge about fairness in sporting games. Rather, they should be used 
to assist our philosophical understanding of the concepts involved. Such an 
approach will broaden our concept of sport since grounding knowledge of fair play 
in human experience provides the framework for a more adequate epistemology, that 
is, one which illustrates the continuous interaction between who we are as people 
and how we understand the world (Jaggar, 1989). The important point here, then, is 
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that gender matters. This study develops a framework that enables the researcher to 
connect ethical theory to lived experience. 
4 Feminist Methodology 
Recent approaches to epistemology have called into question some of the 
rudimentary principles of the positivistic epistemological model outlined previously. 
Indeed Morgan (1994) believes: 
... stepping back 
from practices like sport, dissociating ourselves 
from all of their cultural particulars, is less a way of getting a critical 
handle on them than it is a way of consigning ourselves to a 
superficial understanding of them (p. 185). 
An epistemology should serve to establish an account of how knowing connects with 
what one claims to know. MacKinnon (1989) argues that an epistemology is an 
approach to knowledge that sets up an account to tell whether what the researcher 
thinks is real, is actually real, and it is this connection that embodies methodology. 
She states, "method thus puts into operation a way of acquiring that knowledge that a 
particular epistemological stance approves as real" (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 97). 
Feminist epistemology uses different methodologies from different disciplines to 
investigate knowledge of women's experiences (Garry and Pearsall, 1989). 
Consequently, Sherwin (1989) argues that, "by definition, feminists will rely on an 
eclectic methodology, having its roots in various disciplines, and will not restrict 
themselves entirely to any single disciplinary approach" (p. 27). It is not, however, 
the case that just any combination of methods will suffice but rather new 
methodologies are formed to suit the phenomena under investigation. 
Feminist epistemology strives to embody the shared feelings of people and their 
experiences. In this thesis an approach is developed that maintains continuity with 
experience. MacKinnon (1989) argues that it redefines the epistemological issue, 
from a scientific one, concerned with objectivity and impartiality, to a problem of the 
relation of consciousness to social experience. She states: 
This stance locates the position of consciousness, from which one 
knows, in the standpoint and time frame of that attempting to be 
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known. The question is not whether objective reality exists but 
whether that concept accesses the is-ness of the world. Feminist 
epistemology asserts that the social processes of being a woman is on 
some level the same process as that by which woman's consciousness 
becomes aware of itself as such and of its world. Mind and world, as a 
matter of social reality, are taken as interpenetrated (MacKinnon, 
1989, p. 97). 
Feminist epistemology has a time, place, history, and gender (Code, 1989). This 
stance provides knowledge that considers the prevailing social structures and is 
informed by a range of critical theories. A critical perspective attempts to ensure that 
the world is not just described but changed, and informed in an empowering way 
(Sparkes, 1994). In contrast, then, a feminist epistemology seeks to be collective and 
critical. This combined approach challenges some of the previously asserted 
epistemologies established within the positivist tradition. Its fundamental 
assumptions differ considerably as the methods employed seek to construct and 
define the reality that reflects the interests and values of a particular group. Code 
(1989) explains that: 
This contrasts with methods of epistemological and moral theory 
construction that aim to transcend experience, to move beyond it, 
allegedly towards greater clarity and accuracy but at the expense, I 
believe, of the insight and understanding that a maintained continuity 
with experience can afford (p. 166). 
Thus, in order to escape the charge of `remoteness, ' it is argued here that moral 
theories must endeavour to include the neglected realm of particular others in the 
actual contexts of women's experience. This approach will enable the researcher to 
connect moral experience in sport with a theoretical examination of fair play and 
ethos. It permits the methodological flexibility that is essential for reflective 
exploratory research, and allows theoretical constructs to be partly grounded in the 
life of the `actors' (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Here an alternative method for 
philosophy is proposed, where female athletes are given a `voice' within the context 
of sport. In offering the opportunity for women to have a `voice' in a male 
dominated sporting arena, it is hoped that these athletes feel they have contributed to 
a deeper understanding of fairness in sport. Their concerns and experiences are 
taken seriously and used to inform a philosophical understanding of fair play. 
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Emphasis is placed on the specific and the concrete; the universal, abstract is 
addressed but delayed. The methodology used takes its point of departure from 
women's thoughts where the analysis focuses on the detail of women's experiences, 
and then collectively moves on to a broader normative philosophical analysis of fair 
play. As Fleming (1996) states: 
For it is only when those engaging in sporting encounters are able to 
articulate their understandings (or, quite conceivably 
misunderstandings) of fair play, that a grounded theoretical 
conceptualisation of fair play can be established (p. 1). 
Arguably, those who view feminist commitments as incompatible with `real' 
academic philosophy may question the credibility of such an approach. This is not a 
predominantly sociological enterprise. The normative intent of such an empirically 
informed moral theory for fair play ensures that theoretical and conceptual issues 
remain philosophical. In the following section an outline is presented of how the 
above shapes the construction of the methodology used to examine critically the 
social practice of elite women's cricket. 
5 Understanding Moral Experience in Elite Women's Cricket 
It seems evident that critical appraisal of a social practice is both morally and 
empirically complex. We need to adopt a new methodological approach when 
considering moral issues in sport. Hence, it is proposed that in order to articulate and 
understand the nature of sport, we must similarly strive to connect moral deliberation 
with actual experience. This means that, "the theorised meanings attached to sports 
practices must be derived from the lived experiences of the athletes" (Fleming, 1997, 
p. 4). It is relatively novel for philosophers of sport to concentrate on the experience 
of athletes in physical activity in general. In particular, it is even more uncommon to 
find philosophical research that focuses on the central experience of women in 
traditionally male-defined sporting arenas. 
So, if the objective is to put forward an empirically informed moral theory of fair 
play then it is imperative that it is applied to some real, concrete issues. In this 
research the experience of women in cricket is used to advance the understanding of 
a philosophical analysis of the concepts of fair play and ethos. Having said this, 
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however, it is not the intention simply to add an account of female sport experience 
to philosophical literature, and construct a supposed female-based theory that is 
designed to supplant the traditional epistemological modes of thought. Rather, the 
purpose here is to produce a richer, thicker interpretation of fair play and ethos in 
sport in general. 
The aim is to elaborate and refine previous theories of fair play. The embodied 
experience of women in sport can generate a theoretical understanding of fair play 
that is laden with conceptually rich information about both the tacit norms and the 
values that constitute the ethos of elite women's cricket. Vaughan (1992) refers to 
this methodological approach as, "theory elaboration. " The researcher takes existing 
theories and develops them further in conjunction with qualitative empirical analysis. 
Such a process of elaboration allows a critical appraisal of fair play to relate directly 
to those specific circumstances in which the information derived. In this case an 
examination is offered as to exactly what the rule-governed practices are that define 
elite women's cricket, and whether the normative standards that preside are ethically 
acceptable. 
This approach ensures that the moral analysis of fairness within elite women's 
cricket eschews a genderless and abstract position. Here, a meaningful interpretation 
of ethos in cricket is based on the embodied experience of the social actors situated 
therein. Morgan states (1994): 
... the more abstract the account of sport, the greater the 
level of 
generality it aspires to, the less substance it possesses. .. the 
less 
content our descriptions carry and convey the less we are able to offer 
in the way of criticism (p. 185). 
It is not, as noted previously, that abstractness is in itself a problem, for it can be a 
great asset. What is important here, though, is that the account of fair play is not, 
"speculatively remote from the phenomena it purports to explain" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 113). 
This study focuses on the conceptualisation and values that the interviewees 
recognised as belonging to their particular social practice of elite women's cricket. 
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Hence, the ensuing analysis of fair play is manifested and embedded in a particular 
culture, history, and social tradition. The `voice' of the female athlete is used to 
elucidate and inform a moral conceptualisation of fair play. The ethos of elite 
women's cricket becomes apparent throughout the discourse of the interview 
whereby particular rules, values, and dilemmas are invoked and described in regard 
to specific cases and contexts. Holstein and Gubruim (1998) refer to this as an 
ethnomethodological stance. They argue that, by attending to the interpretive voices 
of social actors, the researcher can construct the social reality of the phenomena 
under study. The interviewee reveals particular guidelines for understanding the 
concepts of fair play within a specific ethos. Collectively, these `voices' render it 
possible to construct and interpret an account of an ethos that is recognisable; that is, 
it represents the voices and perspectives of the contributors. This will be explained in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
Fleming (1997) argues that research into ethos and fair play must necessarily be 
qualitative and interpretive as this enables: 
... members of a cultural (or subcultural) group to communicate 
subjective meanings about that culture in order that meanings and 
actions can be fully and appropriately contextualised (Fleming, 1997, 
p. 2). 
In essence, this approach allows the researcher to combine empirical work with 
normative theory. It offers an empirically informed moral theory for sport. The 
theory of fair play grounds its normative stance in the collective perspective of those 
involved. Such an understanding throws light on the internal structures of elite 
women's cricket and the actions of those members within the practice. 
Adopting such an approach ensures that moral theory accommodates context- 
specific cases. Using collective representation, however, is not without 
methodological constraint. Theories and interpretations from particular context 
specific circumstances are provisional and ephemeral. Holstein and Gubrium (1998) 
maintain they are ongoing accomplishments, which reflexively supply meaning to 
actions as those meanings maintain, elaborate, or alter the circumstances in which 
they occur. But to say they are transitory is not to deny that empirically informed 
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moral theory can throw light on issues of fair play in sport. Part Two explains and 
details the methods employed to construct the research design. 
Part Two: Research Design 
1 The Research Cycle 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue that research on any given question falls 
somewhere within a cycle of inferences, known as the research cycle or chain of 
reasoning. They state: 
The cycle may be seen as moving from grounded results (facts, 
observations) through inductive logic to general inferences (abstract 
generalisations, or theory), then from those general inferences (or 
theory) through deductive logic to tentative hypotheses or predictions 
of particular events/outcomes (p. 24). 
Research may start at any given point within this cycle. The theoretical framework 
outlined in Part One of this chapter was used as a basis for planning the research. 
Mixed model studies occur when both types of inferences are used together 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Indeed, when answering the research question one 
may be both subjective and objective in epistemological orientation: 
At some points, one may be more "subjective, " while at others more 
"objective; " at some points the knower and the known must be 
interactive, while at others, one may more easily stand apart from 
what one is studying (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 25). 
This point was developed in the discussion on Immanent Critique (Chapter Four, 
Part Two). The researcher uses an empirically informed analysis of fair play to 
supplement formalist accounts of games as rule-governed practices. We will see how 
the adoption of a subjective/objective approach informs the analysis of ethical ethos 
in Chapter Seven. 
2 Elite Women's Cricket 
Cricket is regarded as an agency of moral deliberation. Even our everyday language 
alludes to notions of fairness derived specifically from a cricketing context (`it's just 
not cricket, ' `batting on a sticky wicket, ' `throwing a googley, ' `knocked for six'). 
The research questions were formed and guided by the researcher's own value 
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system; an ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC was thought to yield interesting 
and important conclusions for a study of fair play in sporting games. 
The practice of elite women's cricket was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it 
was considered necessary to investigate the concept of ethos within an established 
elite female sport. This is because it was thought that the elite level would exhibit a 
high degree of stress and moral agency. Secondly, when the research started, the 
women's national team had just returned from the World Cup in India, where 
throughout the tournament rich examples arose regarding the concept of fairness 
within the game. Moreover, the Women's Cricket Association (WCA) was on the 
brink of a potential merger with their male counterpart, the England and Wales 
Cricket Board (ECB). This merger has subsequently been completed. Lastly, there 
was an opportunity to gain access to members of the team, administration, and 
coaching staff. Thus, elite women's cricket was chosen as an established sporting 
context in which to investigate the concept of fair play within a particular ethos. 
After the research questions had been formulated it was necessary to decide how to 
investigate the topic in a way that was congruent with the researcher's feminist 
commitments to study. The next five sections of this chapter explain the way in 
which the research was conducted: Methods, participant observation, interviews, 
ethical considerations, and construction of analytical categories. 
3 Methods 
When planning the research it became apparent that many methods were available 
such as, surveys, questionnaires, interviews, life histories, and observations. The 
methods developed stemmed from the research questions posed, namely: What is the 
ethos of EWC? And, to what extent does a given ethos relate to fair play norms? 
The ethos of EWC can be revealed through a constant comparison between 
observations, interviews, and analyses of particular incidents (Fleming, 1997). Then, 
a critical appraisal is developed through an iterative process between the empirical 
data and philosophical investigation. In this way ethical theory becomes grounded 
partly in the data and developed further by normative analysis. 
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The design of the study emerged as the factors for an analysis of fair play were 
identified. Data were gathered from different sources including observation, 
documents, and interviews. In order to obtain rich information about the tacit norms, 
values, and interpretations that constitute the ethos of EWC, it was felt necessary to 
explore through observation and semi-structured interviews. 
The methods adopted in the first phase of the research involved: (1) attending and 
observing Cricket Week (see below); and (2) conducting semi-structured interviews 
with elite women cricketers, coaches, and administrators. Hence, there were two 
stages to data collection that will, in turn, now be explained. 
4 Participant Observation 
Cricket Week is an established tradition within women's cricket. It is an annual 
residential tournament for national and club standard players organised by the WCA. 
In 1997 seven teams competed and were captained either by a previous England 
player or a current county player. Throughout the competition all teams play each 
other. On arrival each player is assigned a particular team. After a written request, 
the WCA granted me permission to attend. 
Participant observation at Cricket week formed the starting point for this research. 
Because this method makes no concrete assumptions about what is important it 
allowed the researcher to immerse herself into the day-to-day activities of the 
practice she was trying to understand (May, 1995). It was deemed important to 
participate in the context of Cricket Week and become involved in the environment. 
Time was spent in unfamiliar surroundings making field notes on ideas of fair play, 
and the day-to-day social interactions of people in the group. 
When all the teams had arrived the organiser introduced me as a researcher. The 
interest in fair play was explained generally as the purpose for my presence at 
Cricket Week. As a naive observer, using what May (1995) describes as the role of 
the "fan, " the researcher desired to know as much as possible from the women 
participating within the tournament. A particular team throughout the competition 
was followed and the researcher became an accepted member of that team. This 
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enabled a rapport to develop with one team in particular and ensured that all other 
teams could be observed during the week. 
It was important to recognise the power relations within the group and between the 
observer and observed. All intentions were made open to the group asking 
particularly for the opportunity to talk to as many people as possible about their 
views and experiences of fair play. The nature of the field notes taken depended on 
the ensuing context to the observation or interview. Some were taken by hand during 
contact, others were taped privately, and some observations were recorded by 
memory onto tape as soon as an opportunity presented itself. The researcher was 
aware of the difficulties in trying not to impose one's own subjective interpretation 
on the social context. The field notes taken were subsequently studied to inform the 
second phase of the research. In other words, the observation of Cricket Week was 
used to acquire knowledge from practitioners about the concept of fair play within 
EWC in order to generate pertinent questions for the subsequent interviews. 
Moreover, documents concerning the Women's Cricket Association and the ECB 
were collected and analysed. Much more could be said here about the experience of 
Cricket Week but it would not be pertinent to the aims of the thesis. 
5 Interviews 
The structure of an interview ranges from unstructured and open-ended questions 
(inductive) to highly structured and closed questions (deductive). Open-ended 
interviews are used when information is not readily available. Open-ended 
interviews formed the basis for the field notes in the participant observation phase of 
the research. These `items' were then used to formulate a more structured interview 
for the group setting of EWC. The aim was to understand the ethos of EWC from the 
viewpoints of its participants. The largest source of data came from the interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews were used as it was felt that a flexible structure would 
allow the individual talking to voice their own concerns and personal examples. The 
idea was to look at the individual talking and to pay attention to the detail and 
content of their claims. Code (1989) argues that this is a necessary component of a 
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methodology that tries to maintain continuity with experience. The process of the 
research was, therefore, inductive. 
One of the major disadvantages of interviewing is the risk of the interviewer 
affecting the responses of the interviewee (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
Unknowingly the researcher might affect responses by approving gestures, 
mannerisms, verbal feedback or encouraging the responses that one would like to 
hear more of. The interviews were used to try to understand the sporting experience 
of women in elite level cricket. Their perceptions of what is considered to be 
unacceptable within the ethos of the game were explored. It was believed that such 
individual experience may have been lost through a rigid and more structured 
interview. The researcher was cognizant of the impact she had on the interviewee. 
Based on findings from Cricket Week, it seemed that information was required from 
players, coaches, officials, and administrators. The interview questions were 
constructed around a number of themes that were generated from discussions 
throughout Cricket Week. The type of questions and headings for the interview 
evolved gradually. They considered the following areas: (1) Notions of the good 
player and the well played game; (2) Particular virtues and qualities in EWC; (3) 
Concepts of fair play and cheating; (4) The influence of coaches; (5) The merger of 
the WCA and the ECB; and (6) The recent controversies that had surrounded the 
World Cup. 
It was important to consider a cross section of the people involved within the "inner 
circle" of English elite women's cricket. For this reason the following were chosen 
as an accessible population: a selection of six players, all four coaches (two male), 
and the team manager. Together the interviewees illustrated the range of experience 
within the squad. Some were young, relatively new members on the team, others 
were accomplished cricketers, and some were involved directly with the organisation 
of the WCA and the merger with the ECB. Such a group was indicative of the 
diversity of people involved within elite women's cricket. 
A gatekeeper acts as a conduit between the researcher and the potential participants 
in a study (Research Ethics, 1999/2000). The main gatekeeper used to gain access 
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was a coach to the elite women's team, and one of my interviewees. The researcher 
was introduced to a colleague of the coach who then acted as a further gatekeeper. A 
list of names of those people proposed for interview was provided. The gatekeeper 
telephoned each person and all agreed to participate in the research. All interviewees 
gave informed consent to the study. Interviewees offered a telephone number to the 
researcher so meeting times and locations could be arranged. Each person was then 
contacted. The nature of the research was explained fully and a convenient meeting 
time was organised. 
Interviews ranged from one hour to two hours. The interview was recorded in full on 
tape. There were three similar schedules according to whether the interviewee was a 
player, coach, or manager (See Appendix 1). The tapes were later transcribed and 
the texts were coded. A framework was constructed so that the empirical data could 
be used to inform a philosophical understanding of fair play and ethos. The diagram 
below illustrates the rolling method used whereby one phase of the research merged 
into the next. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
METHOD 
PHASE ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW P 
PHASE TWO: OBSERVATION OF 
CRICKET WEEK 
1 
PHASE THREE: SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
OUTCOMES 
GENERALISED ISSUES AND 
CONTEXT 
THEMES 
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS AND 
CLAIMS 
1 
PHASE FOUR: ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHOS 
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6 Ethical Considerations 
Before the interview, the aims of the thesis were explained along with relevant 
personal information about the researcher undertaking the study, the possible 
consequences, and how the transcripts would be used. All were given the option of 
rejecting the use of a tape recorder. None of the interviewees, however, expressed 
discomfort with this method of data collection. In fact, all were keen to discuss the 
content of the interview. 
In a relatively small, insular community like elite women's cricket, it is very difficult 
to guarantee complete anonymity. Unrealistic promises of anonymity, therefore, 
were not made. However, assurances were given at the beginning of each interview 
that all information and research records would remain confidential. It was 
explained that all names would be given anonymity and the author of the study and 
the supervisors of the research would only see the full transcripts. These assurances 
were given weight because the gatekeeper used to gain access initially was a trusted 
member of the squad. 
It is important to give consideration to the power imbalance between researcher and 
researched (Research Ethics, 1999/2000). Care was taken to ensure that interviewees 
were not pressurised or made uncomfortable in any way. They were not obliged to 
discuss any particular subject but were encouraged to talk about the ethos of the 
practice from their own individual perspective. All interviewees were aware of their 
right to terminate the interview at any time. 
All were offered a final transcript of the interview and asked for their consent to use 
any of the information in the final thesis. This enabled the interviewees to control all 
the information they had volunteered consistent with feminist research ethics 
(Trebilcot, 1993). The research was to be conducted with the interviewees and not 
on them or about them. There were no anticipated possible harmful consequences for 
the participants. 
7 Construction of Analytical Categories 
There are a variety of established ways for analysing qualitative data. Huberman and 
Miles (1994) argue that data are usually prepared by converting raw material 
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(interviews) into partially processed data (transcripts), which are then coded and 
subjected to a particular method of analysis. Analysis schemes may be distinguished 
in two different ways. The first way depends on whether the themes emerged from 
the data or were established a priori. The second concerns the degree of complexity 
of the analysis scheme (simple to complex) (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
In this study a typology of themes emerged from the data. They were refined and 
modified as the transcripts were constantly compared and analysed. Constant 
comparative analysis involves two general processes: (a) unitising or breaking the 
information into units to serve as the basis for defining categories; and (b) 
categorising or bringing together emergent themes that relate units of information to 
the same content (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Kirby and McKenna (1989) use the term "bibbit" to describe a section of data or 
passage from a transcript. Coding refers to the identification of a particular idea or 
concept that identifies a piece of text or bibbit. Effective theoretical coding rests on 
the researcher's sensitivity and familiarisation with the data (Kirby and McKenna, 
1989). Throughout the coding procedure (including transcription) the texts were 
constantly read, re-read, studied, and reflected upon. This ensured that the empirical 
data were categorised and organised and not changed or re-defined in any way. The 
shaping and re-shaping of the codes gradually became more theoretically sensitive. 
The interview texts were divided into bibbits so that they could be effectively 
organised and coded. Each bibbit was referenced so that it could be easily 
recognised and re-located within its original text. The bibbit below is an example 
from one of the interview texts: 
RM. -19 Urm okay good, what would you describe as fair play? 
CIM-19 Playing within the rules of the game basically urm you know 
cricket has gone beyond that even with certain sorts of etiquette and 
things that you would not do even though they are within the rules of 
the game but I think you need to want to win but without cheating. 
Fair play is not cheating to me. 
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The letter `R' indicates the researcher. 'Cl' illustrates that this was the first 
interview conducted with a coach. `M' refers to the name of the interviewee, and the 
number '19' represents where the bibbit occurs within the interview. 
The bibbits were grouped together according to the themes that emerged from within 
the data. Each bibbit was allocated a code (which represented a theme) and placed 
within one of four general categories. Some bibbits were placed within two or more 
themes and allocated to different categories also. A point of saturation occurred 
when bibbits no longer formed new themes. The themes were contextualised based 
on four categories: Person, Game, Contract/Agreement, and Institution (Loland and 
McNamee, 2000) (see Table One, over leaf). 
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Table One: 
Analytical Categories and Themes 
Person Game Contract/Agreement Institution 
Personal Characteristics Fair Play Structure 
* Occupation * Cricket * Concept of 
* Motivation * Overs Game * Laws WCA 
* Involved in Cricket * Declaration Game * Rules * Establishment 
* Personal Experience * Men's game * Unwritten * Acceptance 
* England Career * Umpire 
Good Game ECB 
Role Model Different Games * Merger 
Professional Cheating MCC 
* Concept of 
Player * Trust Media 
* Good Player * Press 
* Not suited to EWC Actions * Television 
* Good Captain * Agreement 
* Characters/Attitudes * Sledging Sponsorship 
* Regions * Walking * Finance 
* Discipline * Appealing 
* Mankadding Cricket Week 
Identity * Ball Tampering 
* Self * World Cup Winning/Losing 
* Dress * LBW 
* Men's perceptions * Unacceptable Competition 
* Public perceptions 
Sportspersonship Professionalism 
Opponent Gamesmanship 
Training 
Coach Spirit * Psychology 
* Fitness 
Umpire 
Etiquette 
Tradition 
Niceties 
Old School 
World Teams 
England Team 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 
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Rather than come up with a set of codes based on the interview questions, the 
interviews were read and re-read and responses were then used to produce a list of 
codes. The codes were placed into one of four columns. Previous drafts had led to a 
final placement of code within these columns. 
The Person column concerned individual experiences and personal histories of each 
interviewee. Shared constructs of identity, their opponents, coaches, umpires, and 
what it meant to be a good player were also allocated to this column. Furthermore, 
information was placed on male and public perceptions of the elite women's game. 
The Game column consists of specific characteristics of the elite women's game and 
notions of the good game. It encompasses views on cricket generally and the 
different perceptions of the one day and test match game. The Contract/Agreement 
column includes the rich detail gained about ethos and the interpretive nature of the 
practice. Concepts of fair play, laws, rules, cheating, sportsmanship, and 
gamesmanship were placed here. Unacceptable, acceptable, and permissible actions 
of the practice were articulated as well as interpretations in respect of examples of 
personal experience. Lastly, the Institution column was constructed to define the 
organisational parameters of the practice. Information that concerned particular 
social convention and engaged notions of governance were allocated to this column. 
This is an experientially derived framework based on the collective and relatively 
shared interpretations of the interviewees. It provides the means to analyse critically 
the concepts of fair play and ethos. Such a framework offers an account of sport-as- 
practice. The themes are inclusive of the multiple perspectives of the interviewees. 
Experience helped to generate and re-shape the theoretical framework and accounts 
of knowledge concerning fair play. 
8 Summary 
This chapter has provided a rationale for the methodological framework employed in 
the thesis. It has raised questions about the way in which theoretical models should 
be applied in philosophy and for the choice of methods employed in this research. In 
this study, a feminist research design is used to construct a mixed model approach in 
order to explore issues of fair play and ethos in EWC successfully. 
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The next chapter attempts to articulate the ethos of the practice of EWC and reflect 
the plurality of different ways of knowing. In order to understand the quiddity of 
ethos as an ethical enterprise the epistemological model outlined above is used to 
explore critically fair play as a system of value more effectively. Chapter Six will 
explore the dynamic character of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the 
sources of that change may be. 
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Chapter Six 
Understanding Ethos as an Ethical Practice 
Part One: Elite Women's Cricket 
1 Introduction 
The last chapter outlined the methodology employed in this thesis; that is, the 
incorporation of empirical findings to structure a normative approach to the study of 
fair play. In this chapter the aim is to present the empirical findings of the framework 
and start to explore critically fair play and ethos as a system of value. 
The words of the interviewees provide a frame of reference to look at ethos where 
norms of acceptability are discussed in specific context and in relation to fair play. 
This is not just a descriptive account. Rather, the researcher looks at the concrete 
particulars grounded in experience to extract the normative standards within the 
practice. Interviewees are reflective and critical of themselves, each other, and 
actions within the game. 
By using the voices of players, coaches, and managers, this chapter aims to articulate 
and explain the ethos of the practice of elite women's cricket. The initial task is to 
describe and comment upon the key issues that arise from the data concerning fair 
play and ethos. Using rich data from one particular culture, this chapter explores the 
dynamic character of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the sources of 
that change may be. 
Employing empirical findings enables the researcher to gain an inside and critical 
view of the practice. Here, the perceived internal goods of cricket drive the 
arguments for an understanding of fair play and ethos. The discovery of concrete 
presuppositions can then be utilised to form a thick account or description of fair 
play. 
Part One begins with an explanation of interviewees' perceptions of fair play. This is 
followed by discussion of those actions that are considered unacceptable and unfair. 
Interviewees' views on the impact of the umpire and of their own team's conduct are 
then considered. Part Two examines in more detail the application of ethos and fair 
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play within the game. Differences between the one day game and declaration cricket 
are observed, followed by four key themes which emerged from the framework: 
Walking, Sledging, Appealing, and Mankadding. These terms will be explained 
precisely later in this chapter. Such discussion would be incomplete without 
reference to the notions of sportspersonship and professionalism. This chapter 
concludes with an argument that fair play is context-dependent: that is, the ethos of 
EWC is a constantly re-negotiated boundary dependent upon the context of the game 
in which it is applied. 
2 Interviewees 
After identifying those members of the inner circle of elite women's cricket, 
interviewees were chosen according to experience, their role within the squad, and 
knowledge of the ECB and WCA. As previously mentioned, six players, four 
coaches, and the then-present team manager were interviewed. It was decided to 
present the interviewees as characters in order to contextualise their backgrounds and 
to provide a more meaningful account of their perceptions about the ethos of elite 
women's cricket. All names are fictitious and, where possible, everything has been 
done to ensure anonymity. 
2.1 M1J: Jane 
Jane, a Southerner, is the England Team Manager. She has a full time professional 
career outside cricket. Although she has never played at the elite level, she has been 
proudly involved with women's cricket for a number of years. She says: 
M]J. -3 ... 
A boy who starts to play cricket has little hope of meeting 
his cricket heroes but in the women 's set up, meet them, I know them 
all urm it is getting a little more professional nowadays and better 
funded urm but when I started it was more or less having bazaars and 
doing the women's institute bit to fund the England team ... 
She has witnessed profound changes in women's cricket and is unsure of some the 
current attitudes at the elite level in sport generally. She considers herself to be a 
traditionalist and, as will be seen later, values the ideal of fair play. 
MIJ. - 17 ... society 
is changing and perhaps this is just my age but all 
my generation think it was better twenty years ago. But the thought of 
materialistic avaricious urm Thatcher generations as we would call it 
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spills into far more than those concepts as well as on the sports field 
urm I think it is more the way people play today you know win at all 
costs and less of the old fashioned it's the taking part and play up and 
play the game. . 
2.2 C1M: Marie 
Marie has been involved in coaching for many years. She boasts a distinguished 
England career. Like Jane, she has a full time professional career. She originates 
from the South of England and has been involved with cricket all her life. She says: 
Cl M. "5 I mean cricket it's been my life I suppose and you know well 
I've had to go out and earn a living but I've got friends in Australia, 
I've got friends in New Zealand, South Africa all because of cricket. 
2.3 C2A: Alexander 
Alexander has been involved with women's cricket as a coach for many years. He 
has a full time professional career and served as one of the `gatekeepers' of the 
research, providing initial means to gain access to interviewees. He said that there is 
a unity to the England team: 
C2A: 21 Urm ... a common theme is their commitment to the cause. Everyone believes in women's cricket, urm I think everyone has a 
certain level of confidence in England cricket. The manner in which 
that is exploited or deployed varies ... urm some train religiously, 
others don't... but I think there is a pretty common theme of unity, 
and cohesion and dedication to the cause. 
He made reference to the difference in attitudes among players. The `Yorkshire 
factor' was an interesting way to examine how players perceive each other. 
Alexander said: 
C2A: 22 
... 
Yorkshire is a very strong county, and er, and probably 
breeds that inherent competitiveness, and confidence that perhaps 
some other counties don 't have at this moment point in time ... urm. 
.. that's probably all 
I'd say on that, actually ... the 
Yorkshire thing 
is a factor ... 
I'm sure other people will have told you the same. 
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2.4 C3R: Robert 
Involved in coaching for many years, Robert has played a significant role in 
women's cricket. He is from the South and reiterated to me the division between 
Northern and Southern players. 
C3R: 13 
... the 
North of England have the stronger set of players in 
terms of better players in the country and I think a little bit like the 
Northern hemisphere and the Southern hemisphere, the North of 
England and the South of England, there's always that divide, and I 
think, I think that, and I'm a Southerner, I think the North are more 
switched on to it than what they are down South ... RR: 14 Switched on to ... C3R: 14 Switched on to being more professional, more of a 
competitive edge. 
2.5 C4H: Harriet 
Harriet is from the South and also one of the coaches. She expressed her frustration 
with some of the players, other coaches, and their commitment to the game. 
C4H. - 10 They are all verbally dedicated to what they do urm I would 
question the higher commitment of some urm ... the coaches are very 
enthusiastic, but not open to criticism a lot of the time, urm ... in 
general though they are all prepared to put their mouths on the line 
and say, yes we need to do this, ' and `yes we need to go to the gym. ' 
But when it actually comes to putting it into practice, that's when it's 
not quite there. They are not actually intrinsically motivated to want 
to be as fit as they possibly can so they can beat Australia ... 
Harriet was asked if she thought there were any differences between Northern and 
Southern players. She felt very strongly about this and openly expressed her 
frustrations. 
C4H. "12 Well the scenario has always been that people from the 
North have afar more gritty approach, urm ... 
I suppose there is a 
difference in the general make up of them as people. The last time I 
was up, I was increasingly irritated with people from up there 
because a lot of them think that they are brilliant, that they don't need 
to do anything, and y'know that is not the case. Yes it's all very well 
being arrogant and having this no-one can touch us attitude, but you 
have to have a degree of realism in there as well. They got up me 
nose, the Southern lot actually put a lot of effort in. I'm not saying 
they don't normally, but it's just a different, actually the Northern lot 
are perhaps more verbally aggressive ... 
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RH. - 13 What did you mean by saying they were a different make up 
ofpeople? 
C4H. "13 Yeah, urm ... 
I'm trying to think ... it's just this blase 
attitude which they seem to have, casual. I don't need to do this 
because I'm good enough anyway. So in those terms they are not 
professional urm, so in terms of different make up of people, I think 
they are more aggressive as individuals and possibly more arrogant 
at times. That's not a sweeping statement, that's one or two but it er 
encompasses everybody else. 
2.6 P1L: Louie 
Louie is from Yorkshire, and is an experienced member of the squad. As she is a 
Northerner it was interesting to hear her views on the so-called `Yorkshire factor. ' 
Pl L: 21 Urm 
... 
I just feel that there is a southern softie mentality. 
When the going gets tough, they don't seem to have this scrappin, 
y'know it seems to be all [puts on a posh voice] okay, well you know, 
"It's not the winning but the taking part" ... they're quite 
happy to 
sit back and say, "ah well never mind, " urm .. 
but, well you play for 
Yorkshire and whatever else it's, well y'know it might not look pretty 
but sometimes you've gotta scrap ... 
They seem to be a bit more 
reserved ... 
It's a weird scenario ... and it's not 
big-headedness on 
my part, I just feel that that's how it's like. 
Here we can see the underlying tensions between the different geographic areas. 
Valerie also from Yorkshire expressed a similar view. 
2.7 P2V: Valerie 
Valerie has been an experienced member of the squad since the 1980s. She is from 
Yorkshire, has a professional career and takes cricket very seriously. She was asked 
whether different attitudes created a tension at the elite level. She said: 
P2V. "15 No, they normally take the Mickey, and we give it back It 
normally creates a good bit of banter urm and, I think it's good, 
people from different counties, I'm sure that they'd never admit it but, 
I'm sure that they'd aspire to having a set up like we've got in 
Yorkshire, you know there is so much for young kids coming through. 
2.8 P3C: Charlotte 
Charlotte is one of the most experienced members of the team. She is a top order 
batter and has played for England for a number of years. She comes from the South 
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and has a professional career. When asked about different players' attitudes she 
laughed and argued that while Northerners are arrogant, Southerners are confident. 
P3C: 10 Definitely [laughs]. Well if you're Northern then you know 
they're arrogant and we're confident [laughs] ... the Northerners 
are closer to the Australians and the Kiwis than the southern softies, 
as they'll call us. There is a sort of additional confidence that they 
seem to exude urm and may be it's mental toughness but they seem to 
sort of have a stronger focus than we do but whether that's just a load 
of coincidence but you can definitely, you know, tell a difference. 
2.9 P4G: Gill 
Gill is also a top order batter. She is relatively new to the squad, is from the South 
and heavily involved with women's cricket. Cricket, she told me, is in her blood. She 
praised the `Yorkshire factor' and the Northern players in the squad. 
P4G: 43 ... To 
be fair to Yorkshire they are doing so well because 
they have a good development system, they are consistently producing 
more good players than any other county, so it's quite right that they 
are winning, but they do have a very tough image y'know we take no 
prisoners. Nobody is good enough to beat us y'know, and a kind of 
arrogance goes along with it which to some degree is well you might 
say probably necessary, and at the England level it's helped us 
because there's about six of 'em in the England team y'know ... 
2.10 P5S: Shauna 
Shauna, another Southerner may be considered an all rounder. Like Gill, she is also 
heavily involved with women's cricket and is an experienced England cricketer. She 
agreed that there is a difference in the mentality of players from different regions. 
P5S: 10 Yes [laughs] I do [laughs] yes I do and I think it's really 
because of the level of cricket that they play week in and week out urm 
Yorkshire are very strong urm they have had international players 
galore in the last few years ... 
Whereas we've struggled in the last 
four or five years ... we've 
dropped down the division urm and down 
South I don't know urm they're a different breed [laughs] ... 
P5S. 11 Urm ... you 
know the Yorkshire lasses are normally quite 
loud and they like to be heard whereas the Southerners are very urm 
quite shy ... 
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2.11 P6R: Rebecca 
Rebecca is one of the newest members to the squad. She is an all rounder, has little 
Test match experience, and is also from the South. Like all of the other interviewees 
she acknowledged a regional difference in players' attitudes. 
P6R: 13 I've seen that in Yorkshire urm knowing that they can win 
knowing that they are the best urm self-belief which obviously all 
comes from winning experience urm they are more aggressive, they 
are more self confident, their body language is better. They are in a 
way I suppose more professional because they know how to win urm. . 
It is now hoped that the reader has familiarised themselves with the characters 
chosen for interview. In the next section these interpretations are used to describe 
the notion of fair play that is applicable in elite women's cricket. It is argued that no 
game can be completely defined by its rules. These rich data are used to present an 
examination of rule application in context. 
3 Fair Play and Elite Women's Cricket 
3.1 The Game of Cricket 
Cricket is played both indoors and outdoors with a ball and bat, between two teams 
of 11 players each. The cricket field can range in size from about 450 ft. by 500 ft. 
to about 525 ft. by 550 ft. In the centre of the field is an area called the pitch. The 
pitch contains `two wickets', 66 ft. apart and each wicket consists of three wooden 
stumps, 28 in high, placed equidistant in a straight line. On top of the stumps two 
strips of wood, known as 'bails, ' are placed end to end in grooves. The wicket is 
centred length wise in a white line, and is known as the `bowling crease'. Another 
white line, called the `popping crease, or simply the crease, is drawn in front of 
and parallel to each bowling crease (Eastaway, 1993). 
The central action of the game takes place between the 'batsman' or 'batswoman' 
who stands behind the popping crease, and the bowler, who delivers the ball from 
the opposite end of the pitch. The rules of cricket are somewhat complicated. The 
team that bats first, a privilege decided by the toss of a coin, sends two batters out 
on the field, one to each wicket. The opposing team then sends a bowler to one 
wicket and a wicketkeeper behind the other wicket. The remaining nine players are 
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placed about the field in positions from which they are deemed best able to catch 
or stop the ball after it has been hit. This is called fielding. 
Two umpires control the game. One stands directly behind the wicket at the 
bowler's end, and the other stands about 30 yards away from the wicket at the 
batter's end, 90° to the line between the two wickets. Bowlers bowl the ball, and 
batters try to hit it in any direction. They can elect to run to the opposite crease if 
they think they have hit the ball far enough to do so. If the batter runs, the partner 
runs for the crease the batter has just left. If both runners reach the opposite creases 
before either of them is put out, a run is scored. The batting team also scores runs 
as penalties for various infractions by the bowler and fielders (Eastaway, 1993). 
Batters may be `put out' of the game in various ways. One way, called bowled out, 
occurs if the ball delivered by the bowler goes by the batter and knocks either bail 
off the wicket. Another is to be caught out, if the ball is caught before it reaches the 
ground. A fielder who stops a batted ball may throw it to the wicketkeeper, who 
then attempts to knock off the bails on the near wicket before the runner reaches 
the crease. Alternatively, the fielder may throw the ball at either wicket for the 
same purpose, or else throw it to the bowler or another fielder, who then attempts 
to knock off the bails of either wicket. When put out by the wicketkeeper, without 
help from another fielder, the batter is said to be stumped; when put out by a 
fielder, the batter is said to be run out. The batter is also out if, in playing the ball, 
the bails are knocked off of the wicket with the bat or with any part of the batter's 
body (called hit wicket). A player is deemed out if the batter's leg intercepts a 
straight bowled ball and thereby prevents the ball from striking the wicket (called 
leg before wicket or LBW); or if any of several other rules are violated. A batter 
who hits the ball to the boundary of the field scores four runs without having to run 
for them; if the ball is hit over the boundary without bouncing (on the fly), the 
batter is credited with six runs. The same batter continues to bat until put out 
(Formhals, 1984). 
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Each batter remains at the wicket reached during the last run; thus, when play 
resumes, a different batter may face the bowler. When the bowler has delivered a 
so-called over of six balls a second bowler bowls from the opposite end. Since the 
new bowler faces in the direction opposite that faced by the first one, the 
wicketkeeper and the fielders shift their positions accordingly. When the second 
bowler has delivered an over, the first bowler resumes bowling. No bowler may 
bowl two consecutive overs (Formhals, 1984). 
A team's innings ends when 10 of the 11 batters have been put out of the game or 
when a predetermined number of overs has been completed, or when the captain of 
the batting team chooses to declare the innings finished. The game can consist of 
Test matches, which are usually played over four days, or can be limited overs 
games where each team is restricted to a fixed number of overs and games are played 
in a day (fifty overs at international level). The team that scores the most runs in 
either game is the winner. The one-day game cultivates different skills and tactics 
than the four-day game. 
Structural differences between the one-day and four-day game made a significant 
impact on interviewees' perceptions of fair play. Each type of game was considered 
to hold a different ethos and represented a separate entity. This supports the work of 
Heinilä (1978) and Nilsson (1993) who argue that interpretations of fair play are 
dependent on a number of key variables, including: sporting culture, gender, 
historical tradition, level of performance, and socio-cultural context. Moreover, a 
case can be made to suggest that ethical systems are specific to particular cultural 
settings (Held, 1993). 
Shauna argued that one-day matches have more appeal as there is always a result at 
the end. 
PSS: 69 Urm totally different thing urm one day matches are one day 
and Test matches are four days so the game is a lot slower more 
tactical more technical and you've got time to play your shots 
whereas one day you've only got fifty overs to spray it around the 
park so then people like to watch one day cricket because it's over in 
one day. 
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There was a tension between the perceived value of each type of game; attitudes 
differed as to which one constituted `real' cricket. It seemed that the older, more 
experienced players preferred Test match cricket whereas newer players to the squad 
found Test match cricket often boring and uneventful. Shauna preferred Test match 
cricket. 
PSS: 72 Urm I think so urm you know cricket is more of a cricket 
game urm there's too much improvisation in the one day game you 
know some of the shots the guys play these days you'd never play in a 
Test match never urm for bowling in one day cricket you just bowl it 
line and length. Whereas in Test match cricket you use the ball more, 
you do different things with it and ... can experiment in the field, you 
can change the field around easy. Whereas in one day cricket you 
can't do that cos you'd probably give them twenty runs in the mean 
time. So I think one day cricket is really about who scores the most 
runs on that day really. 
Other players, like Louie, felt that one-day cricket is more exciting. 
PJL: 98 I think that's the way it will go and I prefer that ... cos at least you get a result at the end of it ... 
batters have got to go out and 
try and score runs, bowlers have to try and get wickets. I've played in 
Test matches where I've just stood there for two hours, not going for 
runs, cos you've just gotta stay there ... to save a 
Test match, not 
even to win it, just to get a draw. Y'know you'll get the purists who'll 
say well, that's all part of it ... 
but if you are going to market it as a 
viable financial thing then the only way you're gonna make that 
happen is to make it more exciting. 
The purists were seen as the traditionalists, known as the `silver tops' because of 
their white hair. They only ever played Test match cricket and raised sponsorship by 
selling chocolate on the boundary as opposed to signing lucrative deals with multi- 
national companies. 
RL. 99 Who are the purists? 
PI L: 99 Y'know all the one 's who have played Test match cricket. I 
think that's why you're getting, well the Aussies are trying to do it, 
and the English, a Test match team and a one day team ... with 
captains for each. 
Louie wanted to see two separate teams; one for Test matches and one for one-day 
cricket. Younger interviewees like Rebecca argued that the one-day game is more 
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intense and competitive than traditional Test match cricket. She argued that the 
different games required a different way of thinking. 
RR: 68 Okay urm would you say there is a winning is everything 
ethos? 
P6R: 68 Urm yes winning is everything ethos in one day cricket 
completely urm nothing else matters in four day cricket you do 
everything you can not to lose because a draw is a respectable result 
urm and a draw is okay you know you try to win but if not then 
definitely not lose but in one day cricket winning is everything, 
definitely. 
P6R: 65 
... it's a 
different way of thinking, you've got to really really 
switch and you've got to play a different game urm and it would be 
such a shame if it went ... the whole ethos is different it's every single ball, or what the sports psychologists say is, every ball is an event you 
know three hundred events per innings and urm Test match is about 
patience, guile, and out thinking the opposition... 
Louie believed that one-day cricket was easier. 
PI L: 100 Yeah, it is two separate completely different games now, and 
it is difficult for girls who have only played one day stuff to 
concentrate for a Test match and tactically it's hard is a Test match. . 
. urm one 
day is easier, y'know you've gotta go out there and score 
the most runs, same in a Test match but there are different ways to get 
there. 
Test match cricket was viewed as `true' cricket by the coaches and manager of the 
squad. Players needed to be tougher mentally and, to win, the opposing team had to 
be bowled out. Jane said: 
RJ. -57 Is true cricket declaration cricket to you? 
MIJ. - 57 Yes and I think that's a traditional view because in a way you 
have to be old enough to remember it.. . 
Charlotte agreed. She argued that the Test match game required tougher players 
mentally than the one-day game. 
P3C: 58 Yeah urm I think that there is a mental toughness that Test 
match cricket enhances that one day cricket doesn 't. One day cricket, 
yes there are game plans, but it's all a bit spontaneous you know it's, 
whereas in Test match cricket the tactics and the mental side of the 
game comes into it far more than one day cricket. So I think it would 
be a shame, I mean I understand the attractions of the fifty over 
thrash and the runs and that and the inevitable result at the end of it. 
137 
But urm I think it's important that the game makes space for the two 
types of game. 
Marie also believed that Test match cricket was `real cricket. ' 
CI M. " 61 I would not want one day cricket to be more important than 
Test match cricket because there is more to Test match cricket. I think 
one day cricket is fantastic and I think it's got a wider scope for the 
general public and there's more entertainment to those who are not so 
entrenched in cricket but in terms of the skills and the challenge of 
declaration cricket to me that is the true Test of who is the best, that's 
real cricket. 
CIM. -62 Urm because real cricket has so much more scope urm 
because clearly it's a bigger area and if we're talking real cricket 
then we're talking Test match cricket you know bowlers have to get 
the batsmen out to win the game urm I mean the batsmen could stay 
there and never score a run but it'll end up being a draw .... CIM. -63 ... the 
beauty of proper cricket is that you don 't win unless 
you bowl the other team out so you've gotta be aggressive, you've 
gotta be competitive. 
A good game was viewed by all as one that is closely contested and which boasts a 
tight finish. No interviewees wished to see a one sided game where one team was 
winning easily. For a game to qualify as good it had to be competitive, exciting, and 
full of uncertain tension. Some players referred to Test match cricket in their 
description; others referred to cricket in general. Marie also mentioned the ability of 
teams and a close finish. 
CIM. -60 ... 
When two sides are evenly matched. A good cricket game 
is one that is evenly contested and that's close and that's what makes 
it ... the game can swing 
ftom one side to the other and that is to me 
that type of cricket where you've got to bowl a side out and because 
it's over such a long period of time it can change you know one team 
can be on top and then the other one is and so what makes a good 
game of cricket is that you don 't know the outcome until the end. The 
one day game is definitely in the last two or three ovens but a Test 
match is enthralling throughout because it keeps changing whereas 
the one day game doesn 't have that. 
Shauna argued that not only was a close finish essential but the quality of umpiring 
had to be good. 
PSS: 71 ... a nice game of cricket 
between two good teams on a good 
track with two good umpires really. 
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Louie, Harriet, and Robert talked of personal performance, technically good batting 
and fielding, and uncertainty of outcome. 
P6R: 63 Urm personal performance, winning, a tight finish ... there 's 
no point in annihilating someone, it's no fun. 
P1 L: 97 Urm 
... one that's to-ing and fro-ing all the time ... 
One 
that's close with some technically good cricket, y'know good bowling 
and batting, and fielding. 
C4H. - 61 Urm when it's exciting [laughs]. A bad one is where you beat 
someone hands down, basically, and it goes on and on and on. Good 
games are when you know you can comfortably get what you want but 
the other side is actually playing quite well. I like it when there is a bit 
of competition, a bit of a challenge between them that makes it quite 
good. 
C3R: 57 Well I'd like to see everybody playing to the best of their 
ability, the tension around the game, that sort of thing. 
3.2 Fair and Foul Play 
First, it is important to explain the conceptions of fair play that were in operation. 
Each of the interviewees was asked what fair play means. Although the responses 
were varied, a relatively shared perception arose. Understandably, as Charlotte 
identifies, the central tenet to this perception was the notion of rules and rule- 
adherence. 
P3C: 16 Urm 
... 
I think it's urm ... you 
know 
... urm, it's good honest commitment to the game, urm ... that you're, 
I would say play 
within the rules or urm to the rules urm ... 
Jane, on the other hand felt that fair play was an old fashioned concept: 
Ml J. " 16 Urm .. 
I'm old fashioned enough to have that concept that 
there is no point in competing if you don't choose to do it by the rules, 
every rule, the spirit of competition ... 
This can be linked to further beliefs about traditions of etiquette, and the notion of a 
spirit of the game. Gill, Marie, and Rebecca all made reference to the idea of fair 
play as rules with accompanying traditions and etiquette. 
P6R: 17 Fair play urm respecting the rules and traditions of the 
sport urm ... 
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CIM. -19 Playing within the rules of the game basically urm you know 
cricket has gone beyond that even with certain sorts of etiquette and 
things that you would not do even though they are within the rules of 
the game but I think you need to want to win but without cheating. 
Fair play is not cheating to me. 
P4G. 75 [sighs and laughs] Fair play ... playing to the spirit of the laws not just the letter. 
Harriet and Valerie felt that fair play meant to play to the limit of the rules without 
harming anyone. Here, fair play included beliefs about self-respect and personal 
responsibility. 
C4H. "18 Fair play, playing to the limits of the rules ... probably 
without harming anybody or I guess playing to the limits I'd say. 
P2V. "22 ... 
Urm fair play is to me, my interpretation is not only 
playing within the rules of the game but also having some self respect 
and honour if you like when you are playing the game. Is pose 
there's certain things that you just don't do, except against the 
Aussies [laughs]. 
Implicit was the idea that fair play is different depending on which team you are 
playing and on which sport. Louie suggested that cricket was seen as `more' fair as it 
held definite rules with boundaries which were seen as `harder to push'. 
PI L: 30 Urm, fair play is playing within the rules ... in cricket, 
there 's definite rules, and it's harder to push the boundaries of those 
rules. 
The idea of `gentle cricket, ' included Shauna and Charlotte's views about cricket not 
being so competitive so therefore being `more' fair in some way. 
P5S: 32 ... cos 
I think it's the level of competitive cricket that you 
play urm more kind of soft cricket say you know gentle cricket so it 
doesn't really matter if something happens or not they just take it in 
their stride and that's it ... 
RC: 55 Would you say there is more fair play in cricket than 
in the other sports you play? 
P3C: 55 Urm ... yeah 
I would say that. That's the nature of the 
game, you know it's not acceptable to argue with the umpire, whereas 
in hockey people do, and you know I think that again the adrenaline 
and the nature of the game are different. I mean you'll hear far more 
`talk' on a hockey pitch than you will on a cricket pitch and certainly 
to the officials. 
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Louie felt that England were too nice on the pitch. She wanted to see a tougher 
mental attitude and less `friendliness' towards the opposition. Here issues of class 
become apparent. The idea of playing fairly was linked to being `nice' and viewed as 
an inherent part of belonging to an upper class community. 
PI L: 48 It is, it's sticking by the rules and it's not the winning but the 
taking part kind of thing ... it's more, well [puts on a soft, posh' 
voice] "At least we played, but at least we played fairly. " 
RL: 76 Do you feel you have to behave properly in cricket then? 
PI L: 76 
... Yes, it's a reserved game, the ethos of cricket is totally different to football ... 
football is like rowdy ... I can 't really think of 
anything on a cricket pitch, total idea of cricket is a lot more [puts on 
a posh voice] "Oh, well done, absolutely super. " 
A link may be established here with historical notions of the role of upper class 
women and sport. Louie implies that behaviour in modern EWC stems from the 
reserved, polite, proper conduct of traditional upper class participation. This serves 
to illustrate the idea that the ethos of EWC is contextually sensitive to a range of 
particularities that are historically situated and embedded within the practice. 
In summary, the concept of fair play was defined by the following considerations: 
rule adherence, etiquette, not cheating, abiding by a spirit of the game, not causing 
harm, and having self respect and honesty. As we saw in Chapter Four (Part One) 
both ICSPE (1996) and the ICFP (1994) defined fair play in this way. Immediately it 
becomes apparent that fair play is more than simply following the rules of the game. 
When asked about those actions that could be considered as not fair play, initial 
responses included, taking drugs, ball tampering, or feigning injury. None of these 
actions were seen as particularly relevant to women's cricket. Louie suggested that 
the reason for this was because the stakes in cricket are not that high; women do not 
earn any money by playing for England. 
RL: 62 Is there drug testing in women 's cricket? 
PI L: 62 Yes, for urm about seven or eight years now, no-one's ever 
been done in cricket though. I'm not being awful but the stakes aren't 
that high, they're not high enough to want to go and do that. We 're 
amateurs at the end of the day. I mean the World Cup is important to 
us, but to me if you've got to go to those lengths to win it, then no. 
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Valerie said that whether actions are considered unacceptable depends on the 
viewpoint a player holds. She felt that the only way a player can cheat is to alter the 
condition of ball in some way. 
P2V. -41 In cricket, well they've got to be tampering with the ball or 
something ... 
I mean it totally depends on your view point. If 
somebody gets nicked behind and doesn't walk, well, there would be 
several people on that pitch who would say that that person has 
cheated, by not walking. It's up to the umpire you know, it's not the 
batsmen's decision, or the bowler's decision, or any player's decision 
on the field, it's the umpire, so for me, you've got to have cheat 
blatantly, and for me that's the only way that you can honestly say, in 
cricket, that that person has cheated. If you get a bottle top and start 
lifting up the seam, to me that's cheating cos you're tampering with 
the ball, and doing all sorts of unfair things, and that's gives an 
unfair disadvantage to your opponents. 
Here, the notion that players have no responsibility to own up `to nicking a ball' is 
an interesting one to which I will return. Louie defined cheating, then, as breaking 
the laws in a blatant, intentional way, or going against the spirit of the game. Other 
interviewees, like Alexander agreed: 
PI L: 60 Urm 
... it's 
blatantly going out to win or change the course 
of a game by doing something that's not in the rules. 
C2A: 52 To break the laws of the game. 
Although a clear theme of fairness emerged, all interviewees felt that many 
competitors, including themselves, did not always follow the laws of the game. As 
Alexander said: 
RA: 53 Do competitors always follow the laws of the game? 
C2A: 53 Nope. 
RA: 54 Why? 
C2A: 54 Why they don't ... 
because they think they can get an 
advantage by breaking the rules of the game. 
Valerie indicated the difficulty in determining whether an action is an intentional 
rule violation or an accident. She said: 
P2V. "32 ... 
If, for example, you make sure you push somebody out of 
the way, so say the bowler has released the ball and on the follow 
through, they have taken a quick single, the ball is in between the 
bowler, so the batsman is, it's difficult to describe, basically the ball 
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is very close to the batsman and the bowler, and the bowler like 
pushes the batsman out of the way to get the ball and runs them out, 
and like if it's blatant. The problem is, it's very difficult often to 
distinguish what is blatant and what is pure accident, do you know 
what I mean? 
Alexander provided another example that included not owning up when a player has 
taken the bails off. 
C2A: 56 Urm, well I haven't seen it ... urm .... but I'm sure it must have happened, which would be a run out decision. The ball comes 
into the keeper, the keeper accidentally knocks the bails off first, and 
then breaks the wicket's bails out of their ground. Out, because the 
umpire was indecisive or something, and the player didn't own up, to 
say the bails dropped off... 
A blurred distinction became more apparent between the notion of bending the rules 
and breaking the rules. Gill felt that there was a distinction between cheating and 
bending the rules. 
P4G: 115 What does it mean ... urm .... well it means [laughs] doing 
anything possible to win urm to win urm ... and cheating as opposed 
to bending the rules ... 
She argued that appealing for a catch that has come off the pad is an instance of 
cheating. 
P4G: 122 Well now, I think cheating is well really, and particularly, 
they had this in India, spin bowlers bowling, quite a lot of close 
fielders round the bat, and urm appealing for catches when they know 
full well it's come off your pad. I see that as cheating, because again 
it is very difficult for an umpire from there, y'know from this sort of 
distance away [makes gesture] and you've gone forward bat and pad. 
It is very difficult but we had a lot of people given out like that, and 
we don 't appeal. Really, honestly we don 't appeal in those situations. 
The notion of appealing will also be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. 
Interviewees were asked whether they would cheat if they had the opportunity. 
Responses were varied. Marie said that although she would not coach or sanction a 
rule infraction ordinarily she might approve of it afterwards if it meant that the team 
ended up winning. 
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Interviewees identified a number of actions that they defined as unacceptable. These 
included: abuse, dissent, intentional breaking of the rules, whacking the stumps in 
temper, physical contact with another player, gesticulating at the umpire. not 
supporting the captain, swearing or distracting the bowler before she commences her 
run-up by `chatting in the slips. ' The last example occurs when fielders who are in 
close proximity to the bowler (in the slips) distract her as she is preparing her run-up. 
Another example refers to the tacit agreement between batters when not to attempt to 
take a possible run. The batters may be in the process of taking a quick single when 
the opposition misfields the ball. The fielder throws the ball in to the wicket keeper 
but it hits a batter in the process and is then deflected into an open space. 
Technically, the batters could take an extra run if they desired, however, it is an 
unwritten rule that no such runs should be taken. The above actions were all deemed 
unacceptable but many players admitted to behaving in such a way. Alexander 
argued that some actions should never be ruled out: 
RA: 73 Is there something that players do that you would never 
approve of them doing? 
C2A: 73 Never approve, urm .... yeah, 
I would never ever approve 
of them doing what Chris Broad did once when he was bowled out 
which was getting his bat and whacking the stumps with it ... urm ... 
never approve of physically confronting another. .. 
but within the 
subtleties of the laws of the game, i. e. not walking, bails dropping off, 
etc. etc. never say never is what I say... 
Louie suggested that it depends on the pressure to win: 
PJL. 70 Again, you can sit here and there 's loads of things you could 
do 
... 
but y'know it's difficult to say, y'know like if you're fielding on 
the boundary, and you know damn well that you might have slid to 
save it but your foot's over and you tap it back in, and without hind 
sight in the women's game, and it's the last over, and they need one 
run to win, are you gonna put your hand up and say it went for four. 
Similarly, Gill, who believed that competition within the game had intensified, 
echoed this view: 
P4G: 61 I think as the whole thing gets much more competitive, I 
mean I think it's quite likely that things will be said during the 
Australia series this summer urm I think as urm ... not that 
it matters 
more, because it's always mattered but that the competition is intense. 
The one day game is intense urm y'know people are more willing to 
express how they feel these days I think than previously, they are less 
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likely to just say oh well that's the umpire's decision, thank you very 
much sir, I'll go off quietly, y'know urm I have said words to an 
umpire [laughs] particularly in the World Cup urm all out of very 
deep frustration, urm but not really acceptable. 
She said that she was more likely to question an overseas umpire: 
P4G: 136 
... 
I think more things are said to umpires these days and I 
know this is going to sound dreadful but I guess I'm more willing to 
say something to an overseas umpire but well I did say something to 
that Indian umpire in the semi-final, and I think that was because of 
the situation. 
RG: 137 What did you say? 
P4G: 137 I said, `that's fucking crap [laughs]. ' Well when I say I said 
it to him I said it in his general direction, and he probably couldn't 
even understand me. 
P4G: 139 
... Ii . ust could not believe it but urm he probably wasn't 
even aware that I said it to him y'know so I'm not saying I would 
never do it again ... 
Rebecca proposed that a player could do anything within her means: 
P6R: 50 
... 
I don't know I think it just all comes from the desire to 
win and the level of the competition and may be things which aren 't 
considered so fair urm I suppose it comes down to the survival of the 
fittest. I suppose you do anything you can, don't you? 
In summary, players saw a difference between breaking the rules and cheating 
arguing that ideas have changed over time. This illustrates Held's (1993) point that 
that moral behaviour arises in the context of particular lives that are embedded in 
particular relationships at different times. Thus, we need to look at these 
relationships if we are to understand ethos and fair play in the context of modern 
sport. It is not enough to consider whether a particular action satisfies a formal rule 
but to master the relationship between principle and situation (Lövlie, 1997). 
Some interviewees, but not all, felt that the pressure and responsibility to be honest 
was dependent on the competitive level of the game. The idea that it is acceptable to 
cheat sometimes was present. Players felt that, because decisions often go against 
them, it was acceptable to seize those opportunities `to inadvertently break the rules' 
as all actions even themselves out in the end. 
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3.3 The Role of the Umpire 
As the game becomes more professional and competitive, the rules of etiquette or 
politeness gradually become less evident. Players identified the umpire as one of the 
key variables concerning fair play. The umpire's role was viewed primarily as one of 
law enforcement. Most of the players stressed that they themselves could not be held 
responsible if an umpire made the wrong decision. This confirms the recent findings 
of Bredemeier and Shields (1994) who also found that players in elite sport deny 
their autonomy when confronted with an ethical decision. 
Alexander indicated the power of the umpire and the impact that they can have on 
the `climate' or ethos of the game. 
C2A: 90 Urm, law enforcement agency, er pretty significant role 
because of the power they've got in that little finger ... urm ... I'm 
not sure. Well I guess they have a general input into the climate of the 
outfield ... 
but I wouldn 't go overboard on that. I mean to me the 
massively significant role they've got is in the decision making. 
Players looked to the umpire to set the tone of the game and establish control and 
consistency. As Charlotte said: 
P3C: 52 Urm, yeah I mean that I think they set the tone in terms of 
their professionalism. I think it's annoying if you've got an umpire 
that dithers, they're the key to setting the tone of the game. You know 
you like an umpire to sort of be consistent and urm perhaps more so 
than in other sports, but you are aware that the umpire should be 
consistent, with signals and that sort of thing. I think as players you 
are quick to pick up on the officials of the game. There 's nothing more 
annoying than an umpire who isn 't in control. 
It was apparent that players' attitudes towards the umpire and quality of umpiring 
have significantly changed over the last ten years. As noted previously, players are 
far more likely to question an umpire's decision or make derisory comments to an 
official in today's climate of accountability. This point is made by one of the 
coaches, Alexander. 
RA: 92 Why, what's changed? 
C2A. 92 I would imagine forty years ago, it would have been unheard 
of for a player to question an umpire's decision, still you're not 
allowed to do that within the laws of the game but you do see it now 
and again. 
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Players and coaches had a lack of respect for international umpires. Marie and 
Harriet felt that they had been on the receiving end of blatant match fixing by some 
referees in the past whose perceptions of administering the laws were different. The 
responsibility to control this was seen as a problem for the governing body of cricket 
itself. This is particularly relevant when one considers the recent scandal in the 
men's game over allegations of match fixing and improper conduct. 
RM: 59 So their perception of rule bending is different? 
CIM. -59 Yeah, not what I would find acceptable but then it's up to the 
rules of the game and the people in control of it to stop that 
happening. 
All interviewees felt that a poor umpire resulted in an unfair game. They also argued 
that opponents could not be trusted to be fair. Players did not expect or trust the 
opposition to play fairly. There was no contractual understanding that players were 
abiding by the same tacit agreements of competition. This illustrates the limited 
explanatory power of the use of social contract theories to explain fair play. 
The umpire has the power to control and define the climate of the game, thus, trust 
should be placed in the officials. As Louie stated: 
RL: 68 Do you always trust your competitors? 
PIL: 68 Urm 
... trust them to walk and things like that ... urm I 
think really in any game you've got officials in charge ... those are 
the one's you've got to trust and if they get it wrong then they get it 
wrong. So I think more, you've got to trust the officials rather than 
your opponents, you can't trust your opponents to walk because that's 
entirely up to them. 
To reiterate then, players consistently denied their autonomy in umpiring decisions; 
players argued that the responsibility to `own up' and `walk' was taken away from 
them. Charlotte saw the decision making process as the umpire's sole responsibility. 
P3C: 16 
... 
but at the same time you know you've got an umpire or 
you've got a referee, you've got people there to actually make that 
decision, and urm you must abide by the decision that they make urm 
but I wouldn't, urm I'm not averse to pushing that rule beyond if its 
to my advantage. But if you know they rule against how I have gone 
then I must accept that decision. 
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The umpire has the power to define how the laws of the game are to be interpreted 
and applied. In this sense he or she becomes the dominant force on the field; they are 
the sole adjudicators of fair and foul play. The umpire's right to exercise discretion 
when applying the laws of the game will have a significant impact on the ethos of 
that game. 
3.4 England and their Opponents 
Members of the squad all believed that they played fairly. They liked to think that 
other teams operated within the same code of fairness but acknowledged that they 
did not trust their opponents. Some players argued that, if the necessity arose, they 
would, grudgingly, have to break the laws of the game. The notion that `old school' 
players were seen to be `more' fair was apparent as was the importance of the level 
and type of game. Players argued that they do follow the laws of the game, but to be 
competitive they must stretch those rules to their limits. Alexander argued that if 
another team started to break the rules then it would be acceptable to match that 
behaviour. 
RA: 65 Let's take the mankadding example. If someone did that to 
you then would it be okay to do the same thing back? 
C2A: 65 Well, it would for me, yeah. 
C2A. 66 ... 
I'd say, if the only way to deal with this is to break the 
rules ourselves, between you, me, and the gate post, I'll deny this 
ever, I'd say fine go and break the rules. 
C2A: 70 But, I would never advise players to break the rules, with the 
exception of, this is the World Cup or a serious match here, and there 
is no other way out. 
Gill accepted this view. 
P4G. 134 Well, I guess I've said that already. Again at international 
level, or at a very competitive level that if someone does that and gets 
away with it then you are just going to have to play the same game 
even if you don't like doing it. 
The level of competition significantly influenced whether players saw breaking the 
laws as acceptable or not. Unacceptable actions that were defined in relation to 
cheating were seen as open to change. Rebecca implied that she may change her 
view on actions that she considered unacceptable now. 
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RR: 46 Is it okay to break the laws if your opponents do? 
P6R: 46 Urm 
... 
break the laws. There isn't many ways you can 
break the laws in cricket, what do you mean ... urm if they tamper 
with the ball then no it's definitely not okay for us to tamper with the 
ball, I'm completely anti that. There are plenty of things you can do to 
the ball, you can put sun cream on the ball, you can lift the seam, if it 
hits the seam it moves off the pitch and there's more chance of there 
being a wicket but I don't think you should alter the condition of the 
ball 
... and may 
be my views on that will change. 
This illustrates the potential dynamic, changing nature of ethos. When perceptions 
on the concept of fairness change, in turn, the ethos is re-negotiated and redefined. 
Bredemeier and Shields (1995) use Haan's concept of moral balance to understand 
the changing nature of fairness in sporting games. What is fair becomes the product 
of unique contextually conditioned negotiations that are carried out within a 
discourse that has a particular past and an anticipated future (Bredemeier and 
Shields, 1995). As Lövlie, (1997) states: 
Judgement is not confined to finding the fit between an action and its 
rule, but to sorting out the threads of the moral web, taking both 
social, psychological and moral facts into consideration (p. 30). 
Although some players saw fair play as both playing to the spirit and to the letter of 
the laws of the game they acknowledged that there is a dividing line where rules can 
be pushed to their limits. For example, Harriet believed: 
RH. -45 Urm do players always follow the laws of the game? 
C4H. -45 [phone rings] ... well I 
don 't think they do because my 
perception of cricket is that there 's certain ways you can push the 
laws to suit your advantage. 
Robert identified an example of this: 
C3R: 20 Well urm you might try and wind someone up in an indirect 
way. If say someone comes out to bat you might say, c'mon on let's 
get them back in the pavilion straight away, you know not talking to 
him but talking to your mates so he can hear what you say. 
Louie held the perception that the WCA acted as the Establishment by setting certain 
traditions and attempting to maintain set standards. The lack of money in the 
women's game was also seen to be a contributory factor in fair play. Most 
significantly, the recurrent variable was the level of the game. 
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PI L: 78 Urm again with me it's a heat of the moment thing. I'd like to 
sit here in all honesty and say that I wouldn't cheat, but scenario A, 
it's the World Cup final, and they need two to win, y'know the ball 
comes back in and you flip the bail off with your finger before the 
ball 's got there, and the umpire 's given then out, are you going to go 
up to the umpire and say, I'm sorry but I've taken the bail off with me 
finger. 
RL: 79 And what would your captain say if you did? 
P1 L: 79 1 think.... I think you'd get a big bollocking ftom the captain. 
Louie's comments support Maclntyre's (1996) claim that, as a member of a practice, 
one's attitudes and preferences become shaped by the practice. The context of the 
game shapes the player's response to fair play. The interpretation of rule following is 
left open to the player to decide on the appropriate action (Reddiford, 1985). 
Part Two: Application of Fair Play/Ethos within the Game 
1 Laws and Ethos 
The idea that the laws of cricket promote fair play was a strong one. Sporting 
behaviour was seen as a direct consequence of the laws of the game. Robert felt that 
the establishment of the elite women's game was the WCA. He believed they ran 
and controlled the game and, as a result, had defined the laws and their 
interpretation. This illustrates the Maclntyrean notion of the institution; that is, the 
institution becomes the foundation for sustaining practices. 
C3R: 42 I think so, yeah I mean I think that urm the establishment of 
this country basically run the game and they've made the laws? 
Other players, Valerie and Charlotte, noted the effects of etiquette and tradition. 
Cricket was seen to be proper and civilised. 
P2V. "52 Yeah, because you've got some rules, well they're not really 
rules, but you've got things that have been handed down traditionally 
like, mankadding, like you don't kick it off your pads to get that extra 
run, so yeah, they do. 
P3C: 50 Yeah, yeah, urm it's a game where there are lots of laws and 
it's something that people would have to have a bit of depth of 
knowledge about especially the higher you go and I think it's you 
know there's so much tradition in terms of going out and tossing the 
coin. Then there 's tea, and the whole sort of make up and the 
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structure of the game. It is very civilised, you know you are with the 
opposition all the time, you are not in isolation, and you know you're 
all having a cup of tea together. Whereas in hockey and football 
you're in separate dressing rooms and there's not the hype in the 
game. 
Rebecca gave a specific example where the law had been changed to enforce 
sporting behaviour. 
RR: 54 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage 
sportspersonship? 
P6R: 54 Urm 
... urm ... the 
laws urm ... yeah I guess so urm the `no ball' law has changed to stop negative bowling you know where 
the bowler can just roll it along the ground and in effect stop the other 
side ftom winning so that's changed... 
Alexander made an interesting point on the idea that a captain can offer a sporting 
declaration. This occurs when one of the captains feels that her team has scored just 
enough runs to secure a draw. To declare provides an opportunity for an exciting and 
close finish. 
C2A: 80 I don't know. I mean we could go off on a tangent for a minute, 
the declaration laws are interesting ... urm ... 
because you get this 
concept of a sporting declaration. 
He also drew attention to the point that the laws of cricket may actually discourage 
sporting behaviour. 
RA: 79 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage 
sportspersonship? 
C2A: 79 Urm ... to an extent 
I think they do urm ... 
but on the other 
side of it, the laws discourage sporting behaviour. I mean if you take 
the appeal rule, law.... There are many many LBW appeals that are 
made which is damn obvious they are not going to be given out ... 
but there 's a psychology in that, it's intimidating the batsmen, and the 
umpire. But you have to appeal for an LBW decision ... now if the 
law of the game was that there was no appealing and the umpire just 
sits there, and when they think it's out they give it out urm you'd have 
a very different climate, because the law says you've got to appeal. 
As we continue it is clear that the rules merely provide the minimum framework 
within which players operate. This supports the claim that, formalism, on its own, as 
a theory of games cannot cope with multiplicity of actions and contexts in which 
151 
players find themselves. The abstract nature of formalism does not account for 
fairness. 
2 Walking 
Law 32 states that: 
The Striker shall be out Caught if the ball touches his bat or if it 
touches below the wrist his hand or glove, holding the bat, and is 
subsequently held by a Fieldsman (sic) before it touches the ground 
(Law 32 (1) Out Caught). 
If a player has been caught out, and after an appeal from the fielder, the umpire will 
signal out by raising his finger above the head. `Walking' is where a player does not 
wait for the umpire's signal and effectively dismisses herself from the game by 
walking off the pitch. Such a noble act was once seen as an inherent part of cricket 
and fair play. It may be the case that the batter has just touched the ball and it has 
deflected into the hands of the wicket keeper. In such cases, it is difficult for the 
umpire to judge whether a player has touched the ball with the bat or glove, and 
hence, been successfully caught out. A player is under no obligation to `own up' and 
say whether they made contact with the ball. To walk indicates that the player does 
not need the umpire to give her out; she has taken responsibility and been honest. 
On the other hand, a fielding team may appeal for a player to be given out even when 
they know she has not touched the ball with bat or glove. Such occasions provide a 
rich context in which to examine players' attitudes towards fair play. 
Robert explained that, in his day, a player was cheating if she knew she had hit the 
ball and did not walk. 
C3R. 27 
... 
I mean in my day as a player if you hit a ball and you got 
caught behind the wicket then you walked or you'd be expected to 
walk. Nowadays, and there's a lot of justification for it, if you nick a 
ball behind and get caught you wait for the umpire to give you out, 
even if you know that you've hit it. 
In cricket today, Robert argued, perceptions are changing. He believed that the 
umpire should take responsibility for such decisions. Collett's (1977) concept of 
permissive rules is of significance here. Permissive rules empower people to act in 
certain ways if, and only if, they wish to do so. In the case above a player `may' 
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walk but is not compelled to do so by Law 32. The obligation to `walk' that a player 
may once have felt is weaker in the professional game today. Thus, the value 
surrounding `walking' carries less ethical force within the ethos, now, than it may 
once have boasted. These changing perceptions have an impact on the simulacra of 
fair play. 
C3R: 28 Urm 
... yeah the umpire's there, let him give you out, that's his job. But in my day if you'd have nicked a ball and waited for the 
umpire and he would've given you not out and everybody heard it and 
you knew you hit it, then that's a form of cheating. 
Other coaches of the squad had mixed views. Jane argued that players should walk 
unless they are in any doubt. She acknowledged and accepted, however, that that was 
not the advice players were given. Alexander saw `not walking' as inadvertently 
breaking the rules of the game. If players were given `not out, ' then they were not 
`really' breaking the rules rather they were `only' breaking the rules inadvertently. 
For Alexander, it was acceptable for players to break the rules in this case. 
Marie argued that some players saw walking as a way of undermining the umpire. 
This is another example of how norms become legitimised through practice. Here, 
players rationalised their decision to not walk as a way of according respect and 
authority to the umpire. She believed that the right thing to do in such situations is to 
walk but would leave it up to the individual player to decide for herself. She said: 
CIM. -22 I personally don't agree with it but I'm sure there are people 
in England who do the same. It's a delicate one isn't it? 
Cl M. "23 urm ... 
but then again what do you do if you're the last 
wicket in and you get a snick, do you walk then and the team is going 
to lose. It's a very difficult one. 
Harriet, on the other hand, held a different view. She believed that players were 
within their rights to stand their ground and wait for the umpire to give the decision. 
There was uncertainty as to whether this action was actually fair. Harriet 
acknowledged that it might include trying to deceive the umpire. 
C4H. -51 ... 
in the women's game, if you've got the confidence, and 
you've got the body language y'know then why not. Well Is pose 
that's when you're pushing the rules isn't it. In theory, people think 
you're out, but you can sway the umpire's decision about the way you 
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come across. So, well, I think you have to give it a go, and the 
responsibility is on the umpire to say you are out, that's what they're 
there for. If it's blatantly obvious, walk, but in some respects I think 
you'd be a bit silly if you did. I think if there's been some dubious 
quality that has gone on, then I think you're well in your rights to say, 
well I think I was in, you make the decision urm ... and you're gonna 
get some people who'll stand there regardless of what's happened. I 
guess you wouldn 't have the umpires there if there wasn 't that 
pushing the limits because it's not written in stone that you walk. We 
haven't thought about this recently ... it used to 
be a group kinda 
thing. If you 're not sure then stand your ground ... we 
're trying to 
say, y'know you've got to be confident at the crease anyway and 
project a positive body language and an arrogant body language urm 
... so if they 
have that anyway... if they're ... 
So if you can stay in 
for a bit longer and you've given off the right signals then I don't 
think, well are you playing fair? 
RH. -52 What do you think? 
C4H. "52 Well [laughs] Australia and New Zealand would do it ... so it's not unfair is it. It's this unwritten thing again. 
Harriet saw not walking as fair play because other teams, such as Australia and New 
Zealand would not walk. The notion that pushing the rules, or inadvertently breaking 
the rules was considered acceptable. This illustrates Schatzki's (1997) point on 
acceptable actions. He argues that a practice establishes not only certain acts are 
correct but also that other actions are acceptable, even if they are not how one should 
proceed. For example, the player who understands walking grasps not only the 
correct procedures for acknowledging the appeal of others, "but also a range of 
actions that can be performed in response ... without 
incurring correction, 
remonstration, and punishment" (Schatzki, 1997, p. 102). Harriet saw this as `pushing 
the rules' to their limits. 
Charlotte, Gill, Shauna and Louie all believed that a player should walk if it was 
obvious that she was out. They acknowledged, however, that the decision became 
harder depending on the context and level of the game. Shauna admitted that she felt 
awful after choosing not to walk in an international match. 
P5S: 21 ... urm 
[laughs] talking about fair play I'll give you two 
instances where twice I've not walked as a batsman ... and 
I can tell 
you [laughs] I've never felt so bad in my entire life you know I 
thought I was going to have to hide myself away for a year or so. 
When asked why she had felt so terrible she said: 
154 
P5S: 24 Because I've been brought up to if you've done something 
like that then you walk, the batsman walks and that's how I've always 
played my cricket urm but if I was the bowler then I would be right 
miffed and you know I've had it too I've had it as a bowler so you 
know so you do feel miffed. 
Shauna felt that being fair had something to with `being English. ' 
PSS: 34 Urm 
........ 
I think we're very competitive we play a lot of 
international cricket urm but we are also quite fair I think being 
English. 
RS: 35 Something to do with the character of being English? 
P5S: 35 Yeah urm reserved polite you know urm "Very nice shot, " 
that type of thing yeah I think we are to some extent. 
She argued that Yorkshire people do not walk and that whether you are a walker or 
not depends on who you are and where you come from. This supports Held's (1993) 
idea that we are embodied beings in particular discourses with particular 
backgrounds. How we act depends on how our narrative selves have been socially 
constructed as part of a community with a particular tradition and history. 
P5S: 36 
... urm 
but you know two or three of the Yorkshire lasses 
are different to me. They'll probably you know give it a bit of this 
sometimes [makes lip sign] or not walk or whatever urm I mean again 
it's different people from different areas and it's a different way of life 
really. 
Louie, who is from Yorkshire, argued that she would walk if she thought she had 
nicked it. 
PIL: 35 
.... 
Well, yeah it's more of an establishment game anyway, 
isn't it, cricket. It's the old stiff upper lip thing in't it ... a 
gentleman's game and whatever else... 
She was asked whether she would feel differently if in a crucial situation. 
PJL: 36 Yeah, I mean it's easy for me to sit here and say that I would 
definitely walk .... and if it's a club game and there's nothing hinging on it, then yeah I'd .... 
but like you say if it's a World Cup 
final and you're the last batter in, and you know you only need one 
run to win .... yeah, so what are you going to 
do and I think 
realistically in the heat of the moment, whether you are a walker or 
not you're gonna do it in that situation ... so again, yeah, well it's all 
down to the situation you find yourself in. 
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Gill argued that she hated the moment where you have to make a decision about 
whether you are going to be honest or not. 
RG: 91 So, in some ways the professional attitude almost means that 
you are allowed to be dishonest? 
P4G: 91 Yeah, in a way it has become that and it's y'know it's a 
shame I think because that's ... urm the game was that you played the game and if you knew you were out you went. It would be great if 
it was like that but life isn't like that anymore, people aren't like that 
anymore ... It 
becomes a very individual thing ... if it came to it and it was a real marginal decision and there was doubt I'd have to wait, 
I'd hate it but I'd have to wait. 
Rebecca argued that fair play is to walk. She said that she would not walk, however, 
and that fair play needs to be given a lower status or consideration in the professional 
game. 
This illustrates the point that players do not always accept the contract to compete or 
accept that they have an obligation to play fairly. The use of the social contract as a 
way of understanding fair play is limited. When we consider context-specific 
examples we can see that athletes do not perceive the contest as a contractual 
agreement in which they are obliged to conduct themselves in a fair and just manner. 
The content of the agreement is negotiated in a way that considers more than just the 
formal rules of the game; it is context-specific. In this way, then, details of athletes' 
contingent circumstances are relevant to the contract to compete and, as a result, they 
should not be ignored. Rebecca's justification for not walking, she explained, is a 
new attitude within the game. 
RR: 20 What makes you say that? 
P6R: 20 Well for example if you're out by being caught behind and 
you don't walk ... 
but I wouldn't walk either cos if I'm not given out 
then I wont walk so I suppose urm I think that is fair play urm fair 
play is to walk. But I think there are times when fair play has to be put 
aside a little bit and you've got to be a little bit more practical when 
you 're given out so many times by what you think are dodgy decisions 
by umpires and if you're given an extra chance to stay in unless it's 
very very obvious and the umpire has been deaf and stupid then 1 
would walk but if it was a very very faint edge to the wicket keeper 
and I wasn't given out then I wouldn't walk. 
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Rebecca perceives fair play differently than any other interviewee. She argues that 
fair play should be accorded a lower status in the professional game. The way 
Rebecca perceives the role of fair play in the game is crucial. She perceives ethical 
situations differently than other players. Blum, (1994) argues that different parts of 
one's moral makeup are brought to bear in `seeing' (and not seeing) different 
features of ethical situations. He states: 
In fact, one of the most important moral differences between people is 
between those who miss and those who see various moral features of 
situations confronting them (Blum, 1994, p. 30). 
It may be argued that Rebecca, one of the younger members of the squad, brings a 
new perspective or competitive outlook to the team. This will be seen in later 
examples. 
The onset of professionalism and recent sponsorship has meant that players face 
greater pressure to resist walking from the pitch. Robert suggested that although 
players may say they would walk, the reality is different. 
C3R: 29 I don 't think many players in the professional game, if they 
hit a ball then they will wait for the umpire ... that's my opinion. They might tell you something different but I would say they would 
wait for the umpire ... 
He argued that it is cheating for a player to stay at the wicket if it is obvious she has 
touched the ball with bat or glove. But, it was acceptable to not walk if the player got 
the faintest of edges and the offence was less obvious. Louden (1992) reminds us to 
situate moral action in context. Here, an instantiation of unfair play is internalised 
and embedded in a particular context. It is only cheating to stay at the wicket if the 
offence was obvious. This norm becomes legitimised and concretely meaningful in 
terms of the accepted ethos of the practice. Furthermore, norms become internalised 
and then shared habits of action (Roberts 1997). Robert states that he would advise 
players to stay at the wicket and wait for the umpire's decision: 
RR: 30 And would you advise players to wait for the umpire? 
C3R: 30 Yes, I think I would say, let the umpire give you out but I 
mean if it's really obvious then that is cheating ... 
157 
In summary, whether you are seen as a `walker' or not was considered a personal 
thing. In the past, not walking from the crease was viewed as cheating. Before the 
1980s a walker may have been highly respected. Today, however, the situation is 
different. Not walking has become an accepted part of the professional modern 
women's game. It is not considered as cheating to wait for the umpire's decision. 
Here we can see a working example of how norms of fair play have become 
legitimised based on everyday practice (Lovlie 1997). 
Fair play is more than just following the rules. To be a fair player or display sporting 
conduct demands more than mere rule adherence. What counts as fair in cricket here 
is more than just an interpretation of the Law - whether a player is caught out behind 
or not. The roots of such noble, chivalrous actions like `walking' can be traced back 
through public schools and what has been deemed the cult of fair play in male sport 
(Mangan 1981). The example offered here shows how fair play is a socially and 
historically constructed idea. The notion that playing cricket is about expressing 
gentility and femininity through morally praiseworthy behaviour is a facet of the 
game that is fast eroding. The concept of `sledging' can be used to illustrate this 
point further. 
3 Sledging 
The laws of cricket refer to the unfair nature of incommodiousness. In other words, it 
is unfair for a member of the fielding team to trouble or annoy a batter while she is 
waiting to receive a ball. The law states: 
6. Incommoding the Striker 
An umpire is justified in intervening under this Law and shall call and 
signal "dead ball" if, in his opinion, any Player of the fielding side 
incommodes the Striker by any noise or action while he is receiving a 
ball (Law 42, (6), p. 44). 
This is known as sledging. Although this term can not be found in the laws of 
cricket, reference is made to the term in the International Cricket Council's Code of 
Conduct which states: 
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Players and Team Officials shall not use crude or abusive language 
(known as `sledging') nor make offensive gestures (Regulations of the 
International Cricket Council 1998, Code of Conduct, 1.5, p. 8). 
Sledging is a term used in cricket to describe certain verbal behaviour of players 
when out in the field. Both Robert and Alexander said that sledging in the women's 
game was less harsh than in the men's game. Valerie gave an example where a 
player had made derisory comments about her batting ability. 
P2V. "27 Urm ... I toured Australia ... as I was at the non-striking 
end she turned round and said, "Don't worry mate, you won't be 
fucking stood there for a long time " ... so urm you know okay then. . 
. 
but that was my sort of welcome to Australia.... and to me that's 
over stepping the line from healthy banter, in my view. 
Interestingly, Jane argued that English girls were far too polite to sledge and 
furthermore that middle class girls were not good at it. She said: 
M1±26... it's not in their nature and we're not used to it and we're 
not, we're far too polite, a cautious a people for that. 
Here is an example of gender stereotypes that are reinforced through the social 
construction and cultural make up of the practice. For Jane any kind of sledging was 
unfair. Alexander, on the other hand, argued that there are different levels to 
sledging; sledging in women's cricket was fair. 
C2A: 34 Well, I wouldn't say sledging is unfair ... 
`cos it's not 
against the rules of the game, certain types of sledging are against the 
rules of the game, that doesn't go on in women's cricket. 
C2A: 35 I haven't come across sledging in women's cricket that 
transgresses the rules of the game. So by my definition, it's fair game, 
fair play. 
Harriet agreed and argued that sledging is an inherent part of the game. 
C4H. -23 I think it's part of the game, I think it's quite a mental thing. 
.. 
But, there 's nothing in the rules that says you can 't do it so I think 
it's one of those of things that makes the game a little bit challenging. 
.. say the, well 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa are good at it. 
For Valerie sledging becomes unfair when it is nasty. She said: 
P2V. "23 Urm ... 
I would do a lot of chat on the pitch, not questioning 
people 's parentage, not nasty, but encouragement, a little bit light 
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hearted occasionally. That is my idea and there's a fine line because 
there's nothing wrong with a little bit of cheek and a little bit of 
humour but as soon as you start stepping over that line, and Is 'pose 
becoming nasty, to me that's not fair. 
Sledging was seen as an inherent part of the game. Southern hemisphere sides were 
viewed as particularly good at it. It was seen as an inevitable consequence of the 
game becoming more professional and competitive. As Robert said: 
C3R: 37 Yeah I think it is and it's all part of the game. It certainly 
goes on a lot more in the Southern hemisphere than it does in this 
country. But I think you know I think that when it all comes down to it, 
that is all in the mental side of the game and how you can in this day 
and age urm the players have sport science people that go all through 
that side of things with them, playing in front of the cameras, the 
media, and all that. Again it's playing at the higher level and all that. 
For the England team, Louie thought that one or two of the players could sledge but 
that it was not really part of their cultural makeup. Harriet argued that sledging was a 
result of who coaches a particular team. Differing perceptions regarding sledging 
illustrate the contested, plural nature of ethos. Within the social field of ethos, views 
about whether norms become acceptable are continually contested and negotiated. 
4 Appealing 
As already mentioned, players can be dismissed for several reasons. However, a 
batter can only be given out if a member(s) of the fielding team appeal(s) to the 
umpire. 
1. Time of Appeals 
The umpires shall not give a batsman out unless appealed to by the 
other side which shall be done prior to the Bowler beginning his run- 
up or bowling action to deliver the next ball. 
2. An appeal "How's That? " 
An appeal "How's That? " shall cover all ways of being out. 
(The Laws of Cricket, Law 27 (1,2), p. 33). 
So, to reiterate, this law means that fielders must appeal if they want an umpire to 
give the batter out. Fielders are expected to make genuine appeals where they believe 
the batter is truly out. A shared perception within the game is the concept of 
excessive or aggressive appealing. This is where fielders appeal for decisions that 
they know to be unfair. For example, the wicket keeper may appeal for caught out 
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when she knows that it has come off the pad of the player and not off her glove or 
bat. The bowler, wicket keeper, and other fielders may appeal together for an LBW 
decision knowing that the player should not be deemed out LBW. Jane felt strongly 
about the kind of appealing that occurs for LBW decisions. 
MIJ. "27 ... 
I mean I'm not happy. If you're the bowler and you think 
you've got them, then of course you should appeal and the wicket 
keeper should support the bowler and appeal urm but if you're down 
at square leg and behind the umpire then I think it's damn rude and 
just not cricket to be appealing for something you can't see. 
The coach, Marie, however, saw things differently. 
CIM-44 
... 
I mean I actually think girls don't appeal enough on 
LBW. I mean for LBW you might as well shout hadn't you, if it's hit 
the pad first then that's up to the umpire, it's his decision, and you 
might as well have a shout. Of all the things and this might sound 
outrageous but you might as well appeal for that one `cos sometimes 
they give em and sometimes they don 't ... 
Alexander argued that appealing for decisions known to be unfair is part of the 
psychology of the game. 
C2A: 79 There are many many LBW appeals that are made which is 
damn obvious they are not going to be given out ... 
but there 's a 
psychology in that, it's intimidating the batsmen, and the umpire. But 
you have to appeal for an LBW decision ... now if the 
law of the 
game was that there was no appealing and the umpire just sits there, 
and when they think it's out they give it out urm you'd have a very 
different climate, because the law says you've got to appeal. 
Valerie saw excessive appealing as a fair and accepted part of the game. Louie said 
that England, as a team, planned to appeal aggressively for every decision because 
they knew the New Zealand team would be doing the same. 
PJL: 83 Yeah, there's that. I mean like New Zealand we were playing 
in the semi-final, and we knew damn well New Zealand were going to 
appeal for everything because the Indian umpires are like that. And 
we thought, right if they are going to do it, then so are we. It was a 
conscious thing before we went out y'know. 
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Charlotte admitted using the same tactic. The idea here is to influence the umpire's 
decision by practising, as a team, how to appeal effectively in order to make it look 
good. 
P3C. 68 
... 
And the appealing I mean there's some countries where 
we would make a point of going all up together to make it more 
convincing, like India and Pakistan, and if we can influence in any 
way, then let's do that. 
Charlotte said that England probably would not use the same tactic against New 
Zealand. She explained that the way England appeals depends very much on where 
they and who they are playing. 
P3C. "70 I think because you tend to, again you're always assessing 
where you are, who you're playing, in your analysis and game plan. I 
think that in India they're used to a lot of appealing. I mean whenever 
we play them they appeal for everything. So rather than miss out, you 
say okay then, it's an aspect of their game that is important that we 
try to include. So it's an analysis of where you are and how it's done, 
so it's assessing where you are, and yep, in Rome do as the Romans 
do. 
Gill explained how a well-timed appeal might be used to unsettle a batsman. 
P4G: 83 What we would say is, if we are going appeal then we all 
appeal, then it's a loud appeal. We don't just leave it to the bowler to 
say [quiet voice] y'know how's that but because there is an element of 
it that is unsettling to the batsmen so y'know you want the people 
behind the bat to be loud in their appeal y'know to shake someone up 
even if they are not out it shakes them up. 
This was seen as an accepted part of the game and not seen as unfair. Excessive 
appealing may be considered as an example of where there is incongruity between 
the purposes of rules and their application. As Russell (1999) explains, ". .. the 
application of rules may be at odds with the purposes that the rules are intended to 
serve" (p. 30). The purpose of the law, here, is that a fielder must ask the umpire if a 
particular action warrants the dismissal of the batter from the game. This derives 
from the notion that it is polite to ask as sporting players do not need an umpire. The 
law states that an umpire cannot give a player out unless there is an appeal by the 
fielding team. This has gradually come to mean that fielders seek to appeal for 
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anything that may seem `worth' a shout just in case the umpire agrees and gives it 
out. 
Players' conceptions of fair play differed depending on the context in which the 
game was played. Players constructed notions of fair play based on the context 
specific circumstances in which they were playing. There was an implicit 
understanding that teams will test opponents out. 
5 Mankadding 
Law 42 is dedicated to factors concerning unfair play. One of these citations 
concerns the unfair stealing of runs, otherwise known as mankadding, after the 
batsman, J. Mankad, who first tried to steal a run. In this example the non-striker 
may try to gain a few yards by leaving her crease early, when the bowler has just 
started her run-up. This allows the non-striker to gain a head start on scoring a run. 
The laws state that such an act is unfair play. 
12. Batsman Unfairly Stealing a Run 
Any attempt by the batsman to steal a run during the Bowler's run-up 
is unfair. Unless the Bowler attempts to run out either Batsman .... the Umpire shall call and signal "dead ball" as soon as the Batsmen 
cross in any such attempt to run. The Batsmen shall then return to 
their original wickets (Law 42 (12), p. 47). 
The umpire may call dead ball when he intervenes in a case of unfair play. This 
means that the ball is not in play. To unfairly steal a run, then, is accounted for in the 
formal rules of the game. However, the application of this rule, and crucially the 
ethos surrounding its application is bound with unwritten rules of etiquette. Within 
the formal rules of the game, the bowler is entitled to knock the bails off as soon as a 
player leaves her crease thereby putting her out of the game. To do so, however 
would contravene the ethos of the unwritten rule, where the accepted etiquette is; 
first, to warn the batter that if she continues the bowler will whip the bails off. If the 
action is repeated then the bowler is deemed within her rights to put the player out of 
the game. Marie explains her view on mankadding and sees it as a form of cheating: 
CIM. -25 ... another thing 
in cricket that is etiquette urm that if the 
backing up batsman urm as the bowler comes in if they leave the 
crease before the bowler has released the ball, you can actually not 
bowl the ball and take the bails off and the batsman would be out. It's 
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called Mankadding because that's where because the chap who did it 
first was Mankad, that was his name. Now in cricket what you 're 
supposed to do but well it's not in the laws of the game actually but 
it's the etiquette, you see if someone does that ... you stop and you go 
urm and threaten the stumps and you say if you do that again then 
we'll take the bails off. Now having done that then you are entitled to 
do that. So what I actually tell players to do now is if you know 
someone who is basically cheating by running early which is what 
they are doing then you must stop and threaten the stumps and the 
chances are they wont do it again then and at least you'll stop them 
cheating. 
It is considered polite for the bowler to warn the non-striker first. 
RJ. "47 Are there any unwritten laws of the game? 
M1J-47 Urm yes probably hundreds cos that's the tradition and 
etiquette ... urm 
like Mankadding, it's polite to warn ... 
Traditionally, as we noted in Chapter Two (Part Two), the laws of cricket in the 
women's game are supposed to be applied with courtesy and politeness. Harriet saw 
this as unwritten law: 
C4H. -46 ... you see the problem with cricket is that there is a lot of 
courtesy, which is not necessarily a law that is written, it is unwritten 
law. So yeah, I would say it's done out of courtesy but in an odd way 
urm ... 
Rebecca saw mankadding as cheating. She did not believe that a bowler should warn 
another player. Although she acknowledged that it was seen as fair play to warn she 
did not believe that she should have to warn out of politeness to another player. 
P6R: 39 ... there's not many ways you can cheat in cricket urm you 
can there's like taking a yard when you're backing up as a batsman. . 
. 
Mankadding ... is that cheating urm yeah in effect that's cheating 
and whether you can get away with it or not urm I suppose that's up 
to the individual urm but it is cheating in that it's going against fair 
play in cricket because you can do it and get away with it and 
probably if you did it nine times out of ten you would get away with it 
and you would get a head start and I suppose that is cheating urm ... 
as a bowler if you catch someone Mankadding I think you should be 
able to stop in your run up and take the bails off and it's out and I 
don't believe in warning ... although that 
has been held in cricket as 
fair play cos it's fair play to warn and to not take the bails off and to 
pretend and say to the batsman, you're out of your crease and if you 
do that again then I'm going to take the bails off then she 's out and 
say to the umpire, look I've warned her. I don't believe in that. I don't 
think that's urm well if it was an inexperienced player who didn't 
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realise she was doing it then fair enough but in an international 
situation when so much is hinging on it and they need one run and 
they are going to gain by that then you shouldn't and I really think 
that urm yeah ... 
Rebecca felt strongly about mankadding as she had recently played in a game where 
a batsman had unfairly stolen runs. She wanted to take the bails off and not warn but 
felt compelled to refrain from doing so. She argued that to forego warning was not 
cheating but, at the same time, may also be considered as not fair play. 
RR: 41 So would some people say that if you had run her out and not 
warned her that would be cheating on your part? 
P6R: 41 It wouldn't have been cheating but it wouldn't have been fair 
play so not cheating but not fair play. 
RR: 42 What do we call that area then? 
P6R: 42 Urm cheating you're in the right though I mean cheating 
essentially is you're doing something wrong to gain an advantage 
yeah urm the batsmen is cheating in that situation but I had spotted 
them doing the wrong thing and I had warned them so that is fair play 
urm if I run them out then it isn't cheating because they've done the 
wrong thing and I've given them their just reward but it can be seen 
as not fair play ... it's quite a grey area isn 't it ... and it's such a 
big 
issue because a side only has ten wickets and they are very important 
especially the fact that they are pinching a yard means that they are 
probably in a tight situation and urm by warning them you let them 
get away with it and I really really believe that you should run them 
out ... 
But what I say about the old school in women 's cricket, well 
not just in women's cricket but in cricket, had I done that ... and we 
also discussed this, had I done that then the powers that be in the 
Women's Cricket Association then all hell would have broken loose 
probably. 
Rebecca had a compulsion to contravene the ethos of the game; do not warn the 
offending player, whip the bails off. The fact that she refrained from such an action 
indicates her reluctance to go against her perceived view of the WCA at that time. In 
fact, all of the team shared this perception, and believed that the `Establishment' 
would have been horrified if England had not warned the non-striking batsman. This 
illustrates Nilsson's (1997) point that rules and their application become sites of 
struggle where norms are constantly re-negotiated and standards are changed. 
Rebecca's attitudes are shaped by the ways in which the institution of EWC governs. 
The institution of a practice principally coordinates factors that governs participants' 
actions (Schatzki, 1997). 
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As Gill explained: 
P4G: 119 What mankadding, oh it would cause a storm urm and we 
wouldn't do it, we just wouldn't do it. You would warn them but why 
because it's not against the rules because the etiquette is so embedded 
in that sense that it's such a dreadful thing to do that, it's so terrible. 
But, I'm not saying that the Australians wouldn't do it, they might, I 
would be surprised, but they might. 
Valerie also agreed that not warning goes against the rules of fair play. 
P2V. "34 I think if you did that without a warning, although its not 
actually cheating, urm it is within the rules, it's not within the rules of 
fair play. 
The ethos, then, directs players to warn the other team before taking the bails off. To 
contravene this was seen as not fair play. The decision to uphold the ethos, to 
continue to warn a player, may be seen as an example of the prescriptive force of 
ethos previously discussed in Chapter Four. The institution played a crucial role, 
here, in defining the way players applied the rule in context. This exemplifies 
Addelson's (1991) point about the way in which selves are positioned in relation to 
power hierarchies. Here, players reflectively positioned their beliefs in relation to the 
beliefs of the WCA, the perceived power hierarchy. Meanings that may be assigned 
to actions within the context of a game, then, are dependent on the pre-existing 
forces that govern and sustain ethos. The view on what may be considered right or 
wrong stems from the lives of cricketers and their relationships with institutions that 
are embedded in cultural notions of what is allowed or deemed acceptable. It is in 
this way, then, that we can see how fair play is tied up with not only the formal rules 
of the game but the ensuing cultural norms of the practice. Moreover, these rich data 
would have been completely missed if an empirical investigation had been 
eschewed. 
Gill believed the attempt to steal runs was using the rules to your advantage and not 
cheating. She explained that the team is coached, `to pinch a yard' until you are 
warned. 
P4G: 117 Yeah, yeah, y'know you're not supposed to leave your 
crease until the ball has been bowled, y'know you start your walk up 
with the bowler but your bat has to be in the crease, but you try and 
reduce the distance as much as you can so you are running a shorter 
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run, now urm we did a session with [mentions name] and he said now 
pinch a yard ... y'know come out of your crease just a little bit before the bowler, and y'know if they notice and you get told off well 
stop it but if you manage to get two singles out of that then you 
manage to get two singles. Now I don't think that's cheating. I think 
that's using the rules to your advantage which is that if the opposition 
doesn't notice that well they've not noticed it, and urm y'know in 
cricket y'know the etiquette, and this still happens, is I'm warning 
you. Now you wouldn't have that in most other sports, y'know I'm 
going to score a goal in a minute, I'm going to get off side in a 
minute, do that again and I'm going to go and score a goal y'know 
doesn't happen but generally we warn people but the next time you 
should take the bails off... 
Players are socialised through the cultural norms of the practice (Nilsson, 1997). 
Notions of fair play become established and perpetuated whereby the ethos of a 
practice becomes shared habits of action that are peculiar to that culture (Roberts, 
1997). Changes may occur within the normative standards of acceptability. Norms 
will be set and reset when something occurs within the context of the game but is 
outside the jurisdiction of the rules and shared ethos. Norms are legitimised and re- 
negotiated constantly to challenge the existing perception of the way it is deemed 
acceptable for players to actually participate. As Roberts (1997) explained cricketing 
selves are continually reweaving themselves to accommodate new beliefs and 
desires. 
6 Sportspersonship 
Each of the interviewees was asked for his or her view on the concept of 
sportspersonship. Jane said that sportspersonship involved the values and ideals of 
competition. 
M1J. "20 Sportspersonship is upholding all the values and ideals and 
competing within all the agreed rules and framework and not trying to 
put one over on the opposition. 
Robert made reference to the `Establishment' of cricket and their role in running the 
game. 
C3R. 42 I think so, yeah I mean I think that urm the establishment of 
this country basically run the game and they've made the laws? 
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Marie believed that the laws of cricket do not have an influence on sportspersonship. 
She argued that sportspersonship concerns the `bit that goes' with the laws. This is 
ethos; the way in which the laws of the game are applied. Both ICSPE (1996) and 
ICFP (1994) argued that fair play is playing with the right spirit. 
CIM. -43 ... Urm the 
laws are the laws and I don't know if any of 
them encourage sportspersonship but the bit that goes with it does, 
doesn't it. Cricket encourages sportspersonship I think, but the laws I 
don't see how they can encourage sportspersonship because they are 
just the laws ... 
Alexander mentioned the notion of gamesmanship (sic) as a negative version of 
sportspersonship. 
C2, A: 49 I guess it means two things. On one level sportspersonship is, 
what a good sport, plays by the rules of the game, never tries to bend 
the rules of the game, urm ... a good sport would not involve him or herself in sledging, "Y'know what a jolly good egg ... y'know 
blah 
blah, blah. " The other angle of sportspersonship is actually overtly or 
covertly manipulating within the rules of the game ... urm so pushing the rules as far as you think they can possibly go ... urm, "Y'know 
the old thing of, that's just not cricket, " using the negative version of 
sportspersonship to not do cricket. 
Louie made the same connection. She felt that gamesmanship (sic) was an inherent 
part of all sport. 
RL: 53 What does sportspersonship mean to you? 
P1 L: 53 Urm .... well to me there 
's like sportspersonship and then 
there 's gamesmanship. Sportspersonship is playing hard and fair ... because you are there for the love of the game and the enjoyment of it. 
Whereas, gamesmanship is y'know is you're winning one nil and 
there's like a minute to go and er you've got a throw in and you're 
deliberately wasting time, y'know, ref, where is it? Now to me that's 
gamesmanship, that's totally different to sportspersonship ... 
RL: 54 Is gamesmanship okay? 
PI L: 54 Yes, it is because you know if the boot was on the other foot 
the other team would do exactly the same. It frustrates the hell out you 
though ... 
Valerie talked of being a good sport. 
P2V. -40 ... gamesmanship to me 
is when you are almost on the verge 
of cheating in terms of etiquette and in terms of fair play, whereas 
sportspersonship is good healthy competition. It's being a good sport 
I suppose. 
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Charlotte and Shauna spoke of the structure of the game and the way in which 
tradition and courtesy have an impact. 
RC: 50 Urm would you say the laws of cricket encourage 
sportspersonship? 
P3C: 50 Yeah, yeah, urm it's a game where there are lots of laws and 
it's something that people would have to have a bit of depth of 
knowledge about especially the higher you go and I think it's you 
know there 's so much tradition in terms of going out and tossing the 
coin. Then there 's tea, and the whole sort of make up and the 
structure of the game. It is very civilised... 
Shauna made a connection between cricket, sportspersonship, class, and being 
English. 
RS: 59 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage 
sportspersonship? 
P5S: 59 Yeah I would because cricket is a very English game played 
by the you know the upper class I suppose for a start, and I don 't 
know it's just heaped in tradition and with that tradition comes the 
rules and regulations and urm I suppose it does encourage 
sportspersonship yeah. 
Gill said that sportspersonship involved respect for other players. 
RG: 110 What does sportspersonship mean to you? 
P4G: 110 
... 
Urm I guess that's the principle of fair play, of 
respecting ... respecting everybody even your opposition respecting 
them as players basically ... 
Rebecca, on the other hand, reiterated that she thought fair play and sportspersonship 
were antiquated terms. 
P6R: 35 Urm 
... urm ... sportspersonship ... that's another really 
sort of weird concept isn't it sportspersonship urm ... 
being a good 
sport being a good loser what does all that mean urm ... 
[laughs] I 
mean when you're playing in the World Cup of course you're not 
going to be a good loser you sulk don't you urm sportspersonship urm 
... 
I don't know that's a bit of an antiquated term as well I think urm 
sportspersonship ... 
Here is an example of tension between the laws of cricket and their intended 
purpose. Rebecca recognises that sportspersonship means something more than just 
playing by the rules but does not consider this as the right way to play the game. 
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7 Professionalism 
During the time the interviews were conducted the WCA had just voted to merge 
with the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB). All interviewees saw women's 
cricket becoming more competitive and more professional. 
C3R. 56 Yes, I do. I think it's becoming more competitive because of 
er sponsorship coming into the women's game now, television, and 
they you know want to do well. 
The onset of professionalism meant that standards of acceptability were changing; 
the parameters were beginning to be re-negotiated and re-defined. Rebecca argued 
that what was once considered acceptable may no longer be the case. 
P6R: 26 Well I think they're becoming more acceptable because in 
women's cricket I think now after having made that jump to 
international cricket the standard of cricket is getting better... but 
when you're in such a competitive environment then things do come 
out, you do say things which taken in isolation might be seen as not 
very nice and I think it surprises people because not only is cricket 
such a traditional game but women playing cricket shouldn't be 
involved in that ... and I suppose it's the whole cricket ethos that 
says it's not fair play, you know the traditions of cricket. 
Marie stated that women's cricket was becoming more competitive both 
internationally and domestically. She spoke of the difference between winning and 
winning at all costs. 
RM"56 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive? 
CI M. "56 Yes I do and I think it needs to be ... we need to get in our domestic program in England more and more competitive cricket. I 
think we have a fear in England of competitive means nasty doesn 't it. 
.. so anyone who wants to 
be at that elite level you are competitive 
aren't you, that's what makes you play, you play to win, but you don't 
play at all costs to win, there's a difference isn't there? 
Charlotte argued that the stakes are now higher than they ever have been before. In 
the future she wanted to see England winning more matches, thus, raising the profile 
of their game. She saw this as a way to legitimising their status within the ECB. 
RC: 56 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive? 
P3C: 56 Yeah, I think that you know the stakes are getting higher, you 
know for, for example, if we want to be taken seriously with the ECB 
and the lottery, we've got to win matches and urm be seen on TV. 
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Rebecca echoed these thoughts emphasising that there are younger players in the 
team and that there is more prestige in playing for England. 
RR: 62 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive? 
P6R: 62 Yes definitely without a doubt. There 's more competition 
domestically, more counties, more prestige to play for England than 
there used to be. The average age has decreased on the national side, 
so definitely yeah. 
Loland and McNamee (2000) argue that practices have internal standards of 
acceptability which are partly driven by notions of the good game and the good 
institution. The examples offered here in Part Two are indicative of how elite 
women's cricket, as a practice and as a tradition is under going many changes. Ethos 
is a fluid, changing entity where those changes occur within the practice itself. 
8 Summary 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that fair play is particular; it is context- 
dependent. Hence, ethos is context-dependent; that is, its structure and form changes 
according to the context of the game. Rebecca's comment sums this point up nicely; 
she argues that her concepts of right and wrong change depending on the context on 
the game. 
P6R: 53 No urm no ... it's up to you as an 
honest player I think not 
to urm I mean if you knew the ball had gone over the boundary then 
you'd have to signal four it's part of sportspersonship isn't it. But it 
all comes down to concepts because if I batted and I was batting and I 
didn't walk I could go on to make eighty and end up getting sixty 
more runs than the time when in effect I was out urm so the people 
said I didn't walk so I cheated I'd gained my side sixty more runs 
which is enough to win by a long way so I think it is really really 
ethical like the example of chasing the ball round the boundary you 
know if I have just said to you that if I hit the ball and get an edge 
then I'm not going to walk in an international game which I'm not but 
then yet I've said I'm honest enough to say, oh yes this ball has 
crossed the boundary and urm Australia have got four urm it's odd 
isn 't it how we change our concepts of what's right and wrong. 
To understand fair play in sport we must look beyond the formalist structure of rules 
and examine the ethos of the game. Rules leave open a whole range of motives that 
an examination of ethos can provide. Part of what an ethos means is to understand 
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the beliefs, values and ideologies of players themselves who have constructed 
agreements as to how the game should be played. As Sherwin (1991) argues, we 
must re-conceptualise the concept of the individual. People have historical roots; 
they develop within specific human contexts that are embedded in particular 
traditions and histories. 
Players positioned themselves reflectively within the game; they were critical of 
themselves and actions within the game. The interviewees are reflective because they 
bring a body of knowledge to the game. To different degrees, they reflectively 
position themselves within the ethos of the practice. The description of the ethos 
presented here examined that shared collective policy. The idea of ethos is a 
continual moral discourse that is enacted within a practice. It represents the plurality 
of contested meanings, values and norms within the game. 
It is not only the laws of the game that provide a framework for fair play but also the 
rich tradition and etiquette which constitute the ethos of the practice. They are 
mutually inclusive; together they form the basis for normative agreements of 
standards of acceptability. The formal rules, on their own, are inadequate in cases of 
personal moral conflicts where it is necessary to take the particulars of the case into 
consideration (Lövlie, 1997). Fair play is more than simply following rules. An 
understanding of fair play, therefore, requires exploring different cases and ethical 
discourses. If we do not explore the particularities of ethos then we leave a wide void 
of uncharted territory in an examination of fair play. 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the empirical findings of the thesis. The 
interviews provided a frame of reference in which to examine how norms of 
acceptability were enacted in relation to fair play. An inside, critical view of the 
practice was used to form a thick account or description of fair play. The next 
chapter will consider whether the ethos of EWC is an ethical one. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
The central aim of this thesis has been to develop a philosophical analysis of the 
concept of ethos with particular reference to the meaning and content of fair play. 
The main contribution included the implementation of a different methodological 
approach. The goal was the successful juxtaposition of empirical work and 
conceptual analysis. To understand the ethos of EWC and fair play in this way 
necessitated a commitment to the theoretical stance posited. 
Chapter Two provided a brief historical description of conceptions of fair play. The 
purpose of this section was to illustrate how fair play is inextricably linked to the 
moralities and practices of particular activities. This served to exemplify the 
contextual feature of fair play; that is, fair play is a socially and historically 
constructed concept. Links were established between the historical traditions of 
cricket as a practice and the concept of fair play in contemporary EWC. 
Chapter Three was a cursory explanation of traditional ethical theories. To show how 
feminist ethics differed from traditional theories, a number of alternative approaches 
were considered. The notion of a context-respectful theory for fair play was 
proposed. The link between Chapter Three and Four is considered important. 
Chapter Four explained how those traditional ethical theories have been instantiated 
in the philosophy of sport literature and continued with a detailed explanation of how 
a context respectful approach can be implemented to understand fair play and the 
concept of ethos in sporting games. The methodology employed was philosophically 
justified by adopting a certain feminist epistemological position. In an attempt to 
secure the stance taken, Immanent Critique and its possibilities for research were 
explored. 
Chapter Five outlined the methodology of the thesis in more detail and explained 
how the research was conducted. The construction of the analytical categories was 
also proposed. Chapter Six used the rich data acquired from the practice to articulate 
the ethos of EWC. In this chapter, three theoretical moves are made to secure the 
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aims of the thesis: (A) The rejection of formalism as an adequate theory of game 
playing; (B) The merits of an empirically informed theory of fair play; and (C) The 
explication of an ethical ethos. Each point will now be considered. 
2 The Rejection of Formalism 
It has been established that, in sport philosophical literature, fair play has been 
characteristically understood in one way: Formalist accounts of the nature of rules 
and laws that govern the practice of sporting games. To recap, formalism proposes 
that actions within games can be defined solely in terms of their rules. But, the 
constitutive rules that set out the formal parameters for the way a game should be 
played neither account for nor define the practice fully. As Schwyzer (1969) argues, 
"The rules of a practice do not tell us what the practice is of which they are the rules" 
(p. 464). In other words, the rules of the practice do not specify what the practice is. 
The sporting game is not solely constituted and made possible by the rules. For 
example, some of the cricketers interviewed did not always know the formal playing 
rules, but certainly knew how to play the game and play it excellently. 
Striving to keep the formal rules of the game is a necessary condition of game 
playing but this, on its own, does not provide a rich account of fair play. This is 
because the rules governing games cannot always be relied upon as definitive guides 
to the regulation of conduct. As Russell (1999) states: 
... rules may 
be vague or indeterminate as to meaning, intent, or 
scope; they may conflict; they may simply fail to foresee situations 
that must be regulated to ensure the good conduct or integrity of a 
game (p. 30). 
So, Russell (1999) argues, rules, on their own, remain "instructively imprecise" or 
abstract. The formal rules of a game are not definitive guides to ensure fair play. 
Sports have to have some agreed core of meaning of when, how, and in what 
circumstances rules are to be applied. As discussed previously in Chapter Four, rules 
cannot determine their own application and do not ensure that fairness is secured in 
games. 
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Other contemporary theories of fair play, however, have also refuted the explanatory 
power of game formalism proposing alternative approaches for a more complete 
understanding of fair play (Schneider and Butcher, 1998). Although such theories 
provide a coherent, defensible, and articulate account of fair play they are not 
actually descriptive of any particular sporting game. This means that the precise 
meanings attached to notions of fair play are left unclear and perfunctory. Formalism 
does not provide a thick account; there is a need to look at the internal goods of the 
practice and how players work within the rules to achieve their ends. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to consider the influence of a given ethos and the notion that 
rules are applied in specific circumstances. Moreover, the role that an ethos plays in 
prescribing how a player acts during play demands examination. 
Accounts of fair play, as we saw in Chapter Four, grapple with the notion of ethos 
but do not effectively scrutinize its impact and influence on norms of fair play. For 
example, D'Agostino (1981) argued an ethos was important but his account did not 
examine the crucial role that a given ethos may play. A philosophical account of 
ethos and its role in the construction and articulation of fair play is proposed but has 
no empirically informed grounding for how it may actually work in practice. In other 
words, an account of social practice grounded in experience is omitted from his 
theoretical outline. It captures part of what is constituted by the abstract notion of 
ethos but leaves out a whole range of considerations and particularities specific to 
sporting games. A given ethos and its ensuing tacit agreements will not be the same 
in every practice. This has implications for the notion of fair play as a universal 
concept. As McNamee and Loland (2000) argue, if norms of fairness in games are 
incompatible then this represents a challenge to the meaning of fair play as a 
universal moral ideal. 
Formalism, then, provides the researcher with the minimum set of preconditions for 
a game to take place. One cannot, of course, talk about fair play without reference to 
the rules. Nevertheless, as has been established, those actions not covered by the 
rules must be considered or such accounts will remain abstract, as they will fail to 
consider the ethos of the practice. Accounts of fair play must look at players' 
conduct and competing motives within games taking into account what governs 
175 
behaviour and the extent of deviation therein. This will facilitate a thick description 
of fair play. 
None of the philosophical accounts of fair play reviewed in Chapter Four gave an 
examination of fair play in context. Indeed, Schneider and Butcher (1998) call for 
more sport-by-sport analyses. This thesis provides a snapshot of what such an 
analysis might look like. More detailed studies need to be conducted to gain a fuller 
picture of fair play across all sporting genres. 
In Chapter Five, the link between a criticism of formalism and the proposal of an 
empirically informed theory of fair play becomes apparent. Formalism, as a theory of 
games, exists in the abstract notion of rules themselves. Players should not be treated 
as disembodied, abstract components of fairness. An epistemological commitment to 
empirically informed theory stems from the insights gained through a study of 
feminist ethics in Chapter Three. People do not exist in abstraction; they are 
embodied selves within particular discourses or nexuses of practices. To play sport, 
to play for one's country, has significance and value in people's lives. Players' 
thoughts and feelings are crucially linked to ideas of fairness whether they may be 
considered ethically acceptable or not. For example, one only has to look at the 
current match fixing scandal in men's cricket as an illustration of unethical practice. 
The point is that we must look at how players perceive rules rather than an 
exposition of the written form of the rule on its own. 
Fair play is a contextualised constitution. Thus, an account of fair play must not 
ignore the social and historical situatedness of games as particular social practices. 
We must look inside the practice to see what counts as ethical behaviour and to 
determine what the social actors therein believe constitutes right and wrong, 
acceptable, and unacceptable behaviour. Considerations must be given to judgments 
in a social context. Only then can we begin to consider a richer, thicker 
understanding of fair play in sport. 
3 Empirically Informed Fair Play 
Thus far, a variety of ways of theorising fair play has been examined. None of these 
have sat comfortably with the following premise: if we do not ask those people 
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whose beliefs partly constitute fair play, then how are we going to know which 
conception is the most fruitful? The adoption of an empirically informed approach 
allows the researcher to gain an insight into the practice whereby the ethos acts as a 
guide to action. In summary, to analyse fair play we must consider: (1) the formal 
rules of the game; (2) how they are applied and; (3) the beliefs, values and ideologies 
of players themselves who have constructed agreements as to how the game will be 
enacted. 
The mixed model approach employed here is more than mere empirical observation. 
A descriptive study of the ethos of EWC identified the perceptions held and 
described common understandings within the ethos. Chapter Six offered a further 
explanatory approach which discerned those independent variables that can account 
for the findings of such descriptive studies. Empirical facts are relevant and 
purposeful for normative discussion. 
Of course this is not a well-used approach in sport philosophy. This is not how 
philosophy is commonly understood. It is argued, however, that this approach, by 
using data to achieve a grounded narrative, leads to a richer understanding of fair 
play. The reference point for fair play stems from the rules but is crucially examined 
from a context-specific and particular ethos. Fair play is partly constituted by the 
ethos, thus, comprehending the particularities of ethos is crucial to an understanding 
of fair play. As a result, the thesis provides more than just empirical generalisations. 
Rather, substance is given to the concepts of ethos and fair play and the precise 
meanings that are attached to fair play are made clearer. 
This methodological approach necessitates an examination of precise meanings in 
context. Theorised critical description of elite women's cricket, based partly in the 
voices of actors themselves, furnishes a thick account of fair play. In order to do this 
the researcher has to go and ask players what they think and feel about fair play. 
Such accounts can supplement previously theorised descriptions because the players 
have given rich information over and above what could have been achieved from a 
thin account. An inside vantage-point gets at how players perceive the rules; what 
notion of fair play is applicable within the context of the game; and which actions of 
an ethos are peripheral to the process. We may be informed by what people fail to 
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do, for example, not walking when they know they are out or unfairly stealing yards 
during the bowler's run-up. 
To reiterate, a normative study of fair play requires more than simply a collection of 
descriptive premises. Theorised critical description on interpretations of fair play 
allows researchers to examine those tacit norms at the very core of rules and ethos. 
The researcher gains access to the preconditions underpinning the sporting culture to 
come up with a normative analysis of fair play or exactly what does or does not 
count as an ethical ethos. The crucial part of the discussion now becomes how we 
decide who has the relevant experience to validate such claims of ethical or unethical 
conduct. So, if to understand practice we must be inside and critical, then we must 
start with the following questions: Where do the internal standards for games as 
practices come from? How do we get a critical edge? 
If we follow Roberts' (1997) line then the following is true: if only actors know the 
ethos, and if fair play is partly constituted by the ethos, then only actors can give an 
informed account of fair play. This, Roberts concludes, is vulgar ethnocentrism at its 
very worst where `anything goes. ' Not so. It is simply wrong to imply that only those 
within the practice can determine what shape an ethical ethos may take. Indeed, had 
a vulgar ethnocentric construction been presented here, then the ethos of EWC 
would have been deemed as ethically acceptable solely because the interviewees 
therein believed it to be so. A vulgar ethnocentric approach condones unethical 
actions simply because they constitute dominant beliefs. 
It is more felicitous to offer a Maclntyrean (1996) explanation here: that is, only 
those who have relevant experience of a practice are thereby competent judges of the 
practice. To become a competent judge one does not have to belong to the practice 
but to gain the relevant inside experience to be able to critique the practice. Whilst it 
may be the case that actors as `knowers' are able to give an informed account of fair 
play, this is not the only requirement for an immanent critique. We can use these 
accounts to occupy the position of a competent judge. It is not just about playing the 
game but understanding the traditions, internal goods, and roles of institutions within 
practices. We are to gain this knowledge from a wider background 
in sport 
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philosophy coupled with observing games and talking to elite women cricketers, 
coaches, and managers. 
In order to critique a practice reflectively, immanent criticism requires that we must 
evaluate both the internal and external standards of the practice. The internal 
standards of an ethos may be accepted by players but unethical; what is fair is not 
necessarily the same as ethical. An ethos can operate with fair agreements and at the 
same time be unethical. For example, players from both teams can agree to take 
bribes for fixing the results of matches. Such agreements can be arranged fairly 
where each player may receive `their fair share' of the money and yet such actions 
are unethical. The idea of ethos is not, therefore, coterminous with justice or fairness. 
The next section examines whether the ethos of EWC is ethically acceptable. Here, 
the critic must be able to gain distance from the practice whilst using balanced 
principled judgment within context. Attention is paid to both the internal goods of 
the practice and the fulfillment of those actions that serve to sustain them. Once we 
have established those goods we do not remain solely within in order to critique 
whether they are being adhered to. 
4 Ethical Ethos 
It has been argued, then, that an interpretation of the social context of games, based 
partly on a thick description of the actors themselves, must be incorporated within an 
analysis of fair play. Morgan (1995) suggests that: 
... the ethos tells us 
in explicit terms what we already know on an 
implicit level: namely, it tells us what social standards and norms we 
presently use to understand and judge the games we play and watch 
(p. 56). 
The game of cricket provides the opportunity for a moral climate to thrive where 
players can pursue the prelusory goal of the game. This climate must embrace an 
ethical ethos if fair play is to flourish. So what should fair play in cricket demand of 
a player? What should the descriptive content of an ethical ethos comprise and how 
can it be appraised? These are not purely philosophical questions but sociological 
ones as well. Such questions have provided the rationale for the descriptive part of 
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the thesis. We need to consider what counts as fair play when there are different 
interpretations of how the rules should be applied. How do we decide which 
interpretation ought to be favoured? How do we come up with criteria to evaluate 
different interpretations of rule violation? Such complex notions provide an 
argument for exploring a given ethos: what counts as meaningful performance in a 
sporting game concerns the context-respectful nature of the practice itself. Brown 
(1995) defines practices, like cricket, as complex social activities: 
We may suppose that they are typically organised in terms of sets of 
rules that make explicit their purposes and regulate the means 
acceptable for achieving those purposes ... They also tend to determine the goods or benefits to be achieved by the practice. In this 
sense such goods, such things deemed good to achieve by the practice, 
are internal to the practice itself (Brown, 1995, p. 240). 
We need to be able to ascertain exactly what the normative standards of a social 
practice are and where the critical appraisal of a social practice originates. 
Furthermore, a critical examination of an ethos must be able to evaluate whether a 
given ethos is ethical. What are the moral prescriptions we want to place on actions 
in sport? Who mitigates how we should behave in sport? What kind of sportspersons 
do we want to aspire to? Does the ethos of EWC instantiate fair play? What should 
we do when there is a choice to be made that is not logically explained by the rules, 
like walking? As Louden (1992) reiterates, "how do we meaningfully criticise moral 
practice outside of our community without appealing to principles that carry more- 
than-merely-parochial-weight (p. 128)? " Sufficient responses to such concerns are 
obviously complex. The question now is the way in which one can critically gain 
access to the moral issues under study. 
The starting point for such an examination originates within the practice itself. 
Cricket as a cultural construct embedded in a particular social and historical frame 
was examined to get at how fair play is legitimised through practice. The central 
premise when competing is to be able to achieve the internal goods of the game. 
They can only be achieved fairly and by those involved in this or that particular kind 
of practice (McNamee, 1997). As previously discussed, these are realised within the 
practice itself. They make up the experiential values of the game, including: the 
pleasure of hitting a ball; taking a catch; bowling a clean wicket; the excitement of a 
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tight finish; or the guile needed to strategically out think the opposition. External 
goods, on the other hand, can be attained from participation in a number of activities. 
They include, fame, prestige, money and medals (McNamee, 1997). Brown (1995) 
argues that these external goods may be in conflict with the internal goods of a 
practice. Other external goods, such as entertainment or education may not be. 
McNamee (1997) argues that for practitioners to attain the internal goods of a 
practice they must display a range of virtues. He states: 
The cheat may gain the prize, the wealth, the adoration but never the 
internal goods. Individuals become enjoined to others in a practice; 
they seek a common good in athletic excellence. To achieve this they 
must display commitment to understanding its ways, rituals, skills, 
history and to see the good of the practice as partially definitive of 
their own good (p. 29-30). 
An ethos gives meaning to those actions that are performed or suppressed according 
to the rules (formal and unwritten) of the game. An ethos informs players how a 
particular rule should be applied. It assigns meanings generally to actions within the 
context of the game as a whole. There are different alternatives that can be taken 
when playing a game and when a rule is to be applied in particular circumstances. 
The question remains how to determine which actions belong to an ethical ethos. If 
the internal goods of a practice are to be sustained then authoritative, respected 
`voices' of that practice must provide good reasons to behave in a certain way. Such 
good reasons are based on their experience and knowledge of traditions, practices, 
and institutions. Providing good reasons for conduct should help to sustain an 
ethical ethos if the interests of the internal goods of the game itself are valued. What 
actions are accepted and considered within the interests of the game will be 
constantly challenged, re-negotiated and re-worked depending on the ensuing 
context of the practice itself. 
The internal standards of acceptability, then, will stem partly from those social actors 
who hold a position of `authority' or dominance and are considered experts within 
the game. Authority here means `accorded respect' by those involved within the 
practice. They are respected performers or `moral experts' within the practice 
because of their knowledge about the game. Other practitioners respect their values 
and ideologies. Louden (1992) states: 
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Moral experts are persons of good moral character who, through 
experience, upbringing, exposure to older exemplars, and continuous 
reflection, have developed the requisite practical skills to know how 
to deliberate well about what is good for themselves and for their 
communities" (p. 13 7). 
Set standards are legitimised through the history and tradition of both the practice 
and the institution in an attempt to uphold the internal goods of the game. Practices 
weave together agents and settings through the understandings and articulations of 
those experts who organise and govern activities (Schatzki, 1997). Whether or not 
the ethos occupies an ethically justifiable position depends on whether the beliefs of 
those designated experts are based on good grounds. 
Loland (1998) argues that the question of whether a game or an ethos may be 
considered ethical can only be dealt with in practical discourse. The consequences of 
actual rule violations, which serve the development of the players' sense of fairness, 
must be examined. Loland (1998) argues that intentional rule violations must be 
rejected as part of an ethos of any sport. Here, Loland is referring to intentional 
formal rule violation. It would be more rigorous, however, to argue that both 
intentional formal rule and unwritten rule violations must be rejected as part of an 
ethos of any sport. 
An example of an unintentional rule violation is when the bowler oversteps the 
bowling crease on her run-up and bowls a no ball. This is where some part of the 
front foot whether grounded or raised was behind the popping crease (Law 24 (3), 
p. 30). An intentional rule violation, on the other hand, is to be considered as 
cheating. For example, taking drugs, tampering with the ball, or sledging. Loland 
(1998) argues that violations of formal playing rules can be ranked according to their 
increasing negative influence on degrees of fairness within a game. He states: 
1. Unintentional Rule Violations - unfair advantages are eliminated or 
compensated for. 
2. Unintentional rule violations - unfair advantages are not eliminated nor 
compensated for. 
3. Intentional rule violations - unfair advantages are eliminated or 
compensated for and additional penalty is imposed. 
4. Intentional rule violations - unfair advantages are eliminated or 
compensated for but no additional penalty is imposed. 
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5. Intentional rule violations - unfair advantages are not eliminated nor 
compensated for (and no additional penalty is imposed). 
(Loland, 1998, p. 90). 
The above hierarchy espouses that there are differing degrees of fairness when rules 
are broken. This has strong implications for the survival of an ethical ethos. The use 
of Immanent Critique as a methodology is able to provide the means for an ethical 
evaluation of a practice. By using the reflective examples of the interviewees it is 
possible to conduct an ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC enabling the 
researcher to show how judgements can be made on whether a given ethos may be 
considered ethical. In order to determine whether the ethos under study is ethical, six 
categories were examined. These emerged from the data and represent the relatively 
shared understandings of the social actors involved. We need to evaluate the content 
of each category. 
(1) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules; 
(2) Impermissible acts that break the formal rules; 
(3) Acceptable acts that break the formal rules; 
(4) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rule; 
(5) Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule; and 
(6) Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rule. 
4.1 Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules 
First, consider those acts which players deemed permissible and are in accordance 
with the formal rules of the game. For a game to be played at all both teams have to 
agree on a number of the formal playing rules of the contest. For example, that there 
are to be six balls in an over, eleven players in a team and so on. Moreover, if 
unintentional violations do occur then players agree that unfair advantages must be 
rectified. For example, when a bowler delivers a no-ball a `free' run is awarded (if 
no runs were scored) to the batting team and an extra ball is assigned to the over. 
This sets the initial standard of acceptability for the contest to be played where 
formal rules are accepted. Here we can see how theorists have attempted to use the 
idea of a social contract to explain the nature of fair play. Athletes must accept some 
of the formal conditions of the contract to ensure that competition can be played. 
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4.2 Impermissible acts that break the formal rules 
Next, players acknowledged that there are unacceptable acts that break the formal 
rules. Examples here included, abuse, physically assaulting an opponent, tampering 
with the ball, taking drugs to improve performance or fixing matches and accepting 
bribes. All of these acts were considered ethically unacceptable and irrelevant to the 
practice of EWC. There were no desires to break the formal rules in this way. 
It must be noted, however, that a small number of interviewees argued that if the 
opposition were to act unfairly then so would they. Gill and Alexander believed that 
the level of competition dictated whether ethical actions were upheld. Coaches may 
advise players to break the formal rules of the game when competing in a World Cup 
match. Furthermore, Rebecca argued that her views on ball tampering might change. 
Normative standards of excellence are those external standards that serve the 
interests of the game. They may be considered principled beliefs. Normative 
standards of acceptability are those internal standards that are adopted by members 
of the practice. They may or may not be principled beliefs. In this category, the 
dominant shared beliefs of EWC may be considered principled beliefs. They are 
based on good grounds that serve the interests of the practice. In other words, if the 
actions mentioned above were adopted they would corrupt the ethos of EWC and 
deny players the possibility of achieving the internal goods of the practice. 
Consequently, it can be argued that, at present, the ethos serves to sustain high 
ethical standards in this category. 
4.3 Acceptable acts that break the formal rules 
EWC considered sledging to be acceptable in terms of a formal rule violation. 
Although the interviewees did not feel that they were particularly good as a team at 
intimidating other opponents, they felt this was a necessary and accepted part of the 
game. Sledging was legitimised and given credibility under the pretext that it was a 
necessary component of a competitive attitude. It was seen as a skill that the national 
team of Australia had perfected and the English team needed to work on. The act of 
sledging can be placed on a continuum ranging from `light hearted banter' to the 
`aggressive intimidation' of a batter. It may be argued that those acts of sledging 
legitimised by the ethos of EWC are to be found on the side of `light hearted banter. ' 
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Nevertheless, the dominant shared beliefs on sledging cannot be considered as 
principled convictions. They are not based on good grounds. Attempting to 
intimidate members of the opposition using verbal abuse of any form is contra to 
maintaining a normative standard of excellence that serves the interests of the 
practice. 
Players considered it acceptable to break Law 42 (13): a formal rule concerning 
player conduct. This law states that players must not question umpires' decisions. 
The idea that the umpire's decision is final (or correct) is, however, less evident 
today than in previous years. Players do question specific decisions made by 
umpires. Denying the authority of the umpire will have a negative effect on the 
practice. We have witnessed similar concerns in other male sports recently, such as 
football and rugby. 
An ethically sound ethos has no room for intentional formal rule violations of this 
kind even if actions form part of all players' shared understandings. Consequently, it 
can be argued that the ethos does not promote high ethical standards in this category. 
4.4 Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rule 
This category forms an important part of determining where the internal standards 
for games as practices originate. It would have been impossible to comment here 
without gaining an inside view of the ethos. Players construct agreements as to how 
the unwritten rules of the game should be applied. Such examples provide rich 
opportunities to consider what happens when formal rules are not broken but shared 
norms or tacit understandings are. 
In the example of mankadding players believe that it is permissible to try to steal a 
few yards while the bowler is attempting her run up. Although, as we have seen, this 
is documented in the formal rules of the game, it is an unwritten rule that the bowler 
ought to warn a player before she puts her out of the game. Such an act is an 
accepted and frequent part of the international game. To take the bails off without 
warning a player would contravene this unwritten rule and would be viewed with 
disgust. The internal standards of acceptability are prescribed and perpetuated by the 
dominant beliefs of those in `authority. ' They sustain the practice of the unwritten 
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rule. At present, these beliefs are considered justified and represent the attitude that 
players value and respect. There were signs, however, that these norms were likely to 
be contested. For example, consider Rebecca's comments: 
P6R: 39 
... as a 
bowler if you catch someone Mankadding I think you 
should be able to stop in your run up and take the bails off and it's out 
and I don't believe in warning ... although that has been held in 
cricket as fair play cos it's fair play to warn and to not take the bails 
off and to pretend and say to the batsman, you're out of your crease 
and if you do that again then I'm going to take the bails off then she 's 
out and say to the umpire, look I've warned her. I don't believe in 
that. 
In the case of walking the dominant belief is no longer one that can be considered 
justified or principled belief. For example it used to be the case that not walking 
from the wicket when you knew you were out was cheating. The dominant belief in 
the ethos of contemporary EWC is somewhat different. The boundaries concerning 
standards of acceptability have been re-negotiated. Permissive rules do not carry 
much moral weight here: a player does not feel obliged to do anything she is not 
compelled to do by the formal playing rules of the game. To stand one's ground, 
show positive body language, and not walk is seen as an accepted part of the game. 
Players rationalise their decisions in a number of ways: to walk would undermine the 
umpire; nobody else walks; or it's inadvertently breaking the rules of the game but 
not really breaking the rules. Under the guise of professionalism and 
competitiveness, principled dominant, shared belief has become unprincipled 
dominant, shared belief. This does not serve the interests of the internal goods of the 
practice and, as a result, should be viewed as an unethical facet of the ethos of elite 
women's cricket. 
4.5 Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule 
Interviewees identified a number of acts that were unacceptable because they were 
considered to break the unwritten rules. Here we may also include the example cited 
previously of not warning a player in the mankadding illustration or distracting the 
bowler before she commences her run-up. Another example refers to the tacit 
agreement between batters when not to attempt to take a possible run. Here the 
internal standards of acceptability appear to sustain the interests of the game. They 
seem to be in line with the normative standards of excellence that are required to 
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sustain an ethical ethos. It is in the interests of the practice to uphold the unwritten 
rules. 
On closer examination of players' attitudes, however, it may be argued that the ethos 
of one-day cricket directs players to eschew some of the unwritten rules of the game. 
A tension became apparent between the one-day game and Test match cricket. The 
`winning is everything' attitude of the one-day game meant that players were more 
likely to break the unwritten rules. In the pressurised, competitive situation of the 
`fifty over thrash' players acknowledged that they would be less likely to uphold the 
unwritten rules of the game. Test match cricket was viewed, however, as less 
competitive because a draw is considered an acceptable result. The importance 
placed on the internal goods of the two types of game is different. The context and 
ethos of the particular type of game influenced whether players would behave 
ethically. It may be argued again that, under the added pressures of sponsorship, 
increased competition, and `professionalism, ' principled, dominant shared belief is in 
danger of becoming unprincipled, dominant shared belief. In the one-day game, as 
opposed to Test match cricket, there was a greater gap between the normative 
standards of excellence and the normative standards of acceptability. 
4.6 Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rule. 
This is a crucial category as it exemplifies that players intentionally break the 
unwritten rules of the game whilst knowing and believing that they should be 
adhered to. Players know what is right and `proper' conduct but they do not act in 
such a way. Here the ethos sanctions acts that break the unwritten rules. It is 
ethically wrong to prescribe adherence to the ethos of a game if that ethos accepts 
and perpetuates intentional violations of its unwritten rules. This is, of course, 
assuming the unwritten rules are ethical. 
An example here is the concept of excessive or aggressive appealing. The shared 
dominant view saw aggressive appealing as an accepted part of the game. The idea is 
to influence an umpire's decision based on the team's ability to make a convincing 
appeal. This skill is practised and used in the game situation. The justification for 
such an approach stemmed from the idea that, because other teams would `shout' for 
anything, then it was acceptable to do the same. 
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In this example, the normative standards of acceptability have been re-defined and 
are in conflict with the normative standards of excellence. We may argue that it is 
ethically unacceptable to appeal for a wicket when it is known that one's appeal is 
founded intentionally on breaking the unwritten rules. Elite women cricketers are not 
ignorant actors when they are breaking the rules in this situation. They have 
consciously practised how to appeal effectively whether they believe the batter is out 
or not. The appeal, whilst it may be unsuccessful in putting a player out of the game, 
will at least unsettle or intimidate. Players know what actions others may label as 
unfair but that they themselves consider to be acceptable within the ethos. Within the 
practice they gain an awareness of `what goes' and subsume what seems to be 
legitimate practice as internalised norms for fair play. 
Here, players do not act in the way that Schneider and Butcher (1998) propose; they 
do not contemplate whether an action they take would be good for the game as a 
whole. Agents do not typically view the world from an objective or impersonal 
standpoint thus, behaviour does not stem from the impersonal point of view 
(Sherwin, 1984). Players have definite ideas as to the way in which rules should be 
applied in particular circumstances. In some cases, this means that their ethos is 
ethically unacceptable. 
5 Summary 
The evaluation offered here concludes that the ethos of EWC is unethical. There are 
degrees, however, of ethical unacceptability. Standards of acceptability can be 
ranked according to their negative influence on the formal and informal rules of the 
practice. 
Formal Rules 
(1) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules 
(2) Impermissible acts that break the formal rules 
(3) Acceptable acts that break the formal rules 
It may be argued that the ethos of EWC retains a moderate standard of ethical 
acceptability within the formal rules of the game. Dominant shared beliefs, however, 
cannot always be considered as principled convictions. Here, the ethos directs 
players to accept most of the formal rules (1). The ethos did not sanction a number of 
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unethical acts that would break the formal rules (2). For example, violence, taking 
drugs, bribery and ball tampering were all considered unacceptable. Players 
considered a version of sledging and dissent to be acceptable acts that break the 
formal playing rules (3). 
Unwritten Rules 
(4) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rules 
(5) Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule 
(6) Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rules 
Mankadding and not walking were viewed as permissible acts in accordance with the 
unwritten rules (4). In the case of the former, the ethos directs players to adhere to 
the unwritten rule: the bowler must warn a player before she puts her out of the 
game. Rebecca's comments illustrated, however, that such politeness should not be 
awarded to a batter. Here we can see the initial signs of a potential re-negotiation of 
the unwritten rule and a lowering of the players' standards of ethical acceptability. 
The same may be said for the case of walking. No longer is the morally praiseworthy 
cricketer one that walks from the wicket when she knows she is out. Players deny 
their own autonomy in ethical decision making and are more likely to blame the 
umpire for not making the correct decision. 
Acts considered impermissible by players because they break the unwritten rule 
included talking before a bowler commenced her run-up, and taking a quick single 
when the opposition had misfielded the ball (5). The ethos directs players to observe 
the unwritten rules here. Consequently, high ethical standards are adopted in this 
category. It is argued that ethical standards are compromised when the ethos 
sanctions acts that break the unwritten rules of the practice (6). This indicates that 
traditional ethical facets of the ethos are eroding and leads to the conclusion that the 
ethos of EWC is unethical. The example considered here was excessive or 
aggressive appealing. 
In summary, this investigation argues that the internal standards of acceptability of 
the ethos of EWC are unethical. The internal goods of the game do not always serve 
as a driving force to sustain and promote an ethical ethos. Norms of fair play are not 
wholly adhered to. An ethically sound ethos has no room for intentional rule 
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violations (formal and unwritten) even if actions form part of players' shared 
understandings. For example, appealing for an edge that has missed the bat or 
sledging an opponent constitute intentional rule violations and, as a result, serve to 
sustain or promote an unethical ethos. 
It is important to note that this evaluation has inadvertently denied the position of a 
vulgar ethnocentric approach by rejecting a prevailing ethical climate based on 
dominant belief. Dominant belief has not been cited and accepted merely because it 
happens to be dominant, shared belief. Vulgar ethnocentrism argues that a game 
should be played the way those involved at the time think it should be played. It is 
argued here that players know what an ethical ethos should look like but sometimes 
refrain from acting in a way that would sustain it. In some instances what players say 
about fair play is laudable but is certainly not adhered to within the practice itself. 
Actions are often rationalised or sanctioned under the guise of the increasing 
pressure to be more competitive and 'professional'. This point illustrates Collett's 
(1977) claim that although rules may be espoused and valued by a community they 
are not always followed. He states: 
Just as the attitudes that subjects express to social psychologists may 
not always be those upon which they act, so too the rules that one 
might uncover concerning people's conceptions of appropriate 
behaviour need not be those that are followed in actuality (Collett, 
1977, p. 19). 
Normative standards of excellence are determined by reference to the formal playing 
rules of the game and their ethos (when ethical) as to what actions preserve good 
conduct in sporting games. The formal rules of the game offer the moral minimum. 
They lay the foundations for fair play. Crucially the role of an ethos comes into 
existence when interpretations are incorporated. Fair play, first and foremost, is 
about adhering to the rules of sport. It is tied up with notions of how the good game 
is to be contested and what an ethical ethos looks like. This means that for a given 
ethos to be ethical its game must be practised in a certain way and with a certain 
attitude. 
190 
It may be argued that the ethos of EWC offers players different notions, standards 
and uses of rules that they may or may not observe in deciding on a particular action. 
Whether a player adheres to an ethical ethos depends on her understanding of the 
situation (perception of the morally relevant features) and whether they are 
motivated to want to behave ethically. Hence, a number of criteria must be satisfied 
for a player to abide by the ethos of the game. First, they must be able to articulate 
and recognise the shared understandings of the practice. They also must be able to 
recognise what constitutes breaking those tacit agreements. Finally, players must 
recognise when a rule violation has occurred and which sanction is to be employed. 
Fair play must be present in order to achieve the internal goods of a contest; that is, 
in the production of a good sports contest. McNamee (1995) argues that, in order to 
sustain an ethical practice, we must find the proper balance between internal and 
external goods. He states: 
This will not be done by denying the place of external goods in those 
practices and in our lives but by ensuring their subordination to our 
prior commitments to the internal goods but by keeping them in their 
place (p. 78). 
If we want our young sportspeople to strive for an ethical ethos then we must teach 
the importance and value of abiding by both the formal playing rules and the 
unwritten rules of the game. This means that initiation into a practice must take into 
account the values espoused for an ethical ethos. Players should be taught not only 
the formal rules of the game but also how to keep the ethos of the game and respect 
the internal goods of that game. Supererogatory actions, that is, good actions over 
and above the rules are to be applauded. As Loland and McNamee (1999) argue: 
... a sense 
for the good game permeated by uncertainty of outcome 
and in which the participants perform and act according to the set 
standards of excellence of the game in which they take part. (Loland 
and McNamee, 1999, p. 24). 
Morgan spoke of the deliberative force of a practice community. This force endures 
only as long as the standards it prescribes are acceptable within the community. In 
EWC the practice community has now changed. The institution of EWC (WCA) has 
now merged with the institution of men's cricket (ECB). Thus, as we have already 
started to see, the ethical standards of acceptability will be re-negotiated. Further 
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research could be done to explore the effects that a change of institution on the 
sporting practice may have. 
6 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to develop a philosophical analysis of the ethos of 
sporting games considering: 
(a) how the ethos of EWC can be understood and interpreted; 
(b) how the ethos of EWC relates to fair play norms; 
(c) how the basic elements of ethos and fair play can be articulated 
and justified and; 
(d) how the above can be located in the context of a feminist 
understanding of sport. 
The accepted view of fair play is that games are rule-governed practices whereby the 
rules are thought to define the practice of game playing. Fair play should not only be 
thought of in a formal way. As we have seen in Chapter Six, we cannot get to the 
kind of rich detail required by looking at fair play solely as a formalist account. The 
rules of the game do not articulate the meaning and diversity of fair play. We must 
look to the ethos of sporting games to uncover more about fair play. 
The methodology employed has posed wider questions for the way in which we look 
at sporting practices in general. It has provided evidence to show that this is a 
legitimate way to analyse ethical dilemmas in sport. The mixed model approach in 
this thesis offers explanatory power when it comes to defining fair play as a thick 
concept. The examination of fair play sought to be less vague than previous accounts 
by attempting `to capture' the particulars and evaluate the moral perceptions of the 
social actors involved. Feminist approaches to fair play view morality from the 
ground up as a kind of social practice rather than from the top down as an expression 
of theory. This is a way to finding out about good sportspersonship. 
The context respectful approach, derived from the feminist ethical literature, can 
offer us an empirically informed theory. Part of what fair play means in sport is what 
those athletes and coaches involved think it means. Thus, a case is made for the 
proper recognition of `feminist ethics' and their encompassing epistemological 
standpoints. It is argued that a feminist understanding of ethical dilemmas within 
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sport will rely necessarily on an eclectic methodology that connects theories to 
experience. This thesis concludes that an approach that can maintain continuity with 
experience is better than the abstract universalism of positivist epistemology. As 
Held (1993) states: 
Feminist morality will develop its principles with awareness of the 
differences between the contexts for which such principles are 
deemed suitable and with attention to the moral experience of those 
actually in such contexts. It will be more open than theories which 
rely on a single, simple, universal moral principle that can be invoked 
for every moral problem (p. 40). 
It is important to stress that acknowledging the contextuality of fair play should not 
hamper the attempt to theorise the formal features of rules. This is a formalist 
account coupled with an instantiation of rules and the players' beliefs and actions 
within the practice. This does not mean that a vulgar ethnocentric approach must be 
adopted. If we fail to consult the people involved it is not possible to unmask those 
tacit agreements crucial to the concept of fair play. Therefore, to determine what fair 
play may look like in a given practice we must not only look to the formal rules of 
that practice but also, crucially, we must examine its ethos. Whilst fair play is about 
adhering to the rules of the game, its ethos, as a dynamic cultural code informs, 
creates and gives meaning to sporting practices. 
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Appendix One 
Interview Schedule for Coach/Player/Manager 
Background 
" What is your occupation? 
Who are your role models in sport generally? 
" Which cricketer/s do you admire the most and why? 
What makes a professional? 
" So, would you say that you are a professional? 
Can you describe the type of person who would not be suited for elite level cricket? 
" Do you think players from different regions have different attitudes? 
Fair Play 
What do you think fair play means? Can you describe an example? 
" Does everyone play fair? 
" Do you think that the England team has a fair play ideal? 
" Do other countries have the same ideal as England? 
" What does sportspersonship mean to you? 
Cheating 
What does it mean to cheat? 
" Do players always follow the laws of the game? 
" Is it okay to break the laws if opponents do? 
" Do players always accept their opponent's attitude during the game? 
" Do players always trust their competitors? 
" What actions do you think are not acceptable in the game? 
" Is there something in the game that you would never approve of doing? 
" If you knew your team could cheat, and get away with it, would you approve? Why? 
Laws 
Would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship? (If so, how? ) 
" Are there any unwritten laws of the game? 
What role does the umpire play in a game? 
" What status do you accord the umpire? 
Dress 
How do you feel about the team wearing trousers instead of clots? 
" Some people think that the traditional "whites" are old fashioned, what is your 
opinion? 
Game 
" Is there `more' fair play in cricket than in other sports? 
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" Do you think the game is becoming more competitive? 
" What makes a good cricket game? 
" Some people argue that the game will suffer if it favours limited overs matches rather 
than traditional declaration cricket? What is your opinion? 
What makes a good coach/player/manager? 
" Do you place pressure on your players to win? 
" Does the coach place pressure on you to win? 
What values are there for you in cricket? 
" Is there a "winning is everything" culture? 
" Has the psychology of the game changed over time? 
" What things, if any, would you say are the niceties of the game? 
" How has sponsorship affected the game? 
" How do you feel about the ECB and the WCA coming together? 
" Will it be a good thing? 
" What would you like to see happen in the future? 
Personal Experience 
" Describe what has been your best experience at the elite level so far ... 
" And your worst experience ... 
Can you think of a controversial incident that you have witnessed in your sport? 
" Describe what happened ... 
How do you feel about the following actions? 
" Sledging 
" Acting/Appealing for LBW 
" Not walking when you know you are out 
" Ball tampering 
" Slips clicking fingers 
" Appealing 
" Shouting 
" Gamesmanship 
Closure 
" Are there any other things you can think of which might be of relevance? 
" Thank the interviewee for his/her time, and finish. 
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